[371] U. S. v. Harvey, 8 Law Reporter, 77 (U. S. C. C., 1845).
[372] U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482 (1869); see also U. S. v. Clark, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 306 (U. S. D. C., 1877).
[373] Penny v. Walker, 64 Maine 430 (1874).
[374] U. S. v. McCracken, 3 Hughes’ Reports (U. S. C. C.) 544 (1878).
[375] Harmon v. Moore, 59 Me. 428 (1871).
[376] Lathrop v. Middleton, 23 Cal. 257 (1863). In this case, however, the boat was at the time in an unfinished condition and had not been used on the ferry.
[377] 3 Fed. Rep. 478 (1880).
[378] United States v. Sears, 55 Fed. Rep. 268 (1893). In Turnpike Co. v. Newland, 15 N. C. 463 (1834), it was held that a mail coach was a “pleasure carriage” within the meaning of the local statute imposing tolls for the use of the road. The use of state facilities by persons employed in the federal civil service, said the court, “must be deemed intended to be on the terms prescribed to all persons, unless the law under which it is performed declared the contrary. We have found no act of Congress exempting persons or carriages engaged in the business of the postoffice from the payment of tolls for passing ferries, bridges or roads.” Payment was, therefore, required.
[379] The seriousness of this conflict was well expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264 (1821). “To interfere with the penal laws of a state,” he said, “where they are not levelled against the legitimate powers of the Union, but have for their sole object the internal government of the country, is a very serious measure which Congress cannot be disposed to adopt lightly or inconsiderately. The motives for it must be serious and weighty. It would then be taken deliberately and the intention would be clearly and unequivocally expressed.”
[380] See above, Chapter IV.