Under these circumstances it would have been of the highest importance to have rescued the King from custody, and to have placed him in the midst of his adherents; and two attempts were made, one soon after the other, to effect this. They were contrived by the society to which Lady Carlisle belonged, and chiefly by the ladies[524]. Once some soldiers on guard had been actually won, and a boat provided to carry the King away to a safe place; but at the critical moment everything was spoiled by unexpected difficulties, or by the watchfulness of his enemies.

The contradiction was most startling: while Parliament was thinking of reconciliation with the King and dismissal of the army, the latter was actually waging war in the name of Parliament against all supporters of these views.

A.D. 1648.

At the beginning of May Cromwell set out with a strong division against the Royalists of South Wales. Some resistance was offered by the feudal castle of Chepstow, which seems to dominate its neighbourhood as though it had grown up out of the ground. While this place, and with it a number of men influential in the country, was being reduced by a subordinate, Cromwell himself moved forward to besiege Pembroke, which was defended with all the more stubbornness, because the chiefs who were shut up there could reckon on no mercy. It capitulated on July 11, but a number of exceptions was made in granting terms to the garrison. Cromwell was less inexorable against the old Royalists than against those who had once borne arms against the King, for the latter were guilty of apostasy from God’s light. Three of them were condemned to death, but were allowed to draw lots which should be executed[525].

Meanwhile Fairfax had been operating to clear the ground in the neighbourhood of the capital. In connexion with the agitation within the city and the removal of part of the army from its vicinity, a movement hostile to the Independents broke out in Kent, which also demanded primarily the dissolution of the army. With all the greater fury consequently the divisions, which were collected, dashed upon the armed crowd which appeared in the field. One of the most murderous conflicts of the whole war took place at Maidstone[526]. The streets were barricaded, the open square defended with cannon, and a musketry fire kept up from the houses. It was late at night when the Independents at last became masters of the town; as they said, by the help of God, who fought all their battles for them.

Meanwhile Lord Holland, who this time actually took up arms for the Presbyterian cause, the Duke of Buckingham and Lord Francis Villiers, appeared with a considerable body of cavalry at Kingston-on-Thames, in the hope that Surrey, Sussex, and Middlesex would join them: they announced A.D. 1648. their intention to bring the King back to Parliament, and to enforce again the recognised laws of the land. But they did not know the activity of the watchful enemy to whom they were opposed. Before any one had declared for them their cavalry was scattered, and the youthful Lord Francis died of the wounds he received in this encounter: on his body was found a lock of his lady-love’s hair. On the other hand, the members of the same party who had risen in Essex, being strengthened by the fugitives from Kent, made a determined defence at Colchester, which could not be overcome by the extremity of want: and everywhere it was seen that the disasters sustained in no way checked the agitation.

It was mainly this state of things which induced the Scots to advance into England before their preparations were completed or their opponents at home pacified[527]: otherwise the friends upon whom they might reckon for the present would be altogether put down. The opinion even of those who did not wish it was that this undertaking would probably succeed, that the Parliament would send Cromwell to Wales, and Fairfax to Colchester, so as to leave free scope for the Scottish army, and that so the sectarian force might easily be dissipated. It would be a good thing no doubt that the King should be restored, but not by these hands and with such evil allies: this would endanger the glorious Reformation for which Scotland had endured so much[528].

We may see what at this moment was still possible. A fresh battle must decide between the moderate Presbyterians and the Independents: but how much depended on its issue? By the victory of the former a monarchy, limited indeed, but still free, and with it the continuation of all legally existing arrangements, would have been saved, and a prospect opened of the restoration of the Episcopal Church within definite limits; the victory of the second could lead to nothing but a republic, and rendered probable a breach with the past in A.D. 1648. the form either of a completely effected and radical revolution on the basis of the rights of the individual, or of the domination of the army and its leaders. Moreover, if the Scots gained the day, there was no need, in the existing state of parties and considering the greater moderation of that which was now supreme, to apprehend the maintenance of that political and religious preponderance at which they had hitherto aimed, though they would not have allowed themselves to be forced back into a subordinate position: a relation of equilibrium between the two countries would have been formed. On the other hand, the victory of the Independents might be expected to cause not only their entire supremacy in England, but also the extension of it over Scotland, and consequently the establishment, at any rate within a short time, of the undoubted preponderance of England in Great Britain. The relations of the European states were such that none of them could interfere decisively at this moment. The French had never yet succeeded in concluding a general peace, the Spaniards especially showing an unyielding obstinacy. There was even a talk of an attack on France to be made in concert by them and the Independents, which in the summer of 1648, when the troubles of the Fronde broke out, might have been very destructive. On this ground the French avoided everything which might have roused the Independents against France, and have caused an alliance between them and Spain. The assistance given by the French to the King’s cause was but indirect and slight, very far removed from the persistent help which two years before they had led him to expect. A stronger support was afforded by Charles I’s son-in-law, William II Prince of Orange, who had now become Stadtholder-General: but he was hampered at every step by constitutional opposition, which limited his participation. In the midst of the existing divisions of Europe these contests were more than ever purely British—between the nationalities, or rather between the religious and political ideas which pervaded them; and now by the advance of the Scots into England, they were brought to a decisive conflict.

Hamilton appeared in England with pomp greater than befitted even his high rank, surrounded by a splendid bodyguard A.D. 1648. and attended by a numerous train of nobles. His cavalry was perhaps the best that ever crossed the Scottish frontier, but his infantry was ill-trained, armed more with pikes than muskets, and not sufficiently familiar with the use of them. Although he had formerly served under or beside Gustavus Adolphus, he could not be reckoned a thorough soldier, nor had he the enthusiasm of a ruling idea: his sympathy with the Royalist cause was always influenced by his own personal position and by the circumstances of the moment. His strategy bore the same character. Of the generals who surrounded him, those who knew most about war, such as Middleton and Colonel Turner, who filled the office of Adjutant-General, would have preferred to direct their advance into Yorkshire by the route previously adopted, since the inhabitants there were again more favourably disposed to the Scots, and the cavalry would have had more room to act on the open moorlands: but Hamilton wished first to relieve Carlisle, for which reason they deviated from this course; and when at Hornby, after a considerable advance, the proposal to turn in the direction of Yorkshire was discussed, Hamilton rejected it, because he expected to find a favourable reception in Manchester, and after that to be able to rekindle the flame of insurrection not yet quite extinct in North Wales. This political motive prevailed over military considerations: Hamilton was wont in most cases to give way readily, but on this one point he held firm. In the army too the conviction prevailed that they should find friends everywhere, and with their help would soon reach London. They fancied themselves engaged in a peaceful occupation, rather than in a dangerous campaign. The separate divisions proceeded on their way far apart from each other, without dreading an enemy. Cromwell came upon them in this state. His troops were of sorry appearance, for they had already suffered severely in Wales, and even when united with the division of Lambert, who came from the North to join them, were by no means equal in number to the enemy; but they felt the full impulse of their religious and political principle, and were fighting for their existence. If Hamilton gained a firm position in A.D. 1648. England, so that their opponents might be able to rally to him, they were lost. If they conquered him, all Britain was in their hands. Though weaker in total numbers, Cromwell and Lambert were the stronger at every single point where, three days in succession, they encountered the enemy. On the first day they had a very obstinate fight with the English Royalists under Marmaduke Langdale[529], who being ill supported by the main army and ultimately outflanked, retired upon Preston. The town itself could not be held against Cromwell’s cavalry, nor the bridge over the Ribble against his musketeers. The Scots did not allow themselves to be turned by this disaster from their line of march upon Wigan and Warrington. In the council of war held on horseback on the open field, the opinion was given that they ought to hold their ground where they were and await attack; but considering the want of provisions and the continued absence of several regiments, it seemed more advisable to continue their march. The unceasing rainy weather, the roads that gave no footing in that deep and boggy country, especially on Wigan Moor, made progress extremely difficult. On this second day the Independents had the advantage of being able to attack in rear the Scottish rear guard, and inflicted serious losses upon it. On the third day Cromwell overtook the advancing force at the pass of Winwick. Here once more a regular battle took place. The Scots and Royalists defended themselves most bravely; once the Independents were forced to give way, but at last they obtained the victory. When the Scots reached Warrington, they found that, in spite of the strong position they had taken up, they were no longer able to cope with the enemy. The long march of two days and two nights without sufficient food had exhausted the strength of the men, they had no ammunition, they had lost all their artillery, and the population around was hostile. In this desperate situation Hamilton was urged to let the infantry capitulate, and escape A.D. 1648. himself with the cavalry. It seems that he never formally gave his consent, but the soldiers, the officers, and the other generals were unanimous in favour of this course, and the entire body of infantry surrendered as prisoners of war.

The cavalry fared no better a few days later. After some days’ march Hamilton despaired of breaking through with them, and on August 25 he surrendered to Major-General Lambert, to whom Cromwell had intrusted the pursuit[530]. Those about the King tried to comfort him by saying that Hamilton had intended to mount the throne himself. He answered that a wave of his hand would have put an end to such a project; he regarded this defeat as the greatest disaster which could happen to him.