[108] Note on the private articles: Baillie i. 469. Guthrie’s assertion goes somewhat further: ‘For the ruling elders, as there was but one from each presbytery, so they enjoined that he should be a well-affected nobleman, and failing there a well-affected gentleman; whereby it came to pass that all the noblemen who were furious in the cause were elected either in one presbytery or in the other.’ (p. 46.)
[109] Documents in Rushworth ii. 342. Aiton, Life of Henderson 358.
[110] Cp. Laud to Strafford. Strafford Letters ii. 265.
BOOK VII.
CONNEXION BETWEEN THE TROUBLES IN SCOTLAND AND THOSE IN ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE.
CHAPTER I.
CAMPAIGN OF CHARLES I AGAINST SCOTLAND.
Some few score of years before these events, the Aragonese had rebelled against Philip II for reasons similar to those for which the Scots rebelled against Charles I. The pressure of the ecclesiastical and temporal rule as exercised by that sovereign had made the Aragonese anxious for their ancient liberties: the Inquisition was as much hated by them as the High Commission by the Scots; and a trivial circumstance had sufficed to cause the nobles, the hidalgos, and the towns to revolt in quick succession. But Philip II had arrayed against the Aragonese the power of his principal state of Castile, to the position of which they feared to be reduced, had recovered their obedience by force, had still more narrowly restricted their ancient liberties, and had established the royal authority more firmly than any of his predecessors had ever succeeded in doing.
The cause of the Scots involved yet more serious issues than that of the Aragonese. If the Aragonese had been victorious, they would only have revived within narrow territorial limits a representative Catholic constitution, according to the ideas of the middle ages. The Scots on the other hand repudiated everything which reminded them of the old hierarchy and its alliance with the crown: they laid claim on religious grounds to a political freedom such as had never yet existed in the world.
So much the more did Charles I believe himself entitled to put an end to this movement by force of arms. Even at the time when Hamilton first went to Scotland, and expressed his anxiety lest he should be met by protestations and A.D. 1639. rebellious assemblies, the King had plainly said that in such a case he might collect troops and scatter the rebels. ‘But,’ rejoined Hamilton, ‘what if there be not troops enough found in the country for this purpose.’ ‘Then,’ answered the King, ‘power shall come from England, and I myself will come in person with them, being resolved to hazard rather my life than to suffer the supreme authority to be contemned.’ Hamilton had offered far more than the King originally intended, but, in spite of all his advances he had only awakened a more violent opposition. The letters in which he announces this result strike a chord of self-reproach, we might almost say of contrition, for he felt deeply that he had brought the King into an almost untenable position. On his return he expressed his conviction that the only course now open to the government was to crush the rebels by force of arms. It was intended that Scotland should be coerced by England, in the same way that Aragon had been coerced by Castile.
In the Privy Council and among the friends of King Charles this design was debated from various sides.
It was pointed out to him that a war between his subjects in the two countries, whatever the issue might be, could only bring loss to him who was King over both. And who, it was asked, could guarantee to him that England would bestow the assistance of which he stood in need? He would be conjuring up a storm which after such long years of peace would burst forth with all the greater violence. How much better under all circumstances was an agreement, more especially as mercy became a king.