This Rule entirely authorises us to assert (in the sense in which “The Logicians” would use the words) “Some boys in the First Class will receive prizes”, for this simply means (according to them) “If there were any boys in the First Class, some of them would receive prizes.”
Now the Converse of this Proposition is, of course, “Some boys, who will receive prizes, are in the First Class”, which means (according to “The Logicians”) “If there were any boys about to receive prizes, some of them would be in the First Class” (which Class we know to be empty).
Of this Pair of Converse Propositions, the first is undoubtedly true: the second, as undoubtedly, false.
It is always sad to see a batsman knock down his own wicket: one pities him, as a man and a brother, but, as a cricketer, one can but pronounce him “Out!”
We see, then, that, among all the conceivable views we have here considered, there are only two which can logically be held, viz.
I and A “assert”, but E does not.
E and A “assert”, but I does not.
The second of these I have shown to involve great practical inconvenience.
The first is the one adopted in this book. (See [p. 19].)
Some further remarks on this subject will be found in [Note (B), at p. 196].