The returns stated about 96,000 men and 4000 officers for the active National Guard; for the reserve, 100,000 men and 3500 officers.[128] Thirty-six free corps claimed to number 3450 men. All deductions made, 60,000 combatants might have been obtained had they known how to set about it. But the weakness of the Council, the difficulty of supervision and repression, allowed the less brave and those who did not stand in need of pay, to shirk all control. Many contrived to limit their services to the interior of Paris. Thus for want of order the effective forces remained very weak, and the line from St. Ouen to Ivry was never held by more than 15,000 or 16,000 Federals.
The cavalry existed only on paper. There were only 500 horses to drag the guns or the waggons and to mount the officers and estafettes. The engineer department remained in a rudimentary state, the finest decrees notwithstanding. Of the 1200 cannon possessed by Paris, only 200 were utilised. There were never more than 500 artillerists, while the returns stated 2500.
Dombrowski occupied the bridge of Asnières, Levallois, and Neuilly with 4000 or 5000 men at the utmost.[129] To protect his positions he had at Clichy and Asnières about thirty ordnance pieces and two ironclad railway carriages, which from the 15th April to the 22nd May, even after the entry of the Versaillese, did not cease running along the lines; at Levallois, a dozen pieces. The ramparts of the north assisted him, and the valiant Porte-Maillot covered him at Neuilly.
On the left bank, from Issy to Ivry, in the forts, the villages, and the trenches, there were 10,000 to 11,000 Federals. The fort of Issy contained on an average 600 men and 50 pieces of 7 and 12 centimetres, of which two-thirds were inactive. The bastions 72 and 73 relieved him a little, aided by four ironclad locomotives established on the viaduct of the Point du Jour. Underneath, the gunboats, re-armed, fired on Breteuil, Sèvres, Brimborion, even daring to push as far as Châtillon, and, unsheltered, cannonaded Meudon. A few hundred tirailleurs occupied the park and the castle of Issy, the Moulineaux, Le Val, and the trenches which united the fort of Issy to that of Vanves. This latter, exposed like Issy, valiantly supported its efforts with a garrison of 500 men and about 20 cannon. The bastions of the enceinte supported it very little.
The fort of Montrouge, with 350 men and 10 to 15 ordnance pieces, had only to support the fort of Vanves. That of Bicêtre, provided with 500 men and 20 pieces, had to fire at objects hidden from its view. Three considerable redoubts protected it—the Hautes Bruyères, with 500 men and 20 pieces; the Moulin Saquet, with 700 men and about 14 pieces; and Villejuif, with 300 men and a few howitzers. At the extreme left, the fort of Ivry and its dependencies had 500 men and about 400 pieces. The intermediate villages, Gentilly, Cachan, and Arcueil, were occupied by 2000 to 2500 Federals.
The nominal command of the forts of the south, first confided to Eudes, assisted by an ex-officer of Garibaldi, La Cécilia, on the 20th passed into the hands of the Alsatian Wetzel, an officer of the army of the Loire. From his headquarters of Issy he was to superintend the trenches of Issy and of Vanves and the defence of the forts. In reality, their commanders, who often changed, did just as they pleased.
The command, from Issy to Arcueil was, towards the middle of April, entrusted to General Wroblewski, one of the best officers of the Polish insurrection, young, an adept in military science, brave, methodical, and shrewd, turning everybody and everything to account; an excellent chief for young troops.[130]
All these general officers never received but one order: "Defend yourselves." As to a general plan, there never was one. Neither Cluseret nor Rossel held councils of war.
The men were also abandoned to themselves, being neither cared for nor controlled. Scarcely any, if any, relieving of the troops under fire ever took place. The whole strain fell upon the same men. Certain battalions remained twenty, thirty days in the trenches, while others were continually kept in reserve. If some men grew so inured to fire that they refused to return home, others were discouraged, came to show their clothes covered with vermin and asked for rest. The generals were obliged to retain them, having no one to put in their places.
This carelessness soon destroyed all discipline. The brave wanted to rely only upon themselves, and the others slunk from the service. The officers did the same, some leaving their posts to assist the fight at a contiguous place, others returning to the town. The court-martial sentenced a few of them very severely. The Council quashed the sentences, and commuted one condemnation to death to three years' imprisonment.