A short history of Belgium

by Léon van der Essen

The scheme of erecting new dioceses had been conceived by the King in 1559, in order to counteract more strongly the propaganda of Protestantism. The existing mediaeval dioceses were too large to enable the bishops to carry out their mission as guardians of the faith. It was necessary, therefore, that the old dioceses be broken up and divided into smaller ones, so that the bishops would have more opportunity for action in smaller areas. The Pope consented, and permitted the erection of thirteen new dioceses. From an ecclesiastical point of view the country was now divided as follows: the archbishopric of Malines, with the suffragan dioceses, Antwerp, Bois-le-Duc, Ghent, Ypres, Bruges, Ruremonde; the archbishopric of Cambrai, with the suffragans, Arras, Tournai, Namur, Saint-Omer; the archbishopric of Utrecht, with the suffragans, Haerlem, Deventer, Leeuwarden, Middelburg, Groninge. The scheme stirred up violent opposition among the Belgian nobles, the abbots, some of the bishops, and even among the common people. The nobles feared the loss of their political influence through the admission of so many bishops into the States-General, where they would occupy leading positions. Many of the abbots were resentful because their monasteries would be compelled to contribute to the new bishops a part of their income, in support of the new dioceses. Some of the bishops were angered over the division of their former dioceses and the reduction of their spiritual power. The people, influenced by political agents and Protestant propagandists, were led to believe that each new bishop would simply be a representative of the Spanish Inquisition.

The movement of opposition would have been easily repressed by the Belgian nobles had they really been faithful to the King. But, on the whole, they were not. They had the same feelings as the French aristocracy at this time. They were horrified at the idea of the supremacy of the sovereign power. Although not possessing any definite aim, they tried to dominate the Prince and the state by means of the political power they themselves controlled. They were members of the Council of State, governors of the different Belgian provinces, captains in the national army, the famous bandes d’ordonnance, and they exercised a tremendous influence on all classes. The political difficulties encountered by the government were for them but favorable opportunities of which to take advantage. The King himself afforded them a chance. With characteristic disregard for the national privileges, he established at Brussels a council called the Consulta, an institution of true Spanish type. Composed of a few individuals, it was dominated by the influence of Cardinal de Granvelle, and undertook to decide the most important questions of national policy. The Consulta stirred up an opposition of formidable character, guided by the most influential Belgian nobles, the Prince of Orange and the counts of Egmont and Horn. Cardinal de Granvelle became the victim of the most violent attacks. Margareta of Parma first sought to defend him, but, little by little, influenced by the nobles, she finally ranged herself on their side and herself requested the King to recall the unsympathetic minister. Partly through weariness, partly through political miscalculation, Philip II yielded. Granvelle left the Netherlands.

This was a triumph for the opposition. Margareta, who had been moved by jealousy of Granvelle and who had hoped to add materially to her power after his departure, fell more and more under the control of the nobles, who flattered her and took advantage of her feminine vanity. A reign of anarchy and favoritism followed, the friends of the nobles being furnished with offices and perquisites. The political opponents of the King now tried to consolidate and to perpetuate their success. They asked that all affairs be subject to the control of the Council of State, the real national body of which they themselves were the masters; that he should convoke the States-General, and that he should temper the placarts against the heretics and abolish the power of the Inquisitors. The granting of the first of these demands would have made the nobles all-powerful in political affairs. From the second measure—the meeting of the States-General—they expected ratification of their conduct and popular support of the opposition they had inaugurated. In dealing with the question of the placarts, they played a sort of religious policy calculated to bring them the support of the Lutherans and the Calvinists.

Philip II rejected their demands. Astonished by this resistance, which they did not expect after the capitulation of the King on the question of Granvelle, some of the Belgian nobles, and especially the Prince of Orange, succeeded in embroiling the Protestant sectarians in the struggle. The Calvinists, more warlike than the Lutherans, were more than ready to join the movement, owing to their hatred of the Catholic King of Spain. But, once begun, the movement became an irresistible one. Stirred up by their preachers and assisted by the worst elements of the populace, the Calvinists invaded the churches, smashed the statues of the saints, carried away the treasures, attacked the convents, and killed monks and priests (1566). The Belgian nobles, surprised by the revolt they had so imprudently initiated, were unable to stop it; rather they were submerged by the current. From this time onward the political anti-Spanish movement became a part of the general movement of the wars of religion. Many Catholics foresaw what would happen and deserted the cause, separating themselves from a revolt that was being directed as much against the church as against Spanish rule.

From the revolt of 1566 and the outrages of the sectarians resulted the later policy of Philip II toward the Netherlands. Hitherto he had but followed the traditional policy of his father, Emperor Charles. He had showed respect for political institutions; he had avoided any cause of rupture. He had tried, of course unwillingly and unskilfully, to satisfy public opinion. His patience brought him nothing but a serious check. He had recalled, in 1561, the Spanish garrisons which had been quartered in Belgium during the war with France; he had sacrificed his loyal minister Granvelle and had capitulated to the nobles. But the more he showed himself to be conciliatory the more audacious became the opposition. This was at first purely political and aimed only at the reconstruction of the Burgundian state as against the Spanish state; later, it had dared to claim liberty of conscience, an unheard-of thing at this period; finally, it had favored the Calvinistic agitation and had caused the desecration of convents and churches.

When the news of this outrage reached the King, he angrily exclaimed: “By the soul of my father, for these crimes they shall pay a heavy price.” In the eyes of Philip II, official protector of Catholicism, both the royal and the divine majesty had been insulted, and the claim for autonomy had but aggravated the triumph of heresy. His rebellious subjects were to be chastised. He would impose political absolutism upon them as well as the religious control that prevailed in Spain. The iron rule he intended to introduce would preserve for the church and for himself those countries which were the cornerstones of his world-power.

From now on we may speak of the “Spanish rule.” The traditionally lax policy of Emperor Charles was gone. The tyranny of Spain was destined to crush the Belgians. That task was intrusted to the Duke of Alva, who came to Belgium as governor in 1567. Don Luis Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alva and Marquess of Soria, was a cold and implacable warrior. The greatness of his king was for him the greatness of Spain. He hated the Belgians, who had dared to ask for liberty of conscience, as much as he hated the heretics. He accomplished his terrible mission unwaveringly and remorselessly; his method of government was terror. Accustomed to fight the Moslem Moors of Spain, he knew only two weapons with which to crush the heretics—the sword and the stake. He wrote in one of his letters: “It is infinitely better to keep, by means of war, for God and for the King, an impoverished and even ruined country, than to keep it, without war, undamaged, for the devil and his partisans, the heretics.”

Such was the terrible warrior to whom Philip II intrusted a double task: to chastise the rebels and heretics and to subject the nation to the rule of Madrid. Alva arrived in Belgium with a large number of the best Spanish troops. Contrary to all customs in the free Netherlands, they were billeted in the cities. A fortress was ordered built at Antwerp. The counts of Egmont and Horn and the burgomaster of Antwerp were treacherously arrested and imprisoned. But the real leader of the opposition, the Prince of Orange, could not be taken. More clear-sighted than his friends, he had fled to Holland before the coming vengeance. In defiance of all national privileges, Alva established an extraordinary tribunal, which the people soon called the “Council of Blood”; that court of justice, established and conducted in a thoroughly revolutionary manner, condemned scores of people who were more or less guilty of revolt against the King. About two thousand victims were sentenced to death and executed. Only political crimes were taken into account, and the condemnation was followed by the confiscation of property—a remarkably remunerative operation for the Spanish treasure chest. Terror fell upon the Belgians. All who had engaged in the slightest degree in the revolt of 1566 fled to foreign countries; Lutherans and Calvinists, panic-stricken, left the Netherlands in large numbers.

Meanwhile the Prince of Orange had sought for help among the German Protestant princes; he gathered an army and invaded Belgium. He had expected a general revolt of the people against Alva at the first news of his campaign. But the soldiers of his army, merely hirelings, and many of them fanatical Protestants, pillaged churches and convents on their way; they disgusted the naturally religious populace of Belgium, and the campaign of William the Silent proved a complete failure. The prince was compelled to seek refuge in France, where he hoped to get help from Coligny and the French Huguenots.