Feeling nettled, although not in command of Company B, and not responsible for its behavior, at Colonel Jewett's brusque manner towards it in the ravine, when it was discovered that the flank movement before mentioned, would be a failure for want of support, in order to say I had been the furtherest to the front of anyone over the fence or in the regiment, I foolishly ran forward under heavy fire a few steps after ordered back, to a big stump, hit it with my sword savagely, as I was disgusted at not being fully supported, when on turning round I found myself alone with bullets flying about me faster than ever, and the men rapidly scaling the fence twenty-five yards in rear on the left in full retreat from the angle. The men of Company B had gone the furtherest ahead of any over the fence, Stetson and others repeatedly calling, "Come back! Come back!" As usual, whenever there was an exceedingly hot place on the line of battle in our front, Alexander Scott, A. H. Crown and others of the Burlington Company (D), as well as Z. M. Mansur, the Bruces, W. H. Blake, Judson Spofferd, J. W. Bancroft and others of Company K, were sure to be there fighting vigorously in the very front, as most of them were on this occasion. Fully forty or more men were with me from the three left companies, and it is regretted more of them can't be remembered by name, but the movement was too quickly executed, to go minutely into details, and forty years is a long time for a professional soldier where he has had to do with so many enlisted men meantime, to remember names.
Says General W. H. Morris in his official report of this battle which as a whole is not in the best judgment, although he was a brave, courageous man: "The enemy was holding a fence on the crest of a hill in our front. I ordered the Tenth Vermont to charge and take it, and the regiment advanced in gallant style and took the crest. The left wing in its enthusiasm having advanced too far beyond the fence, it was necessary to recall it * * * I cannot speak of the conduct of the officers and men with too much praise." The regiment's loss was seventy-one killed and wounded, of which eight were from Company B. This loss was as needless as the fight, as we suspected at the time, and as history has proved since.
Like most other engagements the most deserving who are generally on the fighting line where their work is not usually seen by such as can reward them in orders or otherwise, it was favorite staff officers and pets who were mentioned for gallantry in general orders afterwards. Had the men advanced less regularly in line as at drill, more independently and rapidly, firing meantime when in range of the enemy, our loss in comparison with what it was would have been insignificant. All the rest of the brigade had a less trying time of it than the three left companies of the Tenth Vermont, as they were advancing through the woods with no open field in front with two natural lines of breastworks, such as the formidable rail fences which bordered both long sides of the triangle before mentioned. This statement is in justice to the three left companies of the Tenth Vermont. The manner in which they stood the galling fire without breaking shows what splendid discipline they were under. I commanded all three companies afterwards in battle separately, and felt honored in doing so. There were few skulkers in these companies in any battle they were ever in when under my command.
This battle is another illustration of the folly of appointing men inexperienced in scientific warfare to high military office if it can be avoided, and it generally can be in time of peace, especially in the regular army. Every army, Corps, Division, Brigade and Regimental Commander, should be a man who has had enough actual experience in fighting to know how to take care of his men in battle. If such had been the case in this fight, comparatively few men would have been killed or wounded. It is criminal to make any man a general, especially in the regular army, who has not had enough experience in actual fighting to know how to fight his command without an unnecessary loss of life; and Congress which has the authority and is indirectly responsible in such matters, should make laws such as will render it impossible to do so except in emergencies, and until it does so every individual member of Congress will be criminally guilty before God for every man so sacrificed in battle. It is not known to me whose fault it was that orders were not given to advance more rapidly, and to fire sooner in the fight at Locust Grove.
[ADDENDA NO. 2.]
The Battle of Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864. and the Status of the Sixth Corps with Generals Grant and Sheridan.
I was absent wounded in Vermont at the time of the battle of Cedar Creek, Va., and only know that my regiment fought desperately and lost heavily in killed and wounded. Captain Lucian D. Thompson of Waterbury, Vt., was decapitated by a solid shot from the enemy and Captain Chester F. Nye, Adjutant Wyllys Lyman and Lieutenants George E. Davis, B. Brooks Clark, Austin W. Fuller and George P. Welch were wounded. From June 1st to October 19, 1864, we had seven officers killed which included all the officers who originally went out with my old Company B, twelve wounded and two captured, making twenty-one in all. Surely, the blood shed in the Tenth Vermont for the preservation of the Union should satisfy the most exacting that the regiment stood up to the rack all through the Civil War from the time it entered it.
After the morning surprise at Cedar Creek, Oct. 19, 1864, just a month after the battle of Winchester, the Sixth Corps, I was told by officers of my regiment afterwards, was the only unstampeded infantry organization in the command around which General H. G. Wright soon rallied the better part of the surprised little army which Sheridan, after his historic ride of "Twenty Miles Away" from Winchester, found awaiting him ready to advance and again punish the enemy which it most effectually did. It was the last fight in the valley of the Civil War, and it was fitting that the Sixth Corps should have been allowed so largely to have so brilliantly rung down the curtain on the great Civil War stage in this section. The Sixth Corps was the mainstay of Sheridan's brilliant little army in the Shenandoah Valley campaign, and no one knew it better than he. When the spring campaign opened in 1865, he wanted it at Five Forks again, but Grant wanted it, too, at the same time to break the backbone of the Confederacy by breaking its lines in front of Petersburg on that memorable morning of April 2nd, 1865, which was the greatest possible honor of the day, and it did it. When given his choice by Grant of any corps in the army of the Potomac, Sheridan again called for it, too, a few days later, April 6, 1865, at Sailor's Creek, Va., the last real battle fought in the Civil War by the Army of the Potomac, when the Sixth Corps was rushed forward by Grant's order at pell-mell speed, where in another of Sheridan's characteristic, snappy, short, effective, two-hour fights, it largely helped to capture several—said to be eleven—general officers, 13,000[37] prisoners and a burning wagon train, almost an entire column, excepting about 2,000 of General Lee's fleeing veterans, including himself, three days before his surrender at Appomattox. It was fitting, too, here, that the Sixth Corps should largely fight this battle and thus again brilliantly and virtually finally ring down the stage curtain of the greatest war tragedy of modern times—The Great Civil War.
Surely with all the brag and conceit in late years by members of other corps, that its corps was the best in the Army of the Potomac—and the Second as well as the Fifth were fine corps, and probably both these and the Sixth Corps were about equal—neither Grant nor Sheridan could have regarded the Sixth as an unreliable one, or second to any as a fighting corps however often members of other corps may conceitedly dub theirs the best in the army. And what other than the Sixth Corps can point to any such enviable repeated preferences on the part of both Grant and Sheridan, or to such a proud record in the closing scenes of the great rebellion? Would they not be glad to do so if they could? And still neither of the able commanders of the Sixth Corps—Sedgwick and Wright—have been honored by an appropriation for a monument by Congress in the capital city of the Nation which the Sixth Corps twice saved, once at the battle of the Monocacy, largely by the Third Division, July 9th, and again three days later largely by the First and Second Divisions at the battle in front of Ft. Stevens in the suburbs of Washington, July 12th, 1864, when Early came so near capturing the city.