[397] Ibid. i. 48.
[398] Works ('Morals and Legislation'), i. 56.
[399] Ibid. i. 56.
[400] Works ('Morals and Legislation'), i. 60.
[401] Ibid. i. 62.
[402] Ibid. i. 65.
[403] These are the two classes of 'springs of action' omitted in the Table.
[404] Works ('Morals and Legislation'), i. 68.
[405] Here Bentham lays down the rule that punishment should rise with the strength of the temptation, a theory which leads to some curious casuistical problems. He does not fully discuss, and I cannot here consider, them. I will only note that it may conceivably be necessary to increase the severity of punishment, instead of removing the temptation or strengthening the preventive action. If so, the law becomes immoral in the sense of punishing more severely as the crime has more moral excuse. This was often true of the old criminal law, which punished offences cruelly because it had no effective system of police. Bentham would of course have agreed that the principle in this case was a bad one.