During the same time a fleet from Hiero arrived at Ostia with a large cargo of supplies. The Syracusan ambassadors, on being introduced into the senate, delivered this message: "That king Hiero was so much affected at the slaughter announced to him of Caius Flaminius the consul and his troops, that he could not have been more distressed at any disasters which could have befallen himself or his own kingdom; and accordingly, though he was well aware that the greatness of the Roman people was almost more admirable in adversity than prosperity, he had nevertheless sent every thing which good and faithful allies are wont to contribute to assist the operations of war, which he earnestly implored the conscript fathers not to refuse to accept. First of all, for the sake of the omen, they had brought a golden statue of Victory, of three hundred pounds' weight, which they begged them to accept, keep by them, and hold as their own peculiar and lasting possession. That they had also brought three hundred thousand pecks of wheat, and two hundred thousand of barley, that there might be no want of provisions, and that as much more as might be necessary they would convey, as a supply, to whatever place they might appoint. He knew that the Roman people employed no legionary troops or cavalry who were not Romans, or of the Latin confederacy, that he had seen foreign auxiliary as well as native light-armed troops in the Roman camps, he had, therefore, sent one thousand archers and slingers, a suitable force against the Bahares and Moors, and other nations which fought with missile weapons" To these presents they added also advice "That the praetor to whose lot the province of Sicily had fallen, should pass a fleet over to Africa, that the enemy also might have a war in their own country, and that less liberty should be afforded them of sending reinforcements to Hannibal" The senate thus replied to the king. "That Hiero was a good man and an admirable ally, and that from the time he first formed a friendship with the Roman people he had uniformly cultivated a spirit of fidelity, and had munificently assisted the Roman cause at all times and in every place. That this was, as it ought to be, a cause of gratitude to the Roman people. That the Roman people had not accepted gold which had been brought them also from certain states, though they felt gratitude for the act. The Victory and the omen," they said, "they would accept, and would assign and dedicate to that goddess, as her abode, the Capitol, the temple of Jupiter, the best and greatest of gods, hoping that, consecrated in that fortress of the city of Rome, she would continue there firm and immoveable, kind and propitious to the Roman people." The slingers, archers, and corn were handed over to the consuls. To the fleet which Titus Otacilius the proprietor had in Sicily, twenty-five quinqueremes were added, and permission was given him, if he thought it for the interest of the state to pass over into Africa.
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The levy completed, the consuls waited a few days, till the allies of the Latin confederacy arrived. At this time the soldiers were bound by an oath, which had never before been the case, dictated by the military tribunes, that they would assemble at the command of the consuls, and not depart without orders; for up to that time the military oath only had been employed; and further, when the soldiers met to divide into decuries or centuries, the cavalry being formed into decuries and the infantry into centuries, all swore together, amongst themselves, of their own accord, that they would not depart or quit their ranks for flight or fear, except for the purpose of taking up or fetching a weapon, and either striking an enemy or saving a countryman. This, from being a voluntary compact among the soldiers themselves, was converted into the legal compulsion of an oath by the tribunes. Before the standards were moved from the city, the harangues of Varro were frequent and furious, protesting that the war had been invited into Italy by the nobles, and that it would continue fixed in the bowels of the state if it employed any more such generals as Fabius; that he would bring the war to conclusion on the very day he got sight of the enemy. His colleague Paulus made but one speech, on the day before they set out from the city, which was more true than gratifying to the people, in which nothing was said severely against Varro, except this only. "That he wondered how any general, before he knew any thing of his own army, or that of the enemy, the situation of the places, or the nature of the country, even now while in the city, and with the gown on, could tell what he must do when in arms, and could even foretell the day on which he would fight standard to standard with the enemy. That, for his own part, he would not, before the time arrived, prematurely anticipate those measures which circumstances imposed on men, rather than men on circumstances. He could only wish that those measures which were taken with due caution and deliberation might turn out prosperously. That temerity, setting aside its folly, had hitherto been also unsuccessful." This obviously appeared, that he would prefer safe to precipitate counsels; but that he might persevere the more constantly in this, Quintus Fabius Maximus is reported to have thus addressed him on his departure.
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"If you either had a colleague like yourself, Lucius Aemilius, which is what I should prefer, or you were like your colleague, an address from me would be superfluous. For were you both good consuls, you would do every thing for the good of the state from your own sense of honour, even without my saying a word: and were you both bad consuls, you would neither receive my words into your ears, nor my counsels into your minds. As the case now is, looking at your colleague and yourself, a man of such character, my address will be solely to you; who, I feel convinced, will prove yourself a good man and a worthy citizen in vain, if the state on the other hand should halt. Pernicious counsels will have the same authority and influence as those which are sound. For you are mistaken, Lucius Paulus, if you imagine that you will have a less violent contest with Caius Terentius than with Hannibal. I know not whether the former, your opponent, or the latter, your open enemy, be the more hostile. With the latter you will have to contend in the field only; with the former, at every place and time. Hannibal, moreover, you have to oppose with your own horse and foot; while Varro will head your own soldiers against you. Let Caius Flaminius be absent from your thoughts, even for the omen's sake. Yet he only began to play the madman's consul, in his province, and at the head of the army. This man is raving before he put up for the consulship, afterwards while canvassing for it, and now having obtained it, before he has seen the camp or the enemy. And he who by talking largely of battles and marshalled armies, even now excites such storms among the citizens with their gowns on, what do you think he will effect among the youth in arms, where words are followed forthwith by acts? But be assured, if this man, as he protests he will, shall immediately engage the enemy either I am unacquainted with military affairs, with this kind of war, and the character of the enemy, or another place will become more celebrated than the Trasimenus by our disaster. Neither is this the season for boasting while I am addressing one man; and besides, I have exceeded the bounds of moderation in despising rather than in courting fame. But the case is really this. The only way of conducting the war against Hannibal is that which I adopted: nor does the event only, that instructor of fools, demonstrate it, but that same reasoning which has continued hitherto, and will continue unchangeable so long as circumstances shall remain the same. We are carrying on war in Italy, in our own country, and our own soil. All around us are countrymen and allies in abundance. With arms, men, horses, and provisions, they do and will assist us. Such proofs of their fidelity have they given in our adversity. Time, nay, everyday makes us better, wiser, and firmer. Hannibal, on the contrary, is in a foreign, a hostile land, amidst all hostile and disadvantageous circumstances, far from his home, far from his country; he has peace neither by land nor sea: no cities, no walls receive him: he sees nothing any where which he can call his own: he daily lives by plunder. He has now scarcely a third part of that army which he conveyed across the Iberus. Famine has destroyed more than the sword; nor have the few remaining a sufficient supply of provisions. Do you doubt, therefore, whether by remaining quiet we shall not conquer him who is daily sinking into decrepitude? who has neither provisions nor money? How long before the walls of Geronium, a miserable fortress of Apulia, as if before the walls of Carthage--? But not even in your presence will I boast. See how Cneius Servilius and Atilius, the last consuls, fooled him. This is the only path of safety, Lucius Paulus, which your countrymen will render more difficult and dangerous to you than their enemies will. For your own soldiers will desire the same thing as those of the enemy: Varro, a Roman consul, and Hannibal, a Carthaginian general, will wish the same thing. You alone must resist two generals: and you will resist them sufficiently if you stand firm against the report and the rumours of men; if neither the empty glory of your colleague, and the unfounded calumnies against yourself, shall move you. They say that truth too often suffers, but is never destroyed. He who despises fame will have it genuine. Let them call you coward instead of cautious, dilatory instead of considerate, unwarlike instead of an expert general. I would rather that a sagacious enemy should fear you, than that foolish countrymen should commend you. A man who hazards all things Hannibal will despise, him who does nothing rashly he will fear. And neither do I advise that nothing should be done; but that in what you do, reason should guide you, and not fortune. All things will be within your own power, and your own. Be always ready armed and on the watch, and neither be wanting when a favourable opportunity presents itself, nor give any favourable opportunity to the enemy. All things are clear and sure to the deliberate man. Precipitation is improvident and blind."
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The address of the consul in reply was by no means cheerful, admitting that what he said was true, rather than easy to put in practice. He said, "That to him, as dictator, his master of the horse was unbearable: what power or influence could a consul have against a factious and intemperate colleague? That he had in his former consulate escaped a popular conflagration not without being singed: his prayer was, that every thing might happen prosperously; but if, on the contrary, any misfortune should occur, that he would rather expose his life to the weapons of the enemy, than to the votes of his incensed countrymen." Directly after this discourse, it is related that Paulus set out, escorted by the principal senators. The plebeian consul attended his own plebeian party, more distinguished by their numbers than respectability. When they had arrived at the camp, the old and new troops being united, they formed two distinct camps, so that the new and smaller one might be the nearer to Hannibal, and the old one might contain the greater part, and all the choicest of the troops. They then sent to Rome Marcus Atilius, the consul of the former year, who alleged his age in excuse. They appoint Geminus Servilius to the command of a Roman legion, and two thousand of the allied infantry and cavalry in the lesser camp. Hannibal, although he perceived that the forces of the enemy were augmented by one-half, was yet wonderfully rejoiced at the arrival of the consuls; for he had not only nothing remaining of the provisions which he daily acquired by plunder, but there was not even any thing left which he could seize, the corn in all the surrounding country having been collected into fortified cities, when the country was too unsafe; so that, as was afterwards discovered, there scarcely remained corn enough for ten days, and the Spaniards would have passed over to the enemy, through want of food, if the completion of that time had been awaited.