The First Seven Divisions / Being a Detailed Account of the Fighting from Mons to Ypres

by Lord Ernest Hamilton

Why the Germans did not pursue with more vigour will never be known till the history of this period comes to be written from the German side. The failure to pursue after Mons is intelligible. While the 2nd A.C. was defending the group of manufacturing towns north of the Valenciennes road, the 1st A.C. on the right was thrown forward in échelon, and formed a standing menace to the left flank of the advancing enemy. A too eager pursuit, in advance of the general line, might well have resulted in the isolation and capture of the German right.

At Le Cateau, however, there was no such risk. Here the German attack had been mainly concentrated against the 5th Division, evidently with the idea of turning the British right flank, and forcing in a wedge between the 1st and 2nd Army Corps. This was in effect done, and all that remained was for the Germans to push their advantage home in order to separate, at any rate, a large percentage of the 2nd A.C. from the main body on its left. This could have been effected without any fear of a flank attack from the 1st A.C, that corps being at the time far too scattered and distant to make any concerted move; and in any case being hopelessly cut off by the Sambre.

Why this programme was not carried through to its consummation can only be guessed at. It may be that the enemy had only imperfect information as to the movements of the 1st A.C.; or it may be that they were deterred by the knowledge that General d'Amade was hurrying up on their right flank from the direction of Arras with the 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions; or it may be again that the advancing troops had been too roughly handled by the British at bay to allow of pursuit. This last hypothesis is not only the most flattering to British self-esteem, but it is also eminently possible. In any case the fact remains that they did not pursue. Sir Horace, on the other hand, had no idea of letting this supineness on the part of the enemy influence his own policy.

The troops were kept moving. On the afternoon of the 26th, the 5th Division managed to get back as far as Estrées, and the 3rd Division to Vermand and Hargicourt, each arriving at its destination about dark. The weather was very bad, and the majority of the men were crowded into farm-barns, but many dropped by the roadside where they were and slept, heedless of the pouring rain.

On the far side of the river the 4th and 6th Brigades, whom we last saw at Landrecies and Maroilles, got to Etreux and Hannappes respectively about 2 p.m., and bivouacked by the roadside; but the 5th Brigade, moving by way of Taisnières and Prisclies, could get no further than Barzy, and was therefore still far behind the line of the 2nd A.C. retreat, and, in fact, of its own division. The 2nd Brigade got to Oisy without mishap. The 1st Brigade was not so fortunate, the Munster Fusiliers being overtaken at Bergues and captured en masse with the exception of some 150 who escaped with the aid of the 15th Hussars. Two guns of the 118th Battery, which were with them were captured at the same time. A mile or two further south, on the high ground just beyond Etreux, the brigade was again attacked, the Black Watch, who were then doing rear-guard, coming under a severe artillery fire. This was most effectively replied to by the 117th Battery under Major Packard and the pursuit was checked. The battery in withdrawing was charged by a squadron of German cavalry, but the charge died away under the fire of the Black Watch.

The story of the rescue of the Munsters by the 15th Hussars is one of which the latter regiment may well be proud. Two troops only of the 15th Hussars were engaged, and yet the number of honours that fell to them is remarkable. Mr. Nicholson got the Cross of the Legion of Honour, Sergt. Papworth got the Victoria Cross, and Sergt. Blishen, Corpl. Shepherd and Corpl. Aspinall the D.C.M.

The story of this affair is as follows: It was reported to the General commanding that the Munster Fusiliers were in trouble, and the 15th Hussars, who were acting as divisional cavalry, were sent back to help. The country in the neighbourhood of Bergues is a difficult one, being traversed by numerous narrow byways cutting in all directions, and the 15th Hussars, not knowing just where the Munster Fusiliers were, separated into troops and beat the country northwards. Just south of Bergues, where the road from that place meets the main road to La Capelle, Mr. Nicholson's troop found 150 of the Munster Fusiliers in great difficulties, with some Germans in pursuit not 200 yards distant. He at once dismounted the troop and, sending the horses off for shelter to a farmyard behind, lined the hedges on the side of the main road and opened fire on the Germans. These retired to a farm some 200 yards up the road, from which they presently brought a machine-gun to bear on the hedges, and under cover of this they shortly afterwards emerged, driving a herd of cattle before them down the road. The Hussars, however, shot down both cattle and Germans and sent the survivors scuttling back once more into the farm.

In the meanwhile the Hon. E. Hardinge's troop, having heard the firing, arrived on the scene from another direction and—also dismounting—crept up to a position from which they could command the farmyard, and opened fire on the Germans massed inside, doing tremendous execution at first, as it was a complete surprise. The Germans, however, quickly recovered themselves and returned the fire with machine-guns. Almost at the first discharge Mr. Hardinge fell mortally wounded, and Sergt. Papworth took over command of the troop.

Bodies of the enemy were now seen advancing on all sides, and it was obvious that, if the little British force was to escape being surrounded, it was time to move. There is always a disposition on such occasions for very tired men to throw up the sponge and surrender. In the present instance, however, any such inclination was summarily checked by the energy and determination of Mr. Nicholson and Sergt. Papworth, who, taking prompt charge of the situation, brought the whole party—Munsters and all—safely out of the difficulty. They had to put in twenty-eight miles of steady marching before they finally caught up with their division.

On the 27th the retreat was resumed, the troops starting as usual in the small hours of the morning. The 1st Division, in place of following the route taken by the 2nd Division, crossed the Sambre and went through Wassigny to Hauteville; the 2nd Division went to Mont d'Origny, and the 3rd and 5th Divisions joined up at Ham, the former, which had been greatly harassed and delayed throughout by hostile cavalry and horse artillery, arriving some hours after the other. On arrival at its destination the whole division dropped by the side of the road and slept.