Although the present debate turned chiefly on these points, Hannibal, being called on by name to give his opinion, led the king, and those who were present, into the consideration of the general conduct of the war, by a speech to this effect:--"If I had been employed in your councils since we came first into Greece, when you were consulting about Euboea, the Achaeans, and Boeotians, I would have offered the same advice which I shall offer you this day, when your thoughts are employed about the Thessalians. My opinion is, that, above all things, Philip and the Macedonians should by some means or other be brought into a participation in this war. For, as to Euboea, as well as the Boeotians and Thessalians, who can doubt that, having no strength of their own, they will ever court the power that is present; and will make use of the same fear, which governs their councils, as an argument for obtaining pardon? That, as soon as they shall see a Roman army in Greece, they will turn away to that government to which they have been accustomed? Nor are they to blame, if, when the Romans were at so great a distance, they did not choose to try your force, and that of your army, who were on the spot. How much more advisable, therefore, and more advantageous would it be, to unite Philip to us, than these; as, if he once embarks in the cause, he will have no room for retreat, and as he will bring with him such a force, as will not only be an accession to a power at war with Rome, but was able, lately, of itself, to withstand the Romans! With such an ally, (I wish to speak without offence,) how could I harbour a doubt about the issue; when I should see the very persons through whom the Romans prevailed against Philip, now ready to act against them? The Aetolians, who, as all agree, conquered Philip, will fight in conjunction with Philip against the Romans. Amynander and the Athamanian nation, who, next to the Aetolians, performed the greatest services in that war, will stand on our side. Philip, at the time when you remained inactive, sustained the whole burden of the war. Now, you and he, two of the greatest kings, will, with the force of Asia and Europe, wage war against one state; which, to say nothing of my own fortune with them, either prosperous or adverse, was certainly, in the memory of our fathers, unequal to a dispute with a single king of Epirus; what then, I say, must it be in competition with you two? But it may be asked. What circumstances induce me to believe that Philip may be brought to a union with us? First, common utility, which is the strongest cement of union; and next, you, Aetolians, are yourselves my informants. For Thoas, your ambassador, among the other arguments which he used to urge, for the purpose of drawing Antiochus into Greece, always above all things insisted upon this,--that Philip expressed extreme indignation that the conditions of servitude had been imposed on him under the appearance of conditions of peace: comparing the king's anger to that of a wild beast chained, or shut up, and wishing to break the bars that confined it. Now, if his temper of mind is such, let us loose his chains; let us break these bars, that he may vent, upon the common foe, this anger so long pent up. But should our embassy fail of producing any effect on him, let us then take care, that if we cannot unite him to ourselves, he may not be united to our enemies. Your son, Seleucus, is at Lysimachia; and if, with the army which he has there, he shall pass through Thrace, and once begin to make depredations on the nearest parts of Macedonia, he will effectually divert Philip from carrying aid to the Romans, to the protection, in the first place, of his own dominions. Such is my opinion respecting Philip. With regard to the general plan of the war, you have, from the beginning, been acquainted with my sentiments: and if my advice had been listened to, the Romans would not now hear that Chalcis in Euboea was taken, and a fort on the Euripus reduced, but that Etruria, and the whole coast of Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul, were in a blaze of war; and, what is to them the greatest cause of alarm, that Hannibal was in Italy. Even as matters stand at present, I recommend it to you, to call home all your land and sea forces; let storeships with provisions follow the fleet; for, as we are here too few for the exigencies of the war, so are we too many for the scanty supplies of necessaries. When you shall have collected together the whole of your force, you will divide the fleet, and keep one division stationed at Corcyra, that the Romans may not have a clear and safe passage; and the other you will send to that part of the coast of Italy which is opposite Sardinia and Africa; while you yourselves, with all the land forces, will proceed to the territory of Bullium. In this position you will hold the command of all Greece; you will give the Romans reason to think, that you intend to sail over to Italy; and you will be in readiness so to do, if occasion require. This is my advice; and though I may not be the most skilful in every kind of warfare, yet surely I must have learned, in a long series of both good and bad fortune, how to wage war against the Romans. For the execution of the measures which I have advised, I promise you my most faithful and zealous endeavours. Whatever plan you shall consider the best, may the gods grant it their approbation."
8
Such, nearly, was the counsel given by Hannibal, which the hearers rather commended at the time, than actually executed. For not one article of it was carried into effect, except the sending Polyxenidas to bring over the fleet and army from Asia. Ambassadors were sent to Larissa, to the diet of the Thessalians. The Aetolians and Amynander appointed a day for the assembling of their troops at Pherae, and the king with his forces came thither immediately. While he waited there for Amynander and the Aetolians, he sent Philip, the Megalopolitan, with two thousand men, to collect the bones of the Macedonians round Cynoscephalae, where the final battle had been fought with king Philip; being advised to this, either in order to gain favour with the Macedonians and draw their displeasure on the king for having left his soldiers unburied, or having of himself, through the spirit of vain-glory incident to kings, conceived such a design,--splendid indeed in appearance, but really insignificant. There is a mount there formed of the bones which had been scattered about, and were then collected into one heap. Although this step procured him no thanks from the Macedonians, yet it excited the heaviest displeasure of Philip; in consequence of which, he who had hitherto intended to regulate his counsels by the fortune of events, now sent instantly a message to the propraetor, Marcus Baebius, that "Antiochus had made an irruption into Thessaly; that, if he thought proper, he should move out of his winter quarters, and that he himself would advance to meet him, that they might consider together what was proper to be done."
9
While Antiochus lay encamped near Pherae, where the Aetolians and Amynander had joined him, ambassadors came to him from Larissa, desiring to know on account of what acts or words of theirs he had made war on the Thessalians; at the same time requesting him to withdraw his army; and that if there seemed to him any necessity for it he would discuss it with them by commissioners. In the mean time, they sent five hundred soldiers, under the command of Hippolochus, to Pherae, as a reinforcement; but these, being debarred of access by the king's troops, who blocked up all the roads, retired to Scotussa. The king answered the Larissan ambassadors in mild terms, that "he came into their country, not with a design of making war, but of protecting and establishing the liberty of the Thessalians." He sent a person to make a similar declaration to the people of Pherae; who, without giving him any answer, sent to the king, in the capacity of ambassador, Pausanias, the first magistrate of their state. He offered remonstrances of a similar kind with those which had been urged in behalf of the people of Chalcis, at the first conference, on the strait of the Euripus, as the cases were similar, and urged some with a greater degree of boldness; on which the king desired that they would consider seriously before they adopted a resolution, which, while they were overcautious and provident of futurity, would give them immediate cause of repentance, and then dismissed him. When the Pheraeans were acquainted with the result of this embassy, without the smallest hesitation they determined to endure whatever the fortune of war might bring on them, rather than violate their engagements with the Romans. They accordingly exerted their utmost efforts to provide for the defence of their city; while the king, on his part, resolved to assail the walls on every side at once; and considering, what was evidently the case, that it depended on the fate of this city, the first which he had besieged, whether he should for the future be despised or dreaded by the whole nation of the Thessalians, he put in practice every where all possible means of striking them with terror. The first fury of the assault they supported with great firmness; but in some time, great numbers of their men being either slain or wounded, their resolution began to fail. Having soon been so reanimated by the rebukes of their leaders, as to resolve on persevering in their resistance, and having abandoned the exterior circle of the wall, as their numbers now began to fail, they withdrew to the interior part of the city, round which had been raised a fortification of less extent. At last, being overcome by distress, and fearing that if they were taken by storm they might meet no mercy from the conqueror, they capitulated. The king then lost no time; but while the alarm was fresh, sent four thousand men against Scotussa, which surrendered without delay, observing the recent example of those in Pherae; who, at length compelled by sufferings, had done that which at first they had obstinately refused. Together with the town, Hippolochus and the Larissan garrison were yielded to him, all of whom were dismissed uninjured by the king; who hoped that such behaviour would operate powerfully towards conciliating the esteem of the Larissans.
10