A short history of Belgium

by Léon van der Essen

It was in vain that Count Philip of Alsace sought to win the support of the German Emperor. Having failed on this side, he turned to England for help against the threatening policy of his overlord. This was a highly important event (1187), for from that time on it became the constant policy of Flanders to keep England as an ally against France.

When Philip of Alsace died suddenly during the siege of Saint Jean d’Acre by the Crusaders, June 1, 1191, Philip August regarded this as a favorable opportunity to annex the county. He was prevented from doing so, however, by the action of the Count of Hainaut, Baldwin V, brother-in-law of the late Flemish count, who invaded Flanders and succeeded in bringing about the political union of the two counties. The county of Artois, however, refused to enter the union, and returned to Philip August. The latter hoped that, as Baldwin V (IX in Flanders) had only two daughters as his heirs, it would be easy to dispose of a strong political influence in the country after the death of Baldwin. Accordingly he brought about the marriage of Jeanne of Flanders, the eldest daughter of Baldwin,[13] to one of his creatures, Ferrand of Portugal. Henceforth he considered that Flanders would be in his hands. Subsequent events, however, were to prove his mistake.

When Count Ferrand arrived in Flanders he was met by the action of a strong feudal party, secretly supported by the subsidies of Philip August. He tried to escape the threatening French influence and, following the policy of his predecessors, appealed to England for help. Now began a fierce struggle between French and English gold for influence in the country. Moderately financed by England, the partisans of the latter became stronger every day. Finally Count Ferrand took a decided stand, repudiated his allegiance to his overlord, and openly accepted the English alliance. Just at this time a vast coalition had been organized against the French king by John I of England, Emperor Otto of Brunswick, and Henry I, Duke of Brabant, with whom Ferrand of Flanders joined. On July 27, 1214, the battle of Bouvines was fought. The allies were defeated by Philip August; Count Ferrand of Flanders fell into the hands of his feudal lord, and was imprisoned at Paris.

The victory of Bouvines established the political hegemony of France in Europe and the subjection of Flanders. The former policy of balance was no longer possible for the Belgian princes. In face of the overwhelming power of the French King, there remained nothing but submission. From the date of the battle of Bouvines to the beginning of the fourteenth century Flanders was subject to the political and intellectual domination of its strong neighbor.

The other Belgian principalities likewise shared the ambition to win the friendship of the French King. From now on the French monarchs found no occasion for armed interference with the Belgian princes. Diplomacy met all needs, and agents from Paris, often shrewd Italians, brought to the heads of the Belgian principalities the wishes—and orders—of their master.

Only one Belgian prince, the Duke of Brabant, resisted the French influence. Since the former duchy of Lotharingia, at the beginning of the twelfth century, had been broken up into many parts, Brabant became the leading power in the central part of Belgium. The house of the dukes of Brabant was indeed the only dynasty that could boast of its national origin; the other Belgian principalities all fell, during the thirteenth century, into the hands of new and foreign families. The dynasty of Brabant was thus exceedingly popular; it won the affection of the noblemen and of the communes, and the person of the duke was the object of real national affection. Moreover, the policy of the dukes was positive and practical, and, above all, paid due regard to the interests of their subjects. One of the main principles of this policy was the conquest of the commercial highroad between the Rhine and the sea, upon which the economic prosperity of Brabant depended.

As the principality of Liège and the county of Limburg blocked the road to the east, controlling all traffic between the Rhine and Bruges, after the reign of Henry I (1190) the dukes of Brabant turned their eyes in this direction. The war with Liège in Henry’s time was not very successful. During the thirteenth century, therefore, the dukes sought to overpower Liège by a resort to diplomacy. As the bishop-prince of Liège was engaged in a continuous struggle against the communes, the dukes of Brabant sometimes supported the bishop against the burgesses, sometimes helped the latter against their lord, according to the needs of the moment.

Ever since 1283, when the Countess Ermengard of Limburg died without heirs, the dukes had cast covetous eyes on Limburg. Many pretenders, including several princes from the left bank of the Rhine, had sprung up. Duke John I of Brabant decided to strike the final blow against the coalition formed against him by the lords of Fauquemont, the Count of Luxemburg, Renaud of Gueldre, and the mighty Archbishop of Cologne. The coming battle would decide to whom should belong the supremacy between the Rhine and the Meuse. By skilful diplomacy, Duke John succeeded in preventing the Count of Flanders and the Bishop of Liège from allying themselves with his enemies. On June 5, 1288, the armies met at Worringen, on the Rhine. The battle lasted a whole day with terrific onslaughts. The army of Brabant, composed of the knights of the duchy, and the communal infantry from Louvain, Brussels, Antwerp, Tirlemont, Jodoigne, and Nivelles, although inferior in numbers to the foe, won a complete victory by the superiority of its tactics. It was a rout for Duke John’s enemies. Twelve hundred of them fell on the battlefield, and both the Archbishop of Cologne and the Count of Gueldre were made prisoners, the Count of Luxemburg and his brothers being numbered among the slain. By sunset, the remainder of the enemy was in full flight and the trumpets of Brabant gaily proclaimed the victory.

The victory of Worringen had far-reaching consequences. It sealed the political decline of the archbishops of Cologne, who thenceforth interfered no more in Belgian affairs; Limburg was annexed by Brabant, and the latter extended its authority over the east of Lotharingia. The dukes now controlled the commercial road between Germany and the sea, and commanded the course of the Meuse, and since their sway encircled the principality of Liège, no further danger was to be feared in this quarter. The German Emperor made no protest against the annexation of Limburg, although it was actually territory of the Empire. It was now perfectly clear that the influence of Germany in Eastern Belgium had come to an end.

This fact encouraged the kings of France to seek to occupy in Belgian affairs the place formerly occupied by Germany. But although the dukes of Brabant maintained peaceful relations with France, they had no wish to become simply the instruments of French politics. They resisted every attempt at domination. Henceforth Brabant, thanks to its spirit of independence, the strong and able diplomacy of its rulers, and the growing spirit of patriotism that characterized its people, became more and more the bulwark of Belgian liberty. It will be found hereafter as the very center of resistance to every attempt at foreign domination, and, in the sixteenth century, it was the States of Brabant which led the struggle against the tyranny of Spain.