International Language and Science / Considerations on the Introduction of an International Language into Science

by Leopold Pfaundler von Hadermur; Louis Couturat; Otto Jespersen; Richard Lorenz; Wilhelm Ostwald

[CHAPTER IV]

ON THE APPLICATION OF LOGIC TO THE PROBLEM OF AN INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE

The problem of an international language has a theoretical as well as a practical importance. I have no intention of discussing the latter here and of explaining once more the necessity of an auxiliary language for international relations of every sort, and the practical possibility of making oneself understood by means of an artificial language, a possibility which has been proved by experience. But an international language is also, according to the words of the celebrated philologist H. Schuchardt, a desideratum of science, in which connection it raises at once problems of philology and logic. That these problems are worthy of the study of scientific men is proved by the discussions of Professors Diels and Gomperz, the reports made to the Academy of Sciences of Leipzig by Professors Brugmann and Leskien, and, finally, the labours and decisions of the Committee of the Délégation pour l'Adoption d'une Langue Internationale. The latter, composed of highly competent scientists and linguists, has determined the principles necessary for an auxiliary language, and has practically realised them.

My desire in what follows is to show briefly the connection of the international language with logic, and its claims on the attention and interest of philosophers. In the words of Leibnitz, "Languages form the best mirror for the human spirit, and an exact analysis of the meaning and relationship of words would be the best means of disclosing the operations of the mind" (N. Essais, III., VII., end). But the majority of philosophers (with some distinguished exceptions, e.g., Professor Wundt) and the majority of linguists (also with some distinguished exceptions, e.g., M. Bréal) have given little attention to the study of language from the point of view of psychology and logic. Now this study is particularly easy and interesting in the case of an artificial language, since the latter presents a structure analogous to that of our existing languages, but much simpler and more regular.

The words of the international language consist of invariable elements (morphemes) of three sorts: stems, derivative affixes (prefixes and suffixes), and grammatical inflections which, as in the case of European languages, are always final letters or final syllables. The stems themselves can be divided into two categories: verb stems, which express a state, action, or relation, e.g., dorm, parol, frap; and non-verbal or nominal stems, which denote an object (living being or thing), or express an aspect of it, e.g., hom, dom, bel, blind. The latter can produce directly only names (substantives or adjectives): man, house, beautiful, blind (in Ido, homo, domo, bela, blinda); the former, on the contrary, produce directly verbs: to sleep, to speak, to strike (in Ido, dormar, parolar, frapar), but they can also give rise to nouns: sleep, word, blow (in Ido, dormo, parolo, frapo). The proper rôle of the grammatical terminations is to determine the grammatical function of a stem word and to indicate the category to which the word belongs, whether verb, substantive, or adverb. Thus parol-ar = to speak; parol-o = (spoken) word; parol-a = oral; parol-e = orally. The same idea, namely, that expressed by the stem word, always runs through the various categories. This follows from a principle which dominates the whole structure of the international language: "Every word element" (morpheme) "represents an elementary idea, which is always the same, so that a combination of elements has a meaning determined by the combination of the corresponding ideas." This principle is only a corollary to the general principle of uniqueness so clearly enunciated by Ostwald: "There exists a unique and reciprocal correspondence between the ideas and the morphemes which express them." This principle represents evidently the ideal of all language, for a language, being essentially a system of symbols, is only theoretically perfect (and useful and convenient in practice) when there exists a unique correspondence between the symbol and the idea symbolised.

Now it follows from this principle that it is quite incorrect to say, as is often done, "Being given a stem, it suffices to add to it -ar to form a verb, -o to form a substantive, -a to form an adjective"; we require to define the sense possessed by this verb, substantive, and adjective. In other words, to every derivative of form there must correspond a derivative of sense which is in no wise arbitrary, but determined by general rules. If dorm-ar = to sleep, dorm-o cannot mean indifferently the sleeper, the dormitory, or the desire to sleep; if blind-a = blind, blind-o cannot signify at pleasure either blindness or the act of blinding. The rule which must guide us here is the principle enunciated above, namely, that a stem always preserves the same sense and expresses the same idea; if one wishes to express another idea related to the former in a definite way, it is necessary to add to the stem a morpheme expressing this relationship. The morphemes which denote the relations of our ideas are the affixes of derivation, which permit us to express a whole family of ideas by the aid and as the function of one fundamental idea, and to form correspondingly a family of words all derived from the same stem, as occurs, as a matter of fact, in natural languages. Certain of these affixes are wrongly classed amongst the grammatical inflections, such as, for example, the participial suffixes which serve to derive an adjective or a substantive from a verb, denoting him who performs the action, or is affected by (subject to) the state or relationship expressed by the stem: dorm-ant-a = sleeping, arol-ant-a = speaking, whence, by simple change of the final letter, dorm-ant-o = sleeper, parol-ant-o = speaker. One will perceive thereby the difference between direct derivation, which is effected by means of the grammatical inflections, and indirect derivation, which is effected by means of the addition of affixes. There is nothing arbitrary about this distinction, for it rests on the logical principles enunciated above, which determine the theoretical and practical value of the international language.

From these principles follow at once the rules of direct derivation. If one starts from a verbal stem, what must be the sense of the substantive directly derived from it? This sense can be none other than the state or action expressed by the verb: dormar = to sleep, dormo = sleep; parolar = to speak, parolo = a word; frapar = to strike, frapo = a blow. In these derived words we perceive the sense of the verb stem, and the proof of that is that in our natural languages we often employ the infinitive for this purpose: le manger, le boire, le dormir, le rire; das rennen (in English the verbal in -ing is employed with the sense of the infinitive). Indeed, one might completely identify the verbal substantive with the infinitive.

If one starts from a substantival stem, what must be the relation between the adjective and substantive derived from it? They must necessarily have the same sense, whichever of the two one considers the primary word; if avara = avaricious, avaro = an avaricious person; if blinda = blind, blindo = a blind person. This rule is all the more necessary in practice as there are a crowd of substantival stems concerning which one could not say whether they produce at first a substantive or an adjective: vidva = widowed, vidvo = widower; nobela = noble, nobelo = nobleman; santa = holy, santo = a saint. This is particularly true of the names of followers of this or that doctrine: katoliko, katolika; skeptiko, skeptika, etc. No one would think of using any suffix to derive one of these words from the other. There is only a very slight difference of meaning between a katolika skeptiko and a skeptika katoliko, the substantive indicating in each case the primary and fundamental idea to which the other is superadded.

This brings us to the enunciation of the principle of reversibility, which may be formulated as follows: "Every derivation must be reversible; that is to say, if one passes from one word to another of the same family in virtue of a certain rule, one must be able to pass inversely from the second to the first in virtue of a rule which is exactly the inverse of the preceding." That is an evident corollary of the principle of uniqueness, for otherwise one would be led to give two meanings to the same word. Let us suppose, for example, that from the noun krono, = a crown, one imagines it possible to derive directly (as is the case in certain languages) the verb kronar = to crown. From this verb one could deduce inversely in virtue of the general rule the substantive krono = coronation, so that the same word krono would then mean both crown and coronation. That would be, however, a logical error inadmissible in the international language, however numerous may be the examples of it which occur in living languages. On the contrary, thanks to the principle of reversibility, one can proceed from any word whatsoever of a family and arrive at any other word of the same family, or return to the initial word, in an absolutely unique manner, whereas if one did not observe this principle one would inevitably obtain two meanings for the same word.