(a) Owing to the high and pronounced trajectory we are able by the use of bombs to reach the enemy in his trench, whereas with rifle fire the only precaution necessary on the part of the enemy is to keep his head below the parapet, the trajectory of rifle fire being practically flat at point blank range.
(b) It is possible with a single 2-pound bomb to obtain an effective zone of 20 yards and a danger space of 40 yards in the enemy’s trench which is dead ground to rifle fire.
(c) The moral effect of bomb fire is much greater than that of rifle fire.
Means of Protection Against Enemy’s Bombs.
(a) The Use of Wire Netting: Trenches, machine gun pits, etc., are covered with close wire netting to prevent the entrance of enemy’s bombs. Low screens of wire netting may be placed in front of the parapet to prevent rolling bombs getting into our trenches.
(b) The Digging of small Ditches and the Breaking up of the Surface of the Ground in front of our position is an effective way of preventing bombs from rolling towards our position.
(c) The adoption of shallow Sleeping Pits in the rear of our trenches to provide quarters for the reliefs has been proven a success.
(d) Trenches should not be made wider or deeper than is absolutely necessary, as the effect of high explosives in deep trenches is much more deadly than in shallow ones, and the highest part of the parapet and parados should be next to the trench and sloping slightly from the trench, the idea being not to aid bombs in rolling into the trench.
(e) Bomb and splinter proof shelters may be built over keeps, trenches and other strong places.
(f) The use of sapheads from which bomb fire is provided to keep the enemy from getting into bombing range of our positions. (See Fig. 1.)
(g) Obstacles should be placed in front of our trenches at sufficient distance when possible to prevent enemy throwing bombs into the latter from behind these obstacles. This will disallow of bombing covering fire for their wire cutters.
Storage of Bombs in Trenches. Each platoon commander in the trenches is responsible that he has a supply of bombs and grenades and procures the same from the brigade bombers’ magazine, which is located anywhere from 1,500 to 2,500 yards in the rear of the front line trenches. They are stored in the trenches in bomb and splinter proof pits provided for that purpose.
General Efficiency and Resourcefulness. When a unit goes into the trenches the success with which it meets depends entirely on the degree of efficiency and resourcefulness and physical condition of the men. We are taught in the different Training Manuals that the British forces do not retreat and should it be necessary that from a tactical or strategical standpoint the commanders of our forces consider it necessary to give ground, the movement is carried out under what is known as a rear guard action and must not under any circumstances be considered in the nature of a defeat, the reason for this being that with anything like equality in numbers, equipment and armament, we are more than a match for the fighting forces of any other nation. Assuming this to be true, it is not so much the training in the building of our trenches that our men require as the training that will enable them on occupying the enemy’s trenches to reconstruct and repair them to meet our own requirements. This work has often to be carried out in daylight and under fire, making it necessary for the men to work in a prone position. It is therefore necessary that the men be skilled in the use of the digging and cutting tools used in trench warfare in order that accordingly as we occupy the enemy’s trenches they may be consolidated for our use and kept in repair as long as they are required for fighting, communication or storage trenches. By this means the ground we gain is consolidated for our purposes as we advance. On the other hand, if we do not consolidate our position as we advance we are left more or less in a state of unpreparedness and give the enemy a chance to launch a counter-attack with good results. All the training that our men can possibly receive on the subjects of musketry, bomb throwing, etc., that fits them for trench warfare is practically lost unless they are thoroughly skilled in the use of the trench digging and cutting tools, in which they require as much training as in the use of the rifle. This can only be accomplished by a systematic arrangement and carrying out of practices in trenches which are built for that purpose. To accomplish the desired results special attention should be given to the instruction and training that will enable a soldier to use intelligently the different kinds of material which may come to hand. For example, our men may be taught to repair a trench by the use of sandbags, sods and brushwood, but might not be able to obtain these materials. At the same time back of the lines there might be all kinds of bale wire, packing cases, cull lumber, etc., by means of which, with a little instruction, the same work of repairing the trench might be accomplished. It is only by getting down into the ground and working out these problems for ourselves and making note of the little things, not being above taking suggestions from the last private in the ranks, that we will be efficient to a degree necessary to outwit and defeat our ever industrious and systematic enemy.
Note.—In the following lectures blackboard illustrations may be used with good results.
LECTURE V.
FRONTAL ATTACK.
Preparation and Organization. In trench warfare, when our movements are changed from the defensive to the offensive, it is necessary to choose certain sections of the enemy’s front line of trenches. These are chosen from a tactical point of view, and after having been occupied and consolidated to our use become the bases from which enfilade attacks are directed to the flanks and front, by means of which we extend and connect our positions. The Officers and their Staffs ordering the offensive, make a very careful study of the neighborhood in the sections to be occupied from maps and sketches which have been compiled from information gained by the Air Service and Reconnaisance. They finally decide the exact extent of front which will be occupied in each case by direct frontal attack. The extent of front in each case is never greater than is absolutely necessary, and is clearly defined in orders. Every officer taking a part in the assault is supplied with maps and sketches, which constitute part of his orders.
(Note the necessity for every officer being able to make a study of a locality from information given on maps and sketches.)