17 They then constituted commissioners, by whose advice the generals, Lucius Paullus and Lucius Anicius, were to regulate the affairs of their provinces; ten for Macedon, and five for Illyria. Those nominated for Macedon were, Aulus Postumius Luscus, Caius Claudius, both of whom had been censors, Caius Licinius Crassus, the colleague of Paullus in the consulship; he then held the province of Gaul, as he had the command continued to him. To these, who were of consular rank, the senate added Cneius Domitius Ænobarbus, Servius Cornelius Sulla, Lucius Junius, Caius Antistius Labeo, Titus Numisius Tarquiniensis, and Aulus Terentius Varro. The following were nominated for Illyria: Publius Ælius Ligus, a man of consular rank, Caius Cicereius, Cneius Bæbius Tamphilus, (he had been prætor the last year, as had Cicereius many years before,) Publius Terentius Tuscivicanus, and Publius Manilius. The consuls were then advised by the senate, that, as one of them must go into Gaul, in the room of Caius Licinius, who was appointed a commissioner, they should, as soon as possible, either settle their provinces between themselves, or cast lots, as might be agreeable to them. They chose to cast lots; when Pisæ fell to Marcus Junius, (who was ordered to introduce to the senate the embassies that came to Rome from all quarters, with congratulations before he went to his province,) and Gaul to Quintus Ælius.
18 But although men of such characters were sent on the commission, that confident hopes might be entertained that the generals, influenced by their counsel, would determine on nothing derogatory either to the clemency or dignity of the Roman people, yet the heads of a plan of settlement were considered in the senate, that the said commissioners might carry, from Rome to the generals, an outline of the entire plan. First, it was determined, that “the Macedonians and Illyrians should be free; in order to demonstrate to all the world that the arms of the Roman people did not bring slavery to the free, but freedom to slaves, and that the nations which already enjoyed freedom, should be convinced that it would be safe and permanent under the protection of the Roman people; and that such nations as lived under regal government should be convinced that their princes, under awe of the Roman people, would be, at present, more just and mild; and that, should war break out at any time between their kings and the Roman people, the issue would bring victory to the latter, and liberty to themselves. It was also provided, that the farming both of the Macedonian mines, which produced a very large profit, and that of crown lands, should be abolished; as business of this kind could not be managed without the intervention of revenue farmers; and wherever a tax-contractor was employed, either the rights of the people were a nonentity, or the freedom of the allies destroyed. Nor could the Macedonians themselves conduct such affairs; for while they afforded the managers opportunities of acquiring plunder for themselves, there never would be wanting causes of disputes and seditions. It was further determined, that there should be a general council of the nation; lest the perverseness of the populace might, some time or other, convert into pestilent licentiousness the liberty granted by the senate with a wholesome degree of moderation: but that Macedonia should be divided into four districts, each of which should have a council of its own; and that they should pay to the Roman people half the tribute which they used formerly to pay to their kings.” Similar instructions were given respecting Illyria. Other particulars were left to the generals and commissioners; whose investigation of matters on the spot would enable them to form more accurate plans.
19 Among the many embassies from kings, nations, and states, Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, attracted the general attention in a very particular manner; for he was received by those who had served along with him in the late war, with even greater demonstration of kindness than if Eumenes had come in person. Two reasons, both, apparently, highly honourable, had induced him to come; one to offer congratulations, which were quite proper, in the case of a victory to which he himself had contributed; the other to complain of disturbances raised by the Gauls, and of a defeat received, by which his brother’s kingdom was endangered. But he had, also, secret hopes of honours and rewards from the senate, which he could scarcely receive without infringing on his duty to his brother. There were among the Romans some evil advisers, who were working on his ambition by promises. They told him, that “the general opinion concerning Attalus and Eumenes was, that one was a steady friend to the Romans, and that the other was not a faithful ally either to them or to Perseus. That it was not easy to determine whether the requests that he might make for himself, or those against his brother, were more likely to be obtained from the senate; so entirely were all disposed to gratify the one, and to grant nothing to the other.” As the event proved, Attalus was one of those who would have coveted all that hope can promise to itself, had not the prudent admonitions of one friend put a curb on those passions, which were growing wanton through prosperity. He had, in his retinue, a physician, called Stratius sent to Rome by Eumenes, who distrusted Attalus, for the purpose of watching over his conduct, and giving him faithful advice, if he should perceive him swerve from his allegiance. This man, although he had to address ears already prepossessed, and a mind already biassed, yet, by addressing him at judiciously selected times, restored the thing to its proper state, even after it had become almost desperate. He said that “different kingdoms grew into power by different means: that their kingdom being lately formed, and unsupported by any long-established strength, was upheld solely by the concord of the brothers; for, while one bore the title and the ornament which distinguishes the head of a sovereign, each of the brothers was considered as a king. As to Attalus, in particular, being the next in years, was there any man who did not consider him as king? and that, not only because they perceived his present power to be great, but because there was not a doubt but he must ascend the throne, in a very short time, in consequence of the age and infirmity of Eumenes, who had no legitimate issue” (for he had not at this time acknowledged the son who afterwards reigned). “To what purpose, then, employ violence, to attain what must come to him presently without any exertions on his part? Besides, a new storm had fallen on the kingdom, from the insurrection of the Gauls, which could scarcely be resisted by the most perfect harmony and union of the brothers. But if to a foreign war domestic dissensions were added, the evil could not be checked; nor would he effect any thing else than preventing his brother from dying on the throne, and depriving himself of the hope of ascending it. If both modes of acting were honourable,—either to preserve the kingdom for his brother, or to take it from him,—yet the honour that would result to him from the preservation of the kingdom, since it was united to brotherly love, would be the greater. The latter indeed, would be detestable, and bordering nearly on parricide; what room, then, could there be for deliberation? For, whether did he mean to demand a share of the kingdom, or to seize the whole? If he would demand a share, then both, by the separation of their strength, would be rendered feeble, and exposed to injuries of every kind; if the whole, would he then require his elder brother, reduced to a private station, at his time of life and labouring under such bodily infirmities, to live in exile, and die in such a wretched state. For, not to mention the catastrophes of undutiful brothers recorded in stories, the fate of Perseus seemed a striking instance, who, prostrated at the feet of a victorious enemy, laid down, in the temple of the Samothracians, before the gods, who, as it were, demanded satisfaction for his crimes, the crown which he had seized after the death of his brother. “Those very men,” he continued, “who not through friendship for him, but enmity to Eumenes, had instigated him to the adoption of such measures, would praise his affection and firmness, if he preserved to the last his allegiance to his brother.”
20 These arguments prevailed in the mind of Attalus. Therefore, on being introduced to the senate, he congratulated them on their success, and made mention of his own services during the war, and those of his brother, whatever he had performed; of the defection of the Gauls, which had lately happened, and which had caused violent commotions; and he entreated that they should send ambassadors to those people, by whose authority they should be summoned to desist. After delivering these messages respecting the general interest of the state, he requested a grant of Ænus and Maronea to himself. Having thus disappointed the hopes of those who expected that he, after arraigning his brother’s conduct, would solicit a partition of the kingdom, he retired from the senate-house. Seldom on other occasions was either a king or private person heard with such a degree of favour and approbation by all; during his stay he received presents and honours of every description, and they treated him similarly at his departure. Of the many embassies which came from Greece and Asia, that of the Rhodians engaged the greatest share of the public attention. At first they appeared in white, the colour which was most becoming to persons congratulating others, for had they worn mourning, they might seem to be lamenting the misfortunes of Perseus. Afterwards the senate being consulted by the consul, Marcus Junius, (the ambassadors standing in the Comitium,) whether they should grant them lodgings, entertainments, and an audience of the senate they voted that no duty of hospitality was due to them. When the consul came out of the senate-house, after the Rhodians had told him that they were come to congratulate the Romans on their late success, and to clear their state of the charges made against it, and requested an audience of the senate, he returned this answer, that “it was the custom of the Romans both to grant audience in their senate, and to perform other acts of kindness and hospitality to their friends and allies; but that the Rhodians had not deserved in that war to be ranked in the number of friends or allies.” On hearing this, they all prostrated themselves on the ground, beseeching the consul and all present not to think it right that new and false imputations should operate more powerfully to their prejudice, than their long course of services, which they had themselves witnessed. They immediately assumed a mourning dress, and going round to the houses of the principal men, supplicated with prayers and tears that their cause might be heard before they were condemned.
21 Marcus Juventius Thalna, the prætor who had the jurisdiction between natives and foreigners, stimulated the public resentment against the Rhodians, and promulgated a bill, that “war should be declared against the Rhodians, and that the people should choose one of the magistrates of the present year, who should be sent with a fleet to carry on that war;” with the hope that he himself should be the person chosen. Two of the plebeian tribunes, Marcus Antonius and Marcus Pomponius, opposed this proceeding. But the prætor, on his part, commenced the business in an unprecedented and pernicious manner; for without first consulting the senate, and without acquainting the consuls, of his own sole judgment he proposed to the people the question, “was it their will and order that war should be declared against the Rhodians?” whereas, ever until then, the senate was first consulted concerning the war, and then the business was laid before the people. On the other side, the plebeian tribunes opposed this proceeding; although it was a received rule that no tribune should protest against a proposal, until opportunity was given to private citizens to argue for and against it; in consequence of which it had often happened that some, who had avowed no intention of protesting, having discovered defects in the law from the discourses of those who opposed it, on that account did protest; and some who came avowedly to protest, abstained from it, being convinced by the arguments of those who spoke in favour of the law. On this occasion the prætor and tribunes vied with each other in doing every thing out of time. While the tribunes blamed the hasty proceeding of the prætor, they imitated the example by protesting before their time. The only pretence they alleged for it was, the necessity for adjourning the entire deliberation concerning the Rhodians until the return of the general and the ten commissioners from Macedon, who, after most carefully weighing the matter according to the communications received in their letters and tablets, were likely to give certain information relative to the feelings which each state had borne towards Perseus or the Romans. But when the prætor, nevertheless, persisted in his determination, the matter came to this, that Antonius, the tribune of the commons, after bringing the ambassadors before the people, dragged down from the rostrum Thalna, who was attempting to ascend it contrary to his wishes, and was beginning to address the people, and gave the Rhodians an opportunity of speaking before the general assembly. But although the violent and, impetuous attempt of the prætor had been defeated by corresponding firmness on the part of the tribune, still anxiety did not as yet leave the minds of the Rhodians; for the senators bore them a most unfriendly feeling; so that the Rhodians were relieved from the impending evil for the present, rather than completely rescued from it. Therefore, when a meeting of the senate was granted to them, after requesting it for a long time and frequently, on their introduction by the consul they lay at first for a long time with their persons prostrated on the ground; afterwards, when the consul raised them up and ordered them to speak, Astymedes, whose appearance was most calculated to excite pity, spoke to the following effect: “Conscript fathers, this grief and degradation of allies, who enjoyed your friendship a short time ago, cannot fail to be pitied even by those who are irritated against us; and how much more justly will compassion enter your minds, if you will but consider the hard conditions under which we this day, in your presence, plead the cause of our state, already almost condemned. Others are accused prior to their condemnation; nor do they suffer punishment until their guilt is ascertained.
22 “Whether we Rhodians have transgressed, or not is yet doubtful; meanwhile we suffer punishments and disgraces of all sorts. In former times, when we visited Rome, after the conquest of Carthage, after the defeat of Philip, and after that of Antiochus, we were escorted from a mansion furnished us by the public, into the senate-house, to present our congratulations to you, conscript fathers, and, from the senate-house to the Capitol, carrying offerings to your gods. But now, from a vile and filthy inn, scarcely gaining a reception for our money, treated as enemies, and forbid to lodge within the city, we come in this squalid dress to the Roman senate-house: we, Rhodians, on whom a short time ago you bestowed the provinces of Lycia and Caria; on whom you conferred the most ample rewards and honours. You order even the Macedonians and Illyrians, as we hear, to be free; though they were in servitude before they waged war with you: (nor do we envy the good fortune of any; on the contrary, we acknowledge therein the usual clemency of the Roman people.) But will you convert, from allies into enemies, the Rhodians, who were guilty of nothing more than remaining neutral during the war? You are in truth the same Romans, who boast that your wars are successful because they are just; who glory not so much in the issue of them, in that you conquer, as in the commencement of them, because you do not undertake them without a just cause. The attack on Messana, in Sicily, made the Carthaginians your enemies. The siege of Athens, and attempt to reduce Greece to slavery, together with the assistance of men and money given to Hannibal, led to hostilities with Philip. Antiochus, on the invitation of the Ætolians, your enemies, came over in person with a fleet from Asia to Greece; and by seizing Demetrias, Chalcis, and the pass of Thermopylæ, endeavoured to dispossess you of empire. The motives to your war with Perseus were his attacks on your allies, and his putting to death the princes and leading members of certain states. But, if we are doomed to ruin, to what motive will our misfortune be ascribed? I do not yet separate the cause of the state from that of our countrymen, Polyaratus and Dino, with others, whom we have brought hither in order to deliver them into your hands. But supposing every one of us were equally guilty, I ask what was our crime with respect to the late war? We favoured the interest of Perseus; and we have supported that prince against you in like manner as, in the wars of Antiochus and Philip, we supported you against those kings. Now, in what manner we are accustomed to assist our allies, and with what vigour to conduct wars, ask Caius Livius and Lucius Æmilius Regillus, who commanded your fleets on the coasts of Asia. Your ships never fought a battle without us. We, with our own fleet, fought one engagement at Samos and a second on the coast of Pamphylia, against that distinguished commander, Hannibal. The victory, which we gained in the latter, was the more glorious to us because, although we lost a great part of our navy and the flower of our youth in the unsuccessful action at Samos, we were not deterred from venturing again to give battle to the king’s fleet on its return from Syria. These matters I have mentioned not out of ostentation, (that would ill become our present situation,) but to remind you in what way the Rhodians assist their allies.
23 “When Philip and Antiochus were subdued, we received from you very ample rewards. If the fortune of Perseus were such as yours now is by the favour of the gods and your own courage, and we were to go into Macedon, to the victorious king, to demand rewards from him, what merit should we have to plead? Is it that he was aided by us with money or corn; with land or sea forces? Had we defended his garrison? where had we, either under his generals or by ourselves? If he should inquire where were our soldiers or ships acting in concert with his; what answer could we give? Perhaps we might be pleading our cause before him, if successful, as we are now, before you. All that we have gained by sending ambassadors to both, to mediate a peace, is, that we received no thanks from either party, and incurred from one of them accusations and danger. Perseus, indeed, might justly object to us what you cannot, conscript fathers, that at the commencement of the war we sent ambassadors to Rome, promising supplies of all sorts requisite for the war, and engaging to be ready, as in former wars, with our docks, our arms, and our men. It was your fault that we did not perform this, since you, whatever was the reason, rejected our assistance on that occasion. We have, therefore, neither acted in any instance as enemies, nor been deficient in the duty of well-affected allies; but we were prevented by you from performing it. What then shall we say? Rhodians, has there been nothing said or done in your country which you disapprove of, and at which the Roman people would be justly offended? Henceforth I do not mean to defend what has been done, (I am not so weak,) but to distinguish the cause of the public from the guilt of private men. For there is no nation whatever that has not, generally, some ill-disposed members, and always an ignorant populace. I have heard, that even among the Romans there have been men who worked themselves into power by courting the multitude; that the plebeians sometimes seceded from you, and that the government was not always in your hands. If it were possible for this to happen in a state so well constituted, who can wonder at there being some among us, who, out of a wish to gain the king’s friendship, led our commons astray by bad advice? Yet they effected nothing more than our remaining inactive, without infringing on our duty. I shall not pass by that, which has been made the heaviest charge against our state during the war. We sent ambassadors at the same time to you and Perseus, to mediate a peace; and that unfortunate design was, by a furious orator, as we afterwards heard, rendered foolish to the last degree; for it is ascertained that he spoke in such a manner as Caius Popilius, the Roman ambassador, should have spoken, when you sent him to the two kings, Antiochus and Ptolemy, to induce them to cease from hostilities. But still, whether this conduct is to be called arrogance or folly, it was the same towards Perseus as towards you. States, as well as individuals, have their different characters; some are violent, others daring, others timid; some addicted to wine, others more particularly to women. Fame says that the Athenian nation was quick and bold, beyond its strength, in beginning an enterprise; and that the Lacedæmonian was dilatory and backward in entering upon business, even when confident of success. I cannot deny that Asia, throughout its whole extent, produces men too much inclined to vanity, and that the speech of even the Rhodians is too much tinctured with vain-glory, because we seem to have the pre-eminence above the neighbouring states; and that, too, owing not so much to our strength as to the marks of honour and esteem conferred on us by you. That embassy received on the spot sufficient reproof for its immediate misconduct, when it was dismissed with so severe an answer. But, if the disgrace which we then suffered was too trifling, surely the present mournful and suppliant embassy would be a sufficient expiation for an embassy even more insolent than that was. Irritable men hate arrogance; men of sense despise it, particularly if shown in words; more especially, if it be shown by an inferior towards a superior; but no one has ever yet thought it deserving of capital punishment. There was, in truth, danger lest the Rhodians should contemn the Romans! Some men have spoken, even of the gods, in terms too presumptuous; yet we have never heard of any one being struck with thunder on that account.
24 “What charge then remains, of which we are to acquit ourselves, since there has been no hostile act on our part, and the insolent language of an ambassador, though grating to the ear, has not deserved the ruin of a state. Conscript fathers, I hear that the estimate of the penalty for our secret wishes has become the subject of your conversation. Some assert that we favoured the king, and therefore that we should be punished with war; others, that we did indeed wish him success, but ought not, on that account, to suffer the penalty of war, since it has not been so instituted either by the practice or laws of any state, that if any one should wish an enemy to perish, he should be condemned, provided that he did nothing towards effecting his wishes. We feel, indeed, grateful to those who absolve us from the punishment, though not from the crime; but we lay down this law for ourselves: if we all entertained the wishes of which we are accused, we will then make no distinction between the will and the deed: let us all be punished. If some of our people in power favoured you, and others the king, I do not demand, that for the sake of us who were on your side, the favourers of the king may be saved; but I deprecate our perishing through them. You are not more inveterate against them than is our state itself; and most of them, when they ascertained this, fled, or put themselves to death, the others have been condemned by us, and they will soon be in your power, conscript fathers. The rest of us Rhodians, as we have merited no thanks during the war, so neither have we deserved punishment. Let the accumulation of our former services atone for our present dereliction of duty. You have recently waged war with three kings: let not the circumstance of our having been inactive in one of these wars, be more injurious to us than our having fought on your side in the other two has served us. Consider Philip, Antiochus, and Perseus, as you would three votes; two of them acquit us; one, although it would be unfavourable, is nevertheless doubtful. If they were to sit in judgment over us, we would be condemned. Conscript fathers, you are to decide, whether Rhodes is to continue on the earth or to be utterly destroyed. You are not deliberating concerning war, conscript fathers, for though it is in your power to declare war, it is not in your power to wage it, as not a single Rhodian will take up arms against you. If you persist in your anger, we will beg time from you, until we carry home an account of this unhappy embassy. We will then, every free person of all the Rhodians, both men and women, with all our wealth, embark in ships, and leaving the seats of our tutelar deities, both public and private, repair to Rome, where, heaping together in the Comitium, at the door of your senate-house, all our gold and silver, all the public and private property that we possess, we will submit our persons, and those of our wives and children, to your disposal; that, whatever we are to suffer, we may suffer here. Let our city be sacked and burned far away from our view. The Romans may pass a judgment, that the Rhodians are enemies; but we have also a right, in some degree, to judge ourselves; and we never will judge ourselves your enemies, nor do one hostile act, should we even suffer extreme calamities.”
25 After so mournful a speech, they all prostrated themselves again, and as supplicants, held out olive branches; but at length they were raised, and withdrew from the senate-house. They then began to ask the opinions of the senators. The most inveterate against the Rhodians were those, who as consuls, prætors, or lieutenant-generals, had been engaged in the war with Macedon. Marcus Porcius Cato was the principal supporter of their cause, who, though naturally austere, acted his part as a senator, on this occasion, with much mildness and lenity. I will not introduce here a specimen of his copious eloquence, by relating what he said: his speech is extant, and is comprised in the fifth book of his Antiquities. The answer given to the Rhodians was, that “they should neither be declared enemies, nor any longer remain in alliance with Rome.” At the head of this embassy were Philocrates and Astymedes. They determined that half their number, with Philocrates, should carry home to Rhodes an account of their proceedings; and that the other half, with Astymedes, should remain at Rome, that they might be acquainted with what passed, and inform their countrymen. For the present, they were commanded to remove their governors out of Lycia and Caria, before a certain day. This intelligence was announced at Rhodes; and although it was galling in itself, yet as the Rhodians were relieved from the dread of a greater evil, for they had feared a war, the announcement created joy. They therefore immediately voted a present, amounting in value to twenty thousand pieces of gold, and deputed Theætetus, the commander of their fleet, on that embassy. They wished to procure an alliance with the Romans; but, in such a manner, as that no order of the people should pass concerning it, nor any thing be committed to writing; for in either of these cases, if they failed in succeeding, there would be greater disgrace in the refusal. The admiral of the fleet was empowered, singly, to negotiate that business, if he could effect it without any law being brought forward at Rome on the subject; for, during a considerable length of time, they had maintained a friendship with the Romans, in such a manner as not to bind themselves by a treaty of alliance, for no other reason than that they might neither preclude the kings from all hope of their assistance, if any of them should need it, nor themselves from a participation of the advantages which might accrue from the good fortune and liberality of the said kings. At this time, however, an alliance seemed particularly desirable, not to render them more secure from others, (for excepting the Romans, they feared none,) but to make them less suspected by the Romans themselves. About this time, the Caunians revolted from them, and the Mylasensians seized on the towns of the Euromensians. The spirit of their community was not so totally broken as to hinder their perceiving, that, if Lycia and Caria were taken from them by the Romans, their other provinces would either assert their own freedom by a revolt, or be seized on by their neighbours; and that they themselves would then be shut up in a small island; within the shores of a barren country, which could by no means maintain the numerous people in so large a city. They therefore sent out with all speed, a body of troops, and reduced the Caunians to obedience, though they had received succours from Cybara: and afterwards defeated in a battle at Orthosia the Mylassians and Alabandians, who, having seized the province of Euroma, had marched against them with their allied forces.
26 Whilst these events are occurring in Rhodes, different matters are going on in Macedon and Rome; in the mean time, in Illyria, Lucius Anicius, having reduced king Gentius under his power, as before mentioned, placed Gabinius over a garrison that he posted in Scodra, which had been the capital of the kingdom; and appointed Caius Licinius commander in Rhizon and Olcinium, which were towns very conveniently situated. Leaving these two in charge of Illyria, he marched with the rest of his forces into Epirus. Here, Phanota was the first place which submitted to him; the whole multitude, with fillets on their heads, coming out to meet him. Placing a garrison there, he went over into Molossis, all the towns of which province, except Passora, Tecmo, Phylace, and Horreum, having surrendered, he marched first against Passora. The two men of the greatest authority in that city, were Antinous and Theodotus, who were remarkable for their warm attachment to Perseus, and hatred to the Romans; the same individuals had instigated the whole nation to revolt from the Romans. These men, since they had no hope of pardon, owing to their consciousness of guilt, shut the gates, that they might be buried under the general ruin of their country, and exhorted the multitude to prefer death to slavery. No man dared to open his lips against men of such transcendent power. At last one Theodotus, a young man of distinction, (when his greater dread of the Romans had overpowered the lesser fear of his own leaders,) exclaimed, “What madness has seized you, to make the public accessory to the crimes of two individuals? I have often heard mention made of men who offered themselves to death for the sake of their country; but those are the first that were ever found, who required that their country should perish for them. Why not open our gates, and submit to that power to which the whole world has submitted?” As he spoke thus, the multitude followed him; on which Antinous and Theodotus rushed out on the advanced guards of the enemy, and freely exposing themselves to their weapons, were slain, and the city was surrendered to the Romans. Through a similar obstinacy in Cephalus, a man in power, the gates of Tecmo were shut: when he was put to death, Anicius received the surrender of the town. Neither Phylace nor Horreum stood a siege. Having thus reduced Epirus, Anicius distributed his troops in winter quarters, through the most convenient towns; and returning into Illyria, held a general convention at Scodra, where the five commissioners had arrived from Rome, and to which place he had summoned the principal men from all parts of the province. There, with advice of the council, he proclaimed from his tribunal, that “the senate and people of Rome granted freedom to the Illyrians; and that he would withdraw his garrisons from all their towns, citadels, and castles. That the Issensians and Taulantians, with the Pirustans, that were included among the Dassaretians, the Rhizonites, and the Olcinians, should not only enjoy liberty, but likewise an immunity from taxes; because when Gentius was in his full strength, they had revolted to the Romans. That the same exemption was granted to the Daorseans; because they forsook Caravantius, and came over with their arms to the Romans; and that the Scodrans, Dassaretians, Selepitans, and the rest of the Illyrians, should pay half the taxes which they had formerly paid to their king.” He then divided Illyria into three districts; he made the first division out of the people above mentioned, the second comprehended all the Labeatians, and the third the Agranonites, Rhizonites, and Olcinians, with the contiguous states. Having established this constitution in Illyria, he returned into Epirus, to his winter quarters at Passaro.