The History of Rome, Books 37 to the End / with the Epitomes and Fragments of the Lost Books

by Livy

34 In the mean time an ambassador came from Antiochus to the camp,—Heraclides, a Byzantian, having mandates concerning peace. The delay and tardiness of the Romans gave him great hope that this might be attained; for he had imagined, that as soon as they set foot in Asia, they would advance in a rapid march against the king. He resolved, however, not to address himself to the consul until he had first applied to Publius Scipio, and instructions to that effect were given him by the king. In him he had the greatest hope, besides that his greatness of soul, and the fulness of his glory, tended very much to make him inclined to peace, and it was known to all nations what sort of a conqueror he had been, both in Spain and afterwards in Africa; and also because his son was then a prisoner with Antiochus. Where, and when, and by what accident he became a prisoner, is, like very many other things, not ascertained among writers. Some say, that in the beginning of the war, as he was going from Chalcis to Oreum, he was intercepted by some of the king’s ships; others, that after the army came into Asia, he was sent with a troop of Fregellans to Antiochus’s camp, to gain intelligence; that on the cavalry sallying out against him, he retreated, and having fallen from his horse in the confusion, he was together with two horsemen, overpowered, and thus conducted to the king. This however is fully ascertained, that if peace had still subsisted with the Romans, and likewise a personal friendship between the king and the Scipios, the young man could not have been treated and courted with greater kindness than he was. When the ambassador, for these reasons, had waited the arrival of Publius Scipio, as soon as he came he applied to the consul, and requested that he should hear his instructions.

35 A full council being assembled, audience was given to the ambassador, who said, that, “though many embassies about peace had already been sent backwards and forwards, without producing any effect, yet he conceived strong hopes of obtaining it, because the former ambassadors had obtained nothing. For the objects of contention in those discussions were Smyrna and Lampsacus, Alexandria in the Troad, and Lysimachia in Europe. Of these, the king had already ceded Lysimachia, that they might not say that he possessed any thing in Europe; and those cities which lay in Asia, he was now ready to deliver up as well as any others, which the Romans might wish to render independent of the king’s government, because they belonged to their party. The king was also willing to pay to the Roman people half the expense of the war.” These were the conditions of peace. The rest of his discourse was, “that, mindful of human affairs, they should use with moderation their own good fortune, and not press too severely on the misfortune of others; that they should limit their empire by Europe; that single acquisitions could be made with more ease than that necessary for holding them collectively. But if they would wish to take away some part of Asia, provided that they would define it by indisputable limits, the king, for the sake of peace and harmony, would willingly suffer his own moderate temper to be overcome by the insatiableness of the Romans.” These concessions, which appeared to the ambassador of great moment towards obtaining a peace, the Romans deemed trifling. They thought it just, that “the king should defray the whole expense occasioned by the war, because it was through his fault that it was begun. And that, not only Ionia and Æolia ought to be evacuated by the king’s troops, but as all Greece had been set free, so all the cities of that nation in Asia should also be free. That this could be effected in no other way, than by Antiochus relinquishing the possession of that part of Asia on the hither side of Mount Taurus.”

36 The ambassador, after he came to the conclusion that he could obtain no reasonable terms in the council, tried to influence the mind of Publius Scipio in private (for such were his orders). First of all he told him that the king would restore him his son without a ransom; and then, as ignorant of the disposition of Scipio as he was of the Roman manners, he promised an immense weight of gold, and, excepting the title of king, an absolute partnership in the sovereignty, if through his means he should obtain a peace. To which Scipio answered, “I am the less surprised that you are ignorant of the Romans in general, and of me, to whom you have been sent, when I see that you are unacquainted with the situation even of the person from whom you come. You ought to have kept Lysimachia to prevent our entering the Chersonese, or to have opposed us at the Hellespont to hinder our passing into Asia, if you meant to ask peace from us as from people solicitous about the issue of war. But after leaving the passage into Asia open, and receiving not only a bridle, but also a yoke, what negotiation on an equality has been left you, when you must submit to orders? I shall consider my son as a very great gift from the munificence of the king; I pray to the gods that my circumstances may never require others, my mind certainly never will require any. For such an act of generosity to me he shall find me grateful, if for a personal favour he will accept a personal return of gratitude. In my public capacity, I will neither accept from him nor give him any thing. All that I can give at present is sincere advice. Go then, and desire him in my name, to cease hostilities, and to refuse no terms of peace.” These words had no effect on the king, who thought that the chance of war would be comparatively safe, since terms were dictated to him already as if he were totally vanquished. Laying aside, therefore, for the present, all farther mention of peace, he turned his whole attention to the preparations for war.

37 The consul having made every preparation for the execution of his designs, when he had quitted the post where he lay, marched first to Dardanus, and then to Rhœteum; from both states the people came out in crowds to meet him. He then advanced to Troy, and having pitched his camp in the plain which is under the walls, when he had gone up to the city and into the citadel, he offered sacrifices to Minerva, the guardian of the citadel; the Trojans, by every act and expression of respect, showing themselves proud of the Romans being descended from them, and the Romans expressing their delight in their origin. The army marching thence, arrived, on the sixth encampment, at the source of the Caicus. To this place also king Eumenes came. He at first endeavoured to bring back his fleet from the Hellespont to Elæa, for the winter; subsequently, when by adverse winds he could not, for several days, pass the promontory of Lectos, that he might not be absent at the commencement of operations, he landed and came, with a small body of men, by the shortest road to the Roman camp. From the camp he was sent home to Pergamus, to hasten supplies of provisions; and when the corn was delivered to the persons whom the consul had ordered to receive it, he returned to the same camp. The plan was, provisions for several days being prepared, to march hence against the enemy, before the winter should prevent them. The king’s camp was near Thyatira; and Antiochus, hearing there that Publius Scipio had fallen sick and was conveyed to Elæa, sent ambassadors to conduct his son to him. As this present was highly grateful to the mind of the father, so was the satisfaction which it gave no less salutary to his body. At length, being sated with the embraces of his son, he said to the ambassadors, “Tell the king that I return him thanks; that at present I can make him no other requital than my advice; which is, not to come to an engagement, until he shall have heard that I have rejoined the army.” Although sixty-two thousand foot, and more than twelve thousand horse, inspired the king at times with hopes in the result of a battle; yet, moved by the advice of so great a man as Scipio, in whom, when he considered the uncertainty of the events of war, he placed safety in any reverse of fortune, he retired, and having crossed the Phrygian river, pitched his camp near Magnesia, which is at Sipylus. And lest, if he wished to prolong the time, the Romans might attack his works, he drew round it a fosse six cubits deep and twelve broad, and on the outside surrounded the fosse with a double rampart: on the inside bank, he raised a wall flanked with towers at small distances, by which the enemy could easily be prevented from crossing the fosse.

38 The consul, thinking that the king was still in the neighbourhood of Thyatira, came down by continued marches on the fifth day into the Hyrcanian plains. Then when he heard that the other had departed, he followed his track, and pitched his camp on the hither side of the Phrygian river, at the distance of four miles from the enemy. Here, a body of about one thousand horse, (the greatest part of whom were Gallogræcians, the rest Dahans, and archers on horseback, of other nations intermixed,) passing the river with great tumult, made an attack on the advanced Roman guards. First of all they threw into confusion those unprepared; then, when the contest continued longer, and the number of the Romans increased, as succours were easily sent from the neighbouring camp, the king’s troops, becoming weary and unable to withstand superior numbers, endeavoured to retreat; but, before they could reach the river, very many were killed on the bank, by the enemy pressing on their rear. For two days after there was quiet, neither party passing the river. On the third, the Romans passed it with their whole force, and encamped at the distance of about two miles and a half from the enemy. While they were employed in measuring and fortifying the camp, a body of the king’s troops, consisting of three thousand chosen horse and foot, approached with great rapidity and violence. The party on guard, though much inferior in number, (being only two thousand,) without calling off any of the soldiers from the fortifying of the camp, sustained the combat with equal success at first, and, in the progress of the contest, repulsed the enemy, killing a hundred, and taking about the same number. During the four ensuing days, both armies stood in order of battle, before their respective camps. On the fifth, the Romans advanced into the middle of the plain, but Antiochus did not stir; so that his rear was not so far as a thousand feet from his rampart.

39 The consul, after perceiving that he declined the contest, called a council next day, and asked their opinion, “how he ought to act if Antiochus would not give him an opportunity of engaging. For the winter was at hand, and he must either keep the soldiers in camp; or, if they chose to retire to winter quarters, defer the business of the war until summer.” The Romans never despised any enemy so much. The assembly on every side called on him to lead on immediately, and make use of the present ardour of the troops; who, as if the business were not to fight against so many thousands, but to slaughter an equal number of cattle, were ready to force their way, through trenches and ramparts, into the camp, if the enemy would not come out to battle. Cneius Domitius was sent to discover the nature of the ground, and on what side the enemies’ rampart could be approached; after he returned with a full account of every particular, it was resolved that the camp should next day be moved nearer to the enemy. On the third day, the standards were carried forward into the middle of the plain, and the soldiers began to form line. Antiochus, thinking that he could hesitate no longer, lest, by declining a battle, he should damp the courage of his men, and add to the confidence of the enemy, drew out his forces in person, advancing only so far from the enemy’s camp as to make it apparent that he was willing to come to an engagement. The Roman line was nearly uniform throughout with respect to both men and armour. There were two Roman legions, and two brigades of allies and Latins, each containing five thousand four hundred men. The Romans formed the centre, the Latins the wings. The spearmen composed the first line, the first-rank men the second, and the veterans closed the rear. Beyond this, which formed as it were the regular line of battle, the consul formed on the right of it, and in one continued line, the auxiliary troops of Eumenes, intermixed with Achæan targeteers, making about three thousand foot; beyond these he posted somewhat less than three thousand horse, of which, eight hundred belonged to Eumenes; all the rest of the cavalry were Roman: and in the extremity of the line he placed bodies of Trallians and Cretans, equal in number, who were composed of five hundred men each. His left wing did not appear to require such supports, because a river and steep banks flanked it. However, four troops of horse were posted there. This was the whole amount of the Roman force, besides two thousand Macedonians and Thracians, who had, as volunteers, accompanied the army. These were left to guard the camp. They placed sixteen elephants behind the veterans, in reserve. For besides that they were not supposed capable of withstanding the great number of the king’s elephants, which were no less than fifty-four, the African elephants are not able to cope with an equal number of Indians, either because they are inferior to them in size, (in which the Indian have much the advantage,) or in unyielding courage.

40 The king’s line was more chequered with troops of many nations, dissimilar both in their persons and armour. There was a body of sixteen thousand men armed after the manner of the Macedonians, which were called a phalanx. This formed the centre, and was divided in front into ten parts. These parts were separated by two elephants placed between each two; the line of soldiers was thirty-two ranks deep from point to rear. This was the main strength of the king’s army, and it exhibited a formidable sight, both in the other particulars of its appearance, and in the elephants towering so high among the soldiers. They were of huge bulk, and the caparisons of their foreheads and crests, and the towers fixed on their backs, with four armed men standing on each tower, besides the managers of the beasts, gave them a terrific appearance. On the right side of the phalanx, he placed five hundred Gallogræcian horsemen. To these he joined three thousand horsemen clad in complete armour, whom they call Cataphracti, or mailed. To these were added a brigade of near a thousand horse, which they called Agema. They were Medes, all picked men, with a mixture of horsemen from many other nations in that part of the world. Adjoining these, a body of sixteen elephants was placed in reserve. On the same side, a little farther on towards the wing, was the royal cohort; these were called Argyraspides[4], from the kind of armour which they wore. Next to these stood one thousand two hundred Dahan bowmen on horseback; then, three thousand light infantry, part Cretans and part Trallians, the number of each being equal; adjoining these, were two thousand five hundred Mysian archers. Four thousand Cyrtæan slingers and Elymæan archers mixed together covered the flank of the wing. Next to the left flank of the phalanx, stood one thousand five hundred Gallogræcian horse, and two thousand Cappadocians, (which were sent by king Ariarathes,) wearing the same kind of armour; then, auxiliaries of all kinds mixed together, two thousand seven hundred; then, three thousand mailed horsemen; then, one thousand other horsemen, being a royal cohort, equipped with lighter coverings for themselves and their horses, but, in other respects, not unlike the rest; they were mostly Syrians, with a mixture of Phrygians and Lydians. In the front of this body of cavalry were the chariots armed with scythes, and a kind of camels called dromedaries. These were ridden by Arabian archers, who carried thin swords four cubits long, that they might be able to reach the enemy from so great a height. Then followed another multitude, like that in the right wing,—first, Tarentines; then, two thousand five hundred Gallogræcian horsemen; then, one thousand new Cretans, and one thousand five hundred Carians and Cilicians, armed in the same manner; then, an equal number of Trallians, with three thousand targeteers (these were Pisidians, Pamphylians, and Lycians); then came brigades of Cyrtæans and Elymæans, equal to the auxiliaries placed on the right wing, and sixteen elephants, separated by a small interval. The king himself was in the right wing; the command of the left he gave to his son Seleucus, and Antipater, the son of his brother; the centre was intrusted to three, Minio, Zeuxis, and Philip, the master of the elephants.

41 A morning mist, which as the day advanced rose up in clouds, spread a general darkness; and the moisture issuing from it, and coming from the southward, wetted every thing, This circumstance, which was scarcely any inconvenience to the Romans, was very disadvantageous to the king’s troops. For the indistinctness of the light did not take away from the Romans the view of all parts of their line, since it was of moderate length; and the moisture tended but little to blunt their swords and javelins, as they were almost all heavy-armed troops. The king’s soldiers, as the line was so extensive, could not even see their wings from the centre, much less could those at the extremities see one another; and then, the moisture relaxed the strings of their bows, their slings, and the thongs of their javelins. Besides, the armed chariots, by means of which Antiochus had trusted utterly to disorder the enemy’s line, turned the terror of their operations on their owners. The manner in which they were armed was this: from the yoke, on both sides of the pole, they had lances[5] ten cubits long, projecting like horns, to transfix any thing that came in their way. At each extremity of the yoke, two scythe-blades projected, one on a line with the yoke, the other on its lower side, pointing to the ground; the former to cut through any thing that might come within its reach on the side, the other to catch such as fell, or endeavoured to go under it. At each extremity of the axle of the wheels, two scythe-blades were fastened in the same manner. The king, as we mentioned before, had placed the chariots so armed in the front, because if they were placed in the rear, or between the ranks, they must be driven through their own soldiers. Which when Eumenes saw, not being ignorant of the method of opposing them, and knowing that aid of that sort might be rendered as dangerous to one side as the other, if an opponent should cast terror into the horses, rather than attack them in a regular battle, ordered the Cretan bowmen, and slingers, and javelin-bearers, with some troops of horse, not in a body, but scattering themselves as widely as possible, to rush forwards, and pour weapons on them from all sides at once. This storm, as it were, partly by the wounds made by the missile weapons thrown from every quarter, and partly by the discordant shouts raised, so terrified the horses, that immediately, as if unbridled, they galloped about at random. The light infantry, the lightly-accoutred slingers, and the active Cretans, quickly evaded their encounter. The horsemen, following them, increased the tumult and the terror of the horses and camels, which were likewise affrighted, the clamour being multiplied and increased by the rest of the crowd of bystanders. By these means, the chariots were driven out of the ground between the two lines. When this fruitless mimicry of war was over, both parties gave the signal, and advanced to a regular engagement.

42 But that futile affair was soon the cause of real loss. For the auxiliaries in reserve, which were posted next, being terrified at the turn and disorder of the chariots, betook themselves to flight, leaving all exposed as far as the post of the mailed horsemen; to whom when the Roman cavalry, after dispersing the reserves, approached, they did not sustain their first onset. Some fled, and others, being delayed by the weight of their coverings and armour, were put to the sword. The whole left wing then gave way, and the auxiliaries, posted between the cavalry and the phalanx, being thrown into confusion, the terror spread even to the centre. Here the ranks were broken, and by the flying soldiers rushing in between them, the use of their long spears, called by the Macedonians sarissas, was hindered. The Roman legions advanced and discharged their javelins among them in disorder. Even the elephants, standing in the way, did not deter the Roman soldiers, who had learned by experience in the African wars, both to evade the onset of the animal, and, getting at one side of it, either to ply it with darts, or, if they could come near enough, to wound its sinews with their swords. The front of the centre was now almost crushed, and the reserve, being surrounded, was attacked on the rear, when the Romans perceived their troops in another quarter flying, and heard shouts of dismay almost close to their camp. For Antiochus, who commanded the right wing, having observed that the enemy, through confidence in the river, had placed no reserve there, except four troops of horse, and that these, keeping close to the infantry, left an open space on the bank of the river, made a charge on them, with a body of auxiliaries and mailed horsemen. He not only attacked them in front, but having surrounded the wing in the direction of the river, pressed them in flank also; until the routed cavalry first, and then the infantry that were next them, fled with precipitation to the camp.

43 Marcus Æmilius, a military tribune, son of Marcus Lepidus, who, in a few years after, became chief pontiff, had the charge of the camp. He, when he saw the troops flying, went out, with his whole guard, to meet them. He ordered them, first, to halt, and then to return to the fight; at the same time upbraiding them with cowardice and disgraceful flight. He then proceeded to threats,—that if they did not obey his orders, they would rush blindly on their own destruction. At last he gave orders to his own men to kill the foremost of the runaways, and with sword-wounds to drive the crowd of fugitives back against the enemy. The greater fear now overcame the less. Compelled by the danger on either side, they first halted, and then returned to the encounter, and Æmilius, with his guard, consisting of two thousand men of distinguished valour, gave a vigorous check to the furious pursuit of Antiochus. At the same time, Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, came up in good time with two hundred horse from the right wing, by which the left of the enemy had been routed, at the beginning of the engagement, as soon as he observed the flight of his friends on the left, and the tumult near the camp. When Antiochus saw those men renewing the fight, whom, but just before, he had seen running away, and another large body advancing from the camp, with a third from the line, he turned his horse to flight. The Romans, thus victorious in both wings, advanced over heaps of slain, (which had been raised principally in the centre, where the strength of the bravest men and the armour by its weight had prevented flight,) to plunder the camp. The horsemen of Eumenes first, and then the rest of the cavalry, pursued the enemy through all parts of the plain, and killed the hindmost as they overtook them. But the fugitives suffered more severe loss by the chariots, elephants, and camels intermixed, and by their own disorderly crowd; for, after they once broke their ranks, they rushed, as if blind, one upon another, and were trodden to death by the trampling of the beasts. In the camp also there was great slaughter committed, rather greater than even in the field; for the flight of the first generally tended to the camp. The guard, through confidence in the great number of these, defended their works with the more obstinacy. The Romans having been stopped at the gates and rampart, which they had expected to take at the first rush, when they did at length break through, actuated by rage, made the more dreadful carnage.