Sundry resolutions corresponding to this idea were adopted by Parliament; for instance, in relation to ship-money[219], which was declared contrary to the laws of the realm, to the private rights of subjects, and to previous statutes. Care was taken to restore to those who had paid them the last raised contributions, which were still in the hands of the sheriffs. This gave the bench of judges greater security against arbitrary dismissal. But as the chief source of the evil was seen to lie in the long intermission of Parliaments and their abrupt dissolution, the most special care was directed towards making this impossible. The general feeling was that they could never long reckon on the good behaviour of the ministers unless the rod of responsibility was always hung over them, that otherwise their arbitrary power would in a short time grow again like Samson’s hair, and that the only means of keeping good ministers lay in the frequent repetition of Parliaments[220]. Demands similar to those of which the Scots had set the example, were made in England also, that Parliament should meet every three years. Neither the power to convoke nor the power to dissolve it was to be left entirely to the King’s pleasure. It was resolved that if the King had not summoned a Parliament before September 3 of the third year, the peers of the realm were to issue the necessary writs in the King’s name: should they prove dilatory, the sheriffs of the A.D. 1641 counties and mayors of the towns were to order the elections: and in case even these did nothing, the burgesses and freeholders might come to the poll unsummoned. On the same principle Parliament was neither to be dissolved nor prorogued until the session had lasted fifty days, without the assent of both Houses.
These proposed enactments met with some opposition from the Lords: but as they involved interests common to both Houses, they passed that House also. We are assured that the King was fully sensible of the injurious effect which these measures must have on himself[221]: he foresaw that the censorship to which his ministers and himself would be subjected every three years must destroy the freedom of his designs, and limit his authority over the people. When the bill was presented to him he showed himself extremely unwilling to accept it. But an outspoken refusal once before had stopped all further negotiations: moreover there was a feeling at court that it would have been better for the King himself if his ministers had had no option in this respect. Charles I was induced to give way on February 16; the clerk of the Parliament was instructed to utter the old Norman formula, ‘Le roi le veut.’
Among those who originally were doomed to destruction was Hamilton: but at the crisis when the Scots penetrated into England a change of policy was observed in him. Though formerly he had recommended extreme measures, he was not prepared to risk his life for them. He now recommended the King to grant the demands of the Scots, and entered into an alliance with their leaders, his former opponents, and with the lords of the opposition party. By his mediation the most conspicuous of the latter, Bedford and Hertford, Essex, Mandeville, Saville, Say, as well as Bristol, were admitted into the Privy Council, thereby obtaining a certain share in the administration. It was generally believed at the time that this suggestion proceeded from the Scots, who desired to see their friends in the King’s council, in order to ensure A.D. 1641 the granting of their demands. The court based on it the prospect of a better understanding with the Parliament. Hamilton had at first some difficulty, but ultimately the King once more obeyed the voice to which for some years he had been wont to pay special attention[222].
On the whole we may suppose that the King under this influence cherished the idea of conducting a Parliamentary government, and, since his late ministers had fallen, of trying to work it through members of the opposition. But circumstances were such that very little could be achieved by means of a mere change of ministry. The restraints imposed on the King meant far more than mere alterations in form: the principle from which they sprang touched the vital point of his power. And the tendencies of a totally different nature and extent which were exhibited in the spirit both of members of Parliament and of the people were such that no accommodation with them was possible.
FOOTNOTES:
[206] Journal of the House of Commons ii.
[207] Giustiniano, Nov. 9. ‘Risolutione la quale—palesa a sudditi, d’avere acconsentito alla convocatione costretto delle sole violenze dell’ inimico.’ Clarendon, Reb. Book ii. Guizot, Book iii.
[208] The editing of these speeches in Rushworth and in the Parliamentary History leaves much to be desired. In the second speech the King is made to say, ‘when I called my Lords and Great ones at York,’ although ‘Great ones’ is not an English political phrase. The King really said ‘when I called the lords of my great counsel to York:’ he accuses the Scots, because they ‘did cavil a delay,’ not merely ‘delay.’ As has before been said, all these important documents require to be better edited.
[209] Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay i. 64. Garrard to Strafford, December 1637. Letters ii. 191.
[210] Montereuil: ‘J’ay entretenu longtems le Sr. Pimme: il me doit tenir bien informé de tout qui se passera au parlement, où il m’a témoigné qu’il seroit bien aise de servir en même temps son pais et la France, dont il reconnoit que les interêts sont unis.’