(4) A total disregard to danger and devotion to duty was shown by a Private, while acting as Stretcher-Bearer during the attack on the Hindenburg Support system near Graincourt. He dressed wounds and got back casualties during the whole day under machine-gun fire, and went out alone next day and brought in a badly wounded man from the front of the forward line, thereby undoubtedly saving a life.
(5) A Non-Commissioned Officer showed great bravery and initiative during the attack on the Hindenburg Support Line. When the Company was temporarily held up by enemy machine-gun fire both flanks, he took out a Lewis-gun to the left flank of the Company, and, though under continuous and heavy fire, engaged the enemy machine-gun with direct fire, and thus enabled the Company to advance.
(6) A Non-Commissioned Officer displayed courage and initiative during the attacks between Anneux and Bourlon Wood. He was in charge of a Lewis-gun team on the right flank of his Company. Heavy casualties were being caused by a party of the enemy firing from the direction of Anneux. Without waiting for orders, the N.C.O. crept forward under rifle and machine-gun fire to a commanding position, and opened fire with his Lewis-gun on the enemy, killing several and dispersing the rest of the party.
(7) A Non-Commissioned Officer displayed conspicuous bravery during the attack on the Hindenburg Support Line and Hughes Switch. A hostile Trench Mortar was in action from a point slightly in advance of Hughes Switch. This N.C.O. rushed forward and bayoneted the men in charge of the Trench Mortar, and took prisoners an officer and eight men who emerged from a dug-out close at hand.
These seven examples, casually selected from the records of fighting in the opening phase of the Battle of Cambrai, illustrate what General Braithwaite meant when he wrote (November 24th) of his ‘implicit confidence’ in the Division. They illustrate, too, what Sir Douglas Haig meant when he wrote that it was ‘reasonable to hope’ that his operations at Cambrai would be successful. For success and confidence in war depend in the ultimate resort on how the soldier obeys orders. The runner who takes messages under fire is an essential link between his Company Commander and Divisional and Army Headquarters. The man who frustrates a turning movement, or who enables his Company to advance, helps directly to bring the issue into accordance with the plan of operation, and, in this regard, these few typical examples are worth more than a chapter of battle stories, as the spirit is worth more than the letter.
IV.—BATTLE OF CAMBRAI (SECOND PHASE).
We turn back at this point to the main narrative.
The 62nd Division, as we saw, was withdrawn during the night of 22nd/23rd November, and was relieved by the 40th. This relief proved of short duration. November 24th, the day of the Special Order, was spent in necessary re-organization, but shortly before midnight on that day, after barely thirty-six hours’ pause, Corps orders were received, that the 62nd were to relieve the 40th during the following evening.
We have the advantage of an impression of that day (November 24th, 1917)—an impression from without, as it were—from the private diary of Major-General the Earl of Scarbrough, at that time, it will be remembered, Director-General of the Territorial and Volunteer Forces, and still Chairman of the West Riding Territorial Force Association. In the company of General Mends and Captain Atkinson-Clark, the Director-General was paying a visit to his County Divisions at the Front. He had lunched on the 23rd at Ypres, with Major-General Cameron, Commanding the 49th Division, in a dug-out just inside the walls. The Division were then in the line, with one Brigade (the West Yorkshires) in reserve, and Lord Scarbrough had visited their camp, and seen their Commanding Officers, who were ‘living in a sea of mud.’ At 8 a.m. on Saturday, the 24th, the visitors left the Second Army, travelled by motor-car through Bapaume, and, passing over a part of the Somme battlefield, where ‘every village had been shelled out of existence,’ reached the operation area of the Third Army. Thus, the Chairman and other Officers of the Association enjoyed the unique experience of taking lunch with Major-General Braithwaite, Commanding the 62nd Division, on the day following their visit to the Headquarters of the 49th. Lord Scarbrough notes that the G.O.C. was ‘immensely pleased’ with the work of his Division, and that Sir Douglas Haig had visited the General and thanked him for their ‘remarkable success.’ Though the Division only came out the day before, after three heavy days’ fighting, and were naturally ‘dog-tired,’ they had just been called upon to be ready to send a Brigade back into the line at half-an-hour’s notice. The enemy had begun a heavy counter-attack on Bourlon Wood, ‘which was the key of his position, and which dominated the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, the main road of supply for his troops in the line further north.’ The 40th Division, the visitors heard, were reported to be having a bad time, as the German Artillery had been reinforced, and a Division brought from the Russian front had been thrown into the line. These notes, written at the time, are exactly confirmed by the records prepared more carefully later on when all the available facts had been ascertained.
If we look at a map once more, we observe that the wider swing-round on the eastern portion of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road had been held up at Crèvecoeur and Rumilly. The consequence was (the causes were uncontrollable, and concern the historian of other Divisions) to increase the German pressure on Bourlon Wood and on the village beyond. The 40th Division had attacked and captured the greater part of these positions during November 23rd, but by reinforcements and counter-attacks the enemy had succeeded in reversing these successes. Orders were issued, accordingly, for the 62nd Division, less the Artillery and R.E., to relieve the 40th Division, less the Artillery, R.E., and Pioneer Battalion, in the Bourlon Section of the line, with the 186th Infantry Brigade on the right, the 187th on the left and the 185th in Divisional Reserve; the Headquarters of the two leading Brigades being located at Graincourt. The relief was carried out without incident, except for a considerable amount of shelling, which caused some casualties in the 186th Brigade. Next day (November 26th) there was a Corps Conference at Divisional Headquarters, where, after long discussion, it was decided that the Guards and the 62nd should attack the following morning with the assistance of Tanks, in order to capture Fontaine and the remainder of Bourlon Wood and Village. The night of the 26th was very cold, with a blizzard blowing of snow and sleet. Zero-hour next morning was fixed for 6-20 a.m. The Tanks, of which 20 were available (16 being allotted to the 187th Infantry Brigade for the capture of Bourlon Village), reached their rendezvous punctually at 2 a.m., and the Infantry were all in position fifty minutes before Zero-hour. A projected bombardment of the village during the day of the 26th was not proceeded with, since three Companies of the Highland Light Infantry (40th Division) were missing, and it was thought that they might still be holding out in Bourlon. Coming now to Zero-hour on the 27th, and observing that, about 10 a.m., Brigadier-General Taylor, Commanding the 187th Brigade, reported that his attack had been unsuccessful and that his troops, which had entered Bourlon, had been compelled under heavy fire to retire, we may enumerate at least four causes which contributed to this comparative failure. The first was darkness and mud: the men, and their rifles and Lewis guns, were covered with mud from the start, and every man in the Brigade was chilled by his long exposure to the driving snow. Secondly, there were strong points south of Bourlon, which, owing to heavy machine-gun fire, had not been dealt with by the Tanks. Thirdly, the village barricades likewise opposed the Tank advance; and, fourthly, in and beyond Bourlon, the enemy were able to bring to bear very effective machine-gun fire. Or we may quote, in illustration of these obstacles, the experience of a Company Officer, from Zero-hour 6-20 a.m., to the time, a few hours later, when he, like so many others, became a casualty: