Brigade Orders with reference to the fresh assault were received immediately after the old. Already on April 15th, the plan of operations was to hand, and the intervening seventeen days was spent mainly in rehearsals. The order of advance from the right was the 185th Infantry Brigade (de Falbe), the 186th (Hill) in the centre, and the 187th (Taylor) on the left. Each Brigade had its definite objective, and they advanced to the attack side by side. The Third Army operated eastwards in the direction of Fontaine-les-Croisilles, with the 2nd Australian Division on the right. Tanks were to crawl up in sufficient numbers. The day was fixed for May 3rd. Zero hour was 3-45 a.m. Once more we may quote Major Watson[77] as to the part borne by the Tanks in this attack. ‘A costly failure,’ is his description of the day’s work. Major R. O. C. Ward, D.S.O., who was killed in the following November, was out with his Tanks in front, ‘but the Infantry could not follow,’ he complained. ‘Attack unsuccessful. Casualties heavy,’ is the bare statement in one of the Battalion diaries. Before consulting a more expansive authority, it will be interesting to examine the accompanying photograph of Hendecourt from the air. Above the village, we see the main road from Arras to Cambrai, which runs from north-east to south-west. Crossing that road, we see the switch trench-line from Drocourt to Quéant, which ran roughly, from north to south. The trenches guarding the village, Orix, Opal, Hop, Morden, are indicated on the face of the photograph, and are still more clearly displayed in the ground-plan sketch which we also reproduce (p. 133). Turning back now to May 3rd, we have the advantage of some notes by an Officer of the 62nd, who watched the opening barrage from the top of the railway embankment. It was an unforgettable sight. ‘Shells of all sizes screamed through the air, and bullets from our machine-guns sped towards the enemy lines. The noise was deafening and appalling. Then the Tanks went forward to do their part in the attack. Hundreds of Very lights and coloured signals were sent up by the enemy all along his line’; and to the careful watcher and time-keeper, these lights and signals brought evil tidings. For after two Companies of one Battalion of the 62nd should have been in the enemy second-line trench, ‘enemy lights were still sent up from that direction.’
We turn to a Company record. Take, for instance, B Company of the 2/5th West Ridings. They advanced steadily to the attack, and fought their way up the slope to the ridge on the left of Bullecourt. But they met very formidable opposition. Some think that the sound of the Tanks deploying in their assembly positions may have reached acute enemy ears; but, whether or not this was the case, and, on the whole, the evidence is against it, a devastating machine-gun fire and a terrific barrage of high explosive and shrapnel were suddenly opened on the advancing Company, while hidden concrete emplacements protected the enemy guns. The survivors gallantly rallied, and pressed on into the Hindenburg Line through a ‘tornado of bullets.’ Lieut. O. Walker was killed at this point, as he was charging at the head of his platoon, rifle in hand, through the German wire. Two enemy machine-guns were captured, and their crews killed by our bombers. Captain J. Walker, M.B.E., Commanding the Company, with a mere handful of men, still pushed on and forced a broken way to the next strong point of hidden emplacements. Here the little party held out for three awful days and nights. They had no water and only their iron rations, and they were bombed and shelled all the time. On the second day, the enemy tried to take them prisoners, but the attempt was repulsed. On the third day, when the position was blown in through our own Batteries having shortened range, this very brave Officer and his few surviving wounded men contrived to fight their way back through the German outpost line, in broad daylight and fired at from every side. A nine hours’ struggle brought them home ‘by a miracle.’[78] Bullecourt was still uncaptured, but its blood-soaked ridges and trenches had taught the Prussians the meaning of Yorkshire grit.
HENDECOURT FROM THE AIR.
The story may be repeated, if it is not clear enough, from the diaries of other Battalions. Take the 2/4th York and Lancasters, for example. It is a vivid narrative, which may be quoted almost verbatim:
By Zero hour on May 3rd, the men had marched on to the tape line, extended, and formed waves, as ordered, each man fixing his bayonet and lying down directly he got into his place. Just as the head of the 6th line came into its alignment, a shell burst close by, wounding Lt.-Col. Blacker, Commanding, and about six other Ranks. ‘Don’t mind me, get the lines out,’ was the gallant Officer’s order, which was instantly obeyed: though the shelling was heavy all the time, the operation was completed as if in a practice-attack. The Adjutant found the lines absolutely correct, and men lying close to shell-holes had in many instances refrained from taking cover for fear of spoiling their interval. It was this kind of spirit which beat the Germans, though they kept us out of Bullecourt on May 3rd. Colonel Blacker, with the assistance of his servant, returned to Battalion Headquarters, and Major Richardson arrived from Brigade to take over the Command of the Battalion. A rum-ration was served out at 3 a.m., and the first line advanced at Zero (3-45 a.m.) less eight minutes. In order to understand what followed, it must be borne in mind that there were 900 yards to be traversed before the first German trench was reached: 900 yards through the heavy smoke and dust of the barrage depicted above. To keep intervals, distance and direction was not an easy task even for the best-trained troops. Still, all was going well, till some confusion was caused by another unit crossing their front between the 4th and 5th lines. These troops were ordered to withdraw and re-form, but the order was mistaken by about 70 men of the right rear Company of the invaded Battalion. They thought it was addressed to them, and withdrew, accordingly, to the railway embankment. The rest, steadily led, despite the mixture of units, pushed on to the first German trench, but the waves had lost their formation before the second line was reached. Major Richardson was killed in a courageous attempt to find out exactly what was happening, and, later, Brigade orders arrived to parade all available personnel for a second attack in two lines. It ended miserably in shell-holes, which afforded insufficient protection from casualties out of proportion to the result, and about 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the long day the order came to retire to the railway cutting. The 7th Division relieved the 62nd.
We need not multiply the records. ‘The attacking troops eventually withdrew to the railway cutting’; ‘finally forced to retire about 11-30 a.m. on the railway embankment’; these entries and entries like these recur with maddening iteration in the narratives of the units on this date, and the loss of life was terribly high. But Bullecourt fell in the end. Ten men had been left in the coveted village by troops which had reached it on May 3rd, but had fallen back from all but its fringes, and these ten men were rescued on May 8th. Day by day, the stubborn fight was waged, with attack and counter-attack of intense ferocity and varying fortune, till at last, on May 17th and following days, Territorial Troops of the County of London and the West Riding drove out the last remnants of the German garrison from their last stronghold in front of Quéant. Let Sir Douglas Haig tell the tale of these successes, which brought to a victorious close the series of fighting known as the Battle of Arras:
‘At 3-45 a.m. on the 3rd May, another attack was undertaken by us.... While the Third and First Armies attacked from Fontaine-les-Croisilles to Fresnoy, the Fifth Army launched a second attack upon the Hindenburg Line in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt. This gave a total front of over sixteen miles. Along practically the whole of this front our troops broke into the enemy’s positions.... To secure the footing gained by the Australians in the Hindenburg Line on the 3rd May, it was advisable that Bullecourt should be captured without loss of time. During the fortnight following our attack, fighting for the possession of this village went on unceasingly.... On the morning of the 7th May, English troops (7th Division, Major-General T. H. Shoubridge) gained a footing in the south-east corner of Bullecourt. Thereafter gradual progress was made, in the face of the most obstinate resistance, and on the 17th May, London and West Riding Territorials[79] completed the capture of the village.... On the 20th May fighting was commenced by the 33rd Division (Major-General R. J. Pinney) for the sector of the Hindenburg Line lying between Bullecourt and our front-line west of Fontaine-les-Croisilles. Steady progress was made until by the 16th June touch had been established by us between these two points.’[80]
COLISEUM MADE OUT OF A GERMAN CRATER.