Scipio, considering that Syphax and the Carthaginians could make no further efforts, gave his whole attention to the siege of Utica, and was now bringing up his engines to the walls, when he was diverted from his purpose by a report of the renewal of the war; and, leaving small forces merely to keep up the appearance of a siege by sea and land, he set out himself with the main strength of his army to meet the enemy. At first he took up his position on an eminence about five miles distant from the king's camp. The next day, coming down with his cavalry into a place called the great plains, which lay at the foot of that eminence, he spent the day in advancing up to the outposts of the enemy, and provoking them by skirmishing attacks. During the ensuing two days, irregular excursions were made by both sides alternately, but nothing worthy of notice was achieved. On the fourth day, both sides came down in battle-array. The Romans placed their principes behind the spearmen, which latter formed the front line, and the triarii they stationed in reserve; the Italian cavalry they opposed to the enemy in the right wing, the Numidians and Masinissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal, placing the Numidians against the Italian cavalry, and the Carthaginians opposite to Masinissa, received the Celtiberians into the centre of their line, to face the Roman legions. Thus arranged, they then commenced the encounter. At the first charge, both the wings, the Numidians and Carthaginians, were together driven from their ground; for neither could the Numidians, who consisted principally of rustics, sustain the shock of the Roman cavalry, nor the Carthaginians, who were also raw soldiers, withstand Masinissa, who, in addition to other circumstances, was rendered formidable by his recent victory. The Celtiberian line, though stript of the support of both the wings, stood their ground; for neither did any hope of safety by flight present itself, as they were ignorant of the country, nor could they expect pardon from Scipio, against whom, though he had deserved well both of them and their nation, they had come into Africa to fight for hire. Surrounded therefore, on all sides by the enemy, they died with obstinate resolution, falling one upon another; and, while the attention of all was turned upon them, Syphax and Hasdrubal gained a considerable space of time to effect their escape. The victors, fatigued with the slaughter, which had continued for a greater length of time than the battle, were interrupted by the night.
9
The next day Scipio sent Laelius and Masinissa, with all the Roman and Numidian cavalry, and the light infantry, to pursue Syphax and Hasdrubal. He himself, with the main strength of the army, reduced the neighbouring towns, which were all subject to the Carthaginians, some by holding out hopes to them, some by threats, and others by force. At Carthage, indeed, the consternation was extreme; and it was fully anticipated there, that Scipio, who was carrying his arms to the different places around, would, after having rapidly subdued all the neighbouring parts, suddenly attack Carthage itself. Their walls were repaired and protected with outworks; and every man individually exerted himself to the utmost in collecting from the country the requisites for holding out against a protracted siege. Mention was seldom made of peace, but not so seldom of sending deputies to recall Hannibal. The majority of them urged that the fleet, which had been equipped to intercept the convoys of the enemy, should be sent to surprise the ships stationed near Utica, which were lying in an unguarded state. It was also urged that they might perhaps overpower the naval camp, which was left under the protection of a trifling force. They chiefly inclined to the latter plan, though they thought, nevertheless, that deputies should be sent to Hannibal; for should the operations of the fleet succeed in the highest degree, the siege of Utica would be partially raised, but they had no general remaining but Hannibal, and no army but his which could defend Carthage itself. The ships were therefore launched the following day, and, at the same time, the deputies set out for Italy; and, their position stimulating them, every thing was done with the greatest expedition; each man considering, that the safety of all was betrayed in whatever degree he remitted his own individual exertions. Scipio, who drew after him an army now encumbered with the spoils of many cities, sent his prisoners, and other booty, to his old camp at Utica, and, as his views were now fixed on Carthage, he seized on Tunes, which was abandoned in consequence of the flight of the garrison. This city is about fifteen miles distant from Carthage, being a place secured both by works, and also by its own natural position; it may be seen from Carthage, and itself affords a prospect both of that city and of the sea which washes it.
10
From this place the Romans, while diligently employed in raising a rampart, descried the fleet of the enemy, on its way to Utica from Carthage. Desisting from their work, therefore, orders for marching were given, and the troops began to move with the utmost haste, lest the ships which were turned towards the land, and occupied with the siege, and which were far from being in a condition for a naval battle, should be surprised and overpowered. For how could ships, carrying engines and machines, and either converted to the purposes of transports, or brought up to the walls so as to afford the means of mounting up, in lieu of a mound and bridges, resist a fleet, with nothing to impede its movements, furnished with every kind of naval implement, and prepared for action. Scipio, therefore, contrary to his usual practice in naval engagements, drew the ships of war, which might have been employed in defending the rest, into the rear, and formed them into a line near the land; opposing to the enemy a row of transports, four deep, to serve as a wall; and, lest these same transports should be thrown into disorder during the confusion of the battle, he bound them together by placing masts and yard-arms across them, from one vessel to the other; and, by means of strong ropes, fastened them together, as it were, by one uninterrupted bond. He also laid planks upon them, so as to form a free passage along the line, leaving spaces under these bridges of communication by which the vessels of observation might run out towards the enemy, and retreat with safety. Having hastily made these arrangements as well as the time would permit, he put on board the transports about a thousand picked men, to keep off the enemy, with a very large store of weapons, particularly missiles, that they might hold out, however long the contest lasted. Thus prepared, and on the watch, they waited the approach of the enemy. The Carthaginians, who, if they had made haste would, on the first assault, have surprised their adversaries while every thing was in a state of confusion, from the hurry and bustle attending the preparations, were so dismayed at their losses by land, and thereby had lost so much confidence even in their strength by sea, in which they had the advantage, that, after consuming the day, in consequence of the slow rate at which they sailed, about sun-set they put in to a harbour which the Africans call Ruscino. The following day, at sun-rise, they drew up their ships towards the open sea, as for a regular naval battle, and with the expectation that the Romans would come out to engage them. After they had continued stationary for some time, and saw that no movement was made on the part of the enemy, then, at length, they attacked the transports. The affair bore no resemblance to a naval fight, but rather had the appearance of ships attacking walls. The transports had considerably the advantage in respect of height; and as the Carthaginians had to throw their weapons upward, against a mark which was above them, most of them failed of taking effect; while the weapons thrown from the transports from above fell with increased force, and derived additional impetus from their very weight. The vessels of observation, and even the lighter kind of barks, which went out through the spaces left under the flooring, which formed a communication between the ships, were at first run down by the mere momentum and bulk of the ships of war; and afterwards they proved a hindrance to the troops appointed to keep the enemy off; for as they mixed with the ships of the enemy, they were frequently under the necessity of withholding their weapons for fear, by a misdirected effort, they should fall on their friends. At length, beams with iron hooks at their ends, called harpoons, began to be thrown from the Carthaginian upon the Roman ships; and, as they could not cut the harpoons themselves, nor the chains suspended by which they were thrown upon their ships, as each of the ships of war of the enemy, being pulled back, drew with it a transport, connected with it by a harpoon, you might see the fastenings by which the transports were joined together rent asunder, and in another part a series of many vessels dragged away together. In this manner chiefly were all the bridges of communication torn to pieces, and scarcely had the troops who fought in front time to leap to the second line of ships. About six transports were towed away to Carthage, where the joy felt was greater than the occasion warranted; but their delight was increased from the reflection, that, in the midst of so many successive disasters and woes, one event, however trifling, which afforded matter of joy, had unexpectedly occurred; besides which, it was manifest that the Roman fleet would have been well nigh annihilated, had not their own commanders been wanting in diligence, and had not Scipio come up to its assistance in time.
11