Following the Civil War impeachment proceedings were instituted against Andrew Johnson. Because of the known prejudices of the people of Iowa, Senator Grimes of that state was expected to vote “guilty.” He voted “not guilty,” and his colleague asked him, “Do you think you are expressing the sentiment of the people of Iowa?” The grand old Roman replied: “I have not inquired concerning the sentiment of the people of Iowa. I vote my convictions.” That would be political suicide today.
A few years ago proceedings to expel a certain senator were pending and several of his associates, after hearing the evidence submitted to them in their judicial capacity, expressed the conviction that the accused was innocent, but, because of the prejudices of their states, they would have to vote for expulsion. Senator Depew told me of a member who actually cried as he contemplated voting to expel a man whom he believed to be innocent.
I would like to ask how long you think the United States of America can maintain her proud position among the nations of the world, if oath-bound representatives of the people accept popular sentiment as the guide of their official conduct.
At the unveiling of the monument to Elijah Lovejoy, a letter was read from Wendel Phillips containing this sentence: “How cautiously most slip into oblivion and are forgotten, while here and there a man forgets himself into immortality.” In these most trying times our greatest need is men in public life whose ears are always open to counsel but ever closed to clamor—who will approach pending problems that threaten our very existence, with no other care but their country’s weal. The corner stone of freedom, as laid by the Fathers, is the absolute independence of the representative, coupled with the unimpeded right of the people to choose again at brief but appropriate intervals.
HOW WOULD YOU BUILD A SUBMARINE?
Suppose the government should delegate to some congressional district the responsibility of building a submarine. Would anyone think of undertaking the task except on the principle of a republic? You would select some man of mechanical aptitude, plus mechanical experience, and you would hold him responsible for the result. Would you require your representative when selected to listen to popular sentiment, as expressed on the street corners or in the press? Would you have him submit his plans and blue prints to the “people,” by referendum or otherwise?
We all admit that some men know more about farming than others, some more about commerce than others, some more about science than others, but the sentiment is alarmingly general that in the realm of statecraft—the most complex subject ever approached—one man is just as wise as another. At Detroit, Michigan, during the campaign of 1916, Woodrow Wilson used this language: “So I say the suspicion is beginning to dawn in many quarters, that the average man knows the business necessities of the country just as well as the extraordinary man.”
I do not wish to question Mr. Wilson’s sincerity, though I am not unmindful of the fact that he spent the greater part of his active life in college work trying to produce “extraordinary men,” and in that field he was quite successful. Taking issue with his position, but not with his sincerity, I am going to insult popular sentiment and say that I believe there are many men competent to select a competent constructor of a submarine, who are not competent to construct a submarine, or competent to instruct a constructor of a submarine.
But, suppose the people should build such a craft on the principle of a democracy, each one doing what seemed to him wise, without dishonesty or graft. I have no question but that a submarine would be produced that would “sub,” and I am equally certain that it would stay “subbed.”
I want to ask whether, in your opinion, the ship of state—the government of the United States—is any less complicated, any less complex or any less likely to “sub” and stay “subbed,” exactly as each and every republic for twenty-five hundred years did “sub”—if placed in the hands of an inexperienced mass of experimenters in statecraft.