Great Britain tried to hold aloof from this international rivalry, this preparation for a war which her people and leaders hoped against hope would be averted. Royal visits of a pacific character were exchanged, parties of Great Britain’s business men visited Berlin, while leaders such as King Edward and Lord Haldane exercised all their ability in striving for some mutual ground of friendly action. Lovers of peace wrote many volumes and filled many newspapers with articles on the beneficence of that policy and the terrors of militarism—books and articles which were never seen in Germany except by those who regarded them as so many confessions of national weakness. Between 1904 and 1908 Great Britain actually reduced her naval expenditures and limited her construction of battleships in the hope that Germany would follow the lead, pleaded at two Hague Conferences for international reduction of armaments, kept away from all increase in her own almost ridiculous military establishment, urged upon two occasions (in 1912–1913) a naval holiday in construction. The following figures from Brassey’s authoritative NAVAL ANNUAL shows that her naval expenditure upon new ships in 1913 was actually less than in 1904, that Germany’s was nearly three times greater, that France and Russia and Italy had doubled theirs:

Great BritainGermanyFranceRussiaItalyAustro-Hungary
1904£13,508,176£4,275,489£4,370,102£4,480,188£1,121,753£1,329,590
19088,660,2027,795,4994,193,5442,703,7211,866,158716,662
191117,566,87711,710,8595,876,6593,240,3942,677,3023,125,000
191217,271,52711,491,1576,997,5527,904,0942,500,0003,620,881
191313,276,40011,176,4077,595,01010,953,6162,800,0003,280,473

GERMANY’S NAVAL PROBLEM

Between 1909 and 1914 British leaders became convinced, as France and Russia and other countries had long been certain, that Germany meant war as soon as she was ready; that her policy was to take the two border enemies, or rivals, first with a great war-machine which would give them no chance for preparation or success, to dictate a peace which would give her control of the sea-coasts and channel touching Britain, to make that country the seat of war preparations, naval uncertainty, perhaps financial difficulty and commercial injury, to prepare at leisure for the war which would conquer England and acquire her colonies. In the first-named year British statesmen of both parties told an amazed Parliament and country that German naval construction of big ships was approaching the British standard, that the cherished policy of a British navy equal to those of any two other nations was absolutely gone, that England would be lucky if, in a few years, she held a 60 per cent superiority over that of Germany alone, that the latter country’s naval construction was clearly aimed at Britain and could be for no other than a hostile purpose. British ships had already been recalled from the Seven Seas to hold the North Sea against the growing naval power of a nation which had 5,000,000 soldiers behind its ships as compared with England’s 250,000 men scattered over the world. From that date in 1909 all who shared in the statecraft of the British Empire understood the issue to be a real one—with France and Russia as allies or without them.

What was back of this situation? Germany was already dominant in Continental Europe. It had compelled Russia to submit when Austria in 1908 annexed the Slav states of Bosnia and Herzegovina and defied Servia to interfere or its proud patron at St. Petersburg to prevent the humiliation; it had brought France to her knees over the Morocco incident and the Delcasse resignation, and would have done so again in 1911 if Great Britain had not ranged herself behind the French republic; it held the issues of peace and war between the great Powers during the Balkan struggles of 1912 and 1913 and prevented Servia from winning its legitimate fruits of victory or Montenegro from holding what it had won; it had watched with delight the defeat of unorganized Russia at the hands of Japan and saw what its writers described as a decadent British Empire holding in feeble hands a quarter of the earth in fee, with revolt coming in Ireland, rebellion seething in India, dissatisfaction in South Africa, separation upon the horizon in Canada and Australia. Here lay the secret of German naval policy, of German hopes that Britain would remain out of the inevitable struggle with France and Russia, of German ambitions for a world-empire.

GERMAN AMBITIONS

The German nation had not up to the passing of Bismarck been the enemy of the British people and until its belated entrance upon the field of world politics and expansion the people had not even been rivals. In the long series of European wars between 1688 and 1815, the German states were allies and friends of England. After that, Prussia, and then the German Empire, became gradually a great national force in the world and its spirit of unity, pride of power, energy in trade, skill and success in industry, vigor of development in tariffs, progress in military power and naval construction were, from the standpoint of its own people, altogether admirable. Following the Franco-Prussian War it had steadily attained a position of European supremacy. Then came the increase of population and trade, the desire for colonies, the restriction of emigration to foreign countries.

It was a natural though difficult ambition. The marriage of Queen Wilhelmina, and later the birth of a heir, averted any immediate probability of acquiring Holland and, with it, the Dutch colonial possessions, except by means of force. The assertion of the United States’ Monroe Doctrine checked German efforts which had been directed to South America and concentrated in Brazil, where 100,000 Germans had settled and where trade relations had become very close. British diplomacy of a trade, as well as political character, in Persia, prevented certain railway schemes from being carried out, which would have given Germany a dominating influence in Asia Minor and on the Persian Gulf. Although the partition of Africa gave the German Empire nearly one million square miles and an obvious opening for colonization and power, the inexperience and ineptitude of German officials in Colonial government, the dislike, also, of Germans for emigration and the fact that the movement of settlers abroad steadily decreased in late years, tended to prevent, on the Continent, an expansion which would have been assured under British colonization and business effort.

At the same time the acquisition of these and other regions such as Samoa was significant. Prior to 1870 Germany was a geographical expression which meant a loose combination of States with sometimes clashing interests, and incoherent expression, and varied patriotism. German trade was then small, the industries too poor to compete with those of Britain, while its people possessed not an acre of soil beyond their European boundaries. Since then it had become a closely-united people with an army of over five million men—admittedly the best-trained troops in the world; with a trade totalling $4,400,000,000 and competing in Britain’s home market, taking away her contracts in India and some of the colonies, beating her in many foreign fields; with an industrial production which included great steel works such as Krupps, ship-building yards said to be of greater productive power than those of Britain, factories of well-kept character operating at high pressure with workmen trained in the best technical system of the world today; with other productive conditions aided by high protective duties and with exports totalling (1910) $2,020,000,000 and imports of $2,380,000,000; with Savings Bank deposits in 1911 totalling $4,500,000.0000 as against a British total of $1,135,000,000.

Couple these conditions with Colonial ambitions dwarfed, or unsuccessful in comparison with British success; continental power as supreme, by virtue of military strength, as Napoleon’s was one hundred years before by the force of genius, but hampered, as was his, by the power of Britain on the seas; a productive force of industry increasing out of all proportion to home requirements, competing with British commerce in every corner of the world and threatened by a possible but finally postponed combination of British countries in a system of inter-Empire tariffs; a population of 64,000,000, increasing at the rate of one million a year and having no suitable opening for emigration or settlement within its own territories; and we have conditions which explained and emphasized German naval construction. Both German ambition and German naval construction were therefore easily comprehensible.