There was in truth much to be said for the bill. A difficulty which had elsewhere been found in the conduct of war by a republic, encountered Parliament as soon as it gained independent power. The spirit of subordination, which is necessary A.D. 1645. to military discipline, did not come naturally to generals and officers who, being members of Parliament, shared in the possession and exercise of this power. Personal interests and the opposition of parliamentary factions had far too much influence on the position and behaviour of them all[412].
When the Lords gave way, they still hoped, in the course of the further discussions on the reconstruction of the army, to prevent its falling entirely into the hands of the Independents. They added to the proposals of the Commons a proviso that the officers and soldiers of the new model should promise to accept the Covenant and the Presbyterian system of church government. The Lower House however was not of the same opinion: it was objected, not without reason, that the church government was not yet fully established, not yet possessed of legal validity. In respect to the Covenant the Commons would only agree to a pledge for the officers, not for the privates, on the ground that this requirement would hinder recruiting. If however this condition was not passed, it was obvious that the separatist element in the army must become very powerful; for who from among the non-presbyterian population would take up arms against the King, except Independents and other separatists! The Lords had wished to make the nomination of officers depend on the choice of the two Houses, but this also they failed to carry: for nothing would so much conduce to the authority of the general to whom the command should be entrusted as the right of selecting his own officers.
Unquestionably military considerations contributed very materially to these resolutions. The soldiers were discontented with their leaders; even under Waller there had been one mutiny; now and then they talked of choosing their officers themselves. Moreover their pay had not been regularly distributed. Thorough and comprehensive arrangements were now made for this: contributions for this express purpose were exacted from the counties. If the troops were A.D. 1645. regularly paid, and kept under strict military discipline, a better result might be expected from the next campaign.
The Parliament selected as general Thomas Fairfax, who then had won a great reputation by the victory of Selby and his share in the battle of Marston Moor, a man whose stately appearance would impress the troops, pliant in council, but of unbending courage in battle. The transformation of the army was so thorough that the troops which were transferred out of the old army were distributed among the new companies and regiments: the traditions of the old associations were not to pass over into the new army.
It was still always held that the main question was as to the acceptance or rejection of the Uxbridge articles; but while the Royalist and Parliamentary parties were preparing to fight about it, elements in the latter grew into importance, which at once broke through their previous arrangements in military matters. Essex and Manchester, who hitherto had played the chief parts, now retired. Fairfax and Cromwell, the one with Presbyterian opinions already growing faint, the other of decidedly separatist and anti-Scottish views, appeared in the foreground.
FOOTNOTES:
[393] ‘To advise consult order and direct concerning the carrying on and managing of the war for the best advantage of the three kingdoms.’
[394] Journals of Lords 1643/4. Febr. 12/17.
[395] Order Book relative to delinquent estates, July 1644 to May 1649, two thick volumes. Some of its contents are in the Lords’ Journals, e.g. July 26 and 29, 1644.
[396] Instructions § 4. Old Parl. Hist. xii. 341.