On the morning of the 28th, while the 2nd Coldstream were on the left of the 4th Brigade at what was known as the Tunnel post, the men of Captain Follett's company were sent out in a very thick mist to reconnoitre. It was a risky undertaking, for the German lines were very close. Suddenly the mist lifted, and two out of the three were instantly shot, the third getting home with only a graze. As leaving them where they lay meant fourteen hours' exposure before they could be got in under cover of darkness, Pte. Dobson volunteered to try and get them in at once. The undertaking appeared on the face of it an absolute impossibility, as it involved crossing a good deal of open ground in full view of the enemy. However, Dobson crawled out and managed to reach the men, one of whom he found dead, and the other wounded in three places. He applied first-aid dressings and then crawled back. A few minutes later he crawled out again, this time in company with Corpl. Brown, the two men dragging a stretcher between them on which the wounded man was placed and dragged back into safety, none of the three being hit. It need scarcely be added that Dobson got the Victoria Cross for this most remarkable performance, Corpl. Brown being awarded the D.C.M.
Towards the end of September operations in the Champagne country, as has been said, were beginning to stagnate. The Aisne had ceased to be a battlefield on which contending forces strove for position, and met in open shock on the downs, or in the beet fields. It had degenerated into a scene of mutual siege, where, in parallel lines of trenches, two armies were content to sit down and block progress. In view of the steady decrease in the distance between the hostile trenches, artillery operations had gradually assumed a more or less complimentary character and the game of war became restricted to sniping and construction work. With each succeeding day the position became more and more aggravated as trenches were made deeper and more secure, and entanglements of all kinds reduced still further the possibility of surprise or assault. For the soldier on duty such operations have but little interest; for the historian or the student of war they have none. We may, therefore, turn without reluctance to the more general situation, which by now was rapidly beginning to develop in interest.
The end of September and the beginning of October found both the Germans and the Allied Armies extending their flanks westward. As growing familiarity with the trench system of warfare began to make it clear to both sides that no further progress was possible by means of direct pressure, the German and Allied leaders began to scent a more favourable outlet for their energies on the western flank of operations, where—and where only—a roadway still lay open. The gradual shifting of German troops westward, or, to be more accurate, north-westward, could have no meaning but that of an attempt to force their way into France along the flat plains of Western Flanders; and no sooner was such an intention made plain than a corresponding movement was made by the Allies in an endeavour to forestall the enemy and envelop his flank before he could extend it. It was clear that the German move postulated the speedy capture of Antwerp, as the fall of that fortress was a necessary preliminary to any extended movement along the Belgian seaboard. A considerable British force was in process of being sent to Antwerp, and in addition to this force, the 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division were landed at Zeebrugge on October 7th, with a view to co-operating either with the Antwerp troops or with the main Allied Army as circumstances dictated.
A consideration of these several important factors in the situation suggested to the C. in C. the desirability of entrusting the western extension movement, in the first instance, to the British Army at the moment occupying the Aisne trenches. Not only would such an exchange of positions greatly increase the facilities for bringing up supplies and for communications generally with England, but, in the event of the co-operation of the 7th and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, it would have the advantage of putting that detached body of troops in touch with the left of the main British Army and so of consolidating the command.
General Joffre at first demurred, on account of the obvious objections attending the transfer from one set of troops to another of trenches situated so very close to those of the enemy as were ours on the Aisne, such transfer only being possible at night and under the strictest precautions. The C. in C, however, was insistent, and in the end the French General was persuaded that the advantages of the plan outweighed the drawbacks. There can be no question now but that the judgment of the C. in C. was fully endorsed by the event.
The transfer of troops was begun on October 3rd, on which day the cavalry set out by road for Flanders, and two days later the 2nd A.C. started entraining for St. Omer at Pont Ste. Maxence and Soissons. Nothing could have been more auspicious than the start of the cavalry as they turned their backs on the Aisne valley. The heavy rains of mid-September had been succeeded by a spell of magnificent weather, and on the morning of the 3rd it was at its best. The sun shone out of a clear sky, and, slanting over the backs of the men as they rode, fell full on the wooded slopes above Le Moncel and Chivres, where the tints of autumn were already beginning to show among the green. Below, down the valley, the winding Aisne showed up here and there, reflecting back the blue of the sky. The spirits of all ranks were in tune with the weather and the scene. Trench warfare offers no opportunities to cavalry—as cavalry—and the change westward at any rate carried with it the promise of increased action.
MANŒUVRING WESTWARD
General Foch, with his Head Quarters at Doulens, at this time commanded all the French troops north of Noyon, and the Flanders plan of campaign was arranged between him and the C. in C. as follows: The 2nd A.C. was to occupy the canal line from Aire to Béthune, and the 3rd A.C. on arrival was to extend that line northward. The road running from Béthune to Lille was to be the dividing line between French and British, and the aim of the British force was to be to wheel to the right and so menace the flank of the Germans facing the 21st French Army Corps under General Maistre. The 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division from Belgium were to co-operate in this general wheeling movement as circumstances permitted.
This scheme, as things turned out, was destined to be entirely upset by the fall of Antwerp on October 9th. For the first week it worked admirably, and the cavalry patrols and infantry outposts opposed to us fell back—as had been anticipated—before our advance. Then German reinforcements began to come up. Four Army Corps were railed up from the eastern frontier, to which were presently added some 90,000 troops released by the fall of Antwerp.