Elements of Criticism, Volume III.

by Lord Henry Home Kames

8. Many actions may be exerted internally and many effects produced, of which we are not conscious. When we investigate the ultimate cause of animal motions, it is the most probable opinion, that they proceed from some internal power: and if so, we are, in this particular, unconscious of our own operations. But consciousness being imply’d in the very conception of deliberating, reasoning, resolving, willing, consenting, these operations cannot go on without our knowledge. The same is the case of passions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated a passion or emotion, but what we are conscious of.

9. The mind is not always in the same state: it is at times chearful, melancholy, severe, peevish. These different states may not improperly be denominated tones. An object, by making an impression, produceth an emotion or passion, which again gives the mind a certain tone suited to it.

10. Perception and sensation are commonly reckoned synonymous terms, signifying the consciousness we have of objects; but, in accurate language, they are distinguished. The consciousness we have of external objects, is termed perception. Thus we are said to perceive a certain animal, a certain colour, sound, taste, smell, &c. The consciousness we have of pleasure or pain arising from external objects, is termed sensation. Thus we have a sensation of cold, of heat, of the pain of a wound, of the pleasure of a landscape, of music, of beauty, of propriety, of behaviour, &c. The consciousness we have of internal action, such as deliberation, resolution, choice, is never termed either a perception or a sensation.

11. Conception ought to be distinguished from perception. External things and their attributes are objects of perception: relations among things are objects of conception. I see two men, James and John: the consciousness I have of them is a perception: but the consciousness I have of their relation as father and son, is termed a conception. Again, perception relates to objects really existing: conception to fictitious objects, or to those framed by the imagination.

12. Feeling, beside denoting one of the external senses, has two different significations. Of these the most common includes not only sensation, but also that branch of consciousness which relates to passions and emotions: it is proper to say, I have a feeling of cold, of heat, or of pain; and it is not less proper to say, I have a feeling of love, of hatred, of anger, or of any other passion. But it is not applied to internal action: for it is not proper to say, that a man feels himself deliberating or resolving. In a sense less common, feeling is put for the thing that is felt; and in this sense it is a general term for every one of our passions and emotions.

13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impression be made upon our body, is probable from reason, and is ascertained by experience. But it is not necessary that we be made sensible of the impression. It is true, that in touching, tasting, and smelling, we feel the impression made at the organ of sense: but in seeing and hearing, we feel no impression. We know indeed by experience, that before we perceive a visible object, its image is spread upon the retina tunica; and that before we perceive a sound, an impression is made upon the drum of the ear: and yet here, we are not conscious either of the organic image or the organic impression: nor are we conscious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception. All we can say, is, that we see that river, or hear that trumpet[96].

14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recall an object in this manner, it appears to me the same as in the original survey, only more faint and obscure. For example, I saw yesterday a spreading oak growing on the brink of a river. I endeavour to recall it to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of it or representative image? Not so. I transport myself ideally to the place where I saw the tree yesterday; upon which I have a perception of the tree and river, similar in all respects to the perception I had of it when I viewed it with my eyes, only more obscure. And in this recollection, I am not conscious of a picture or representative image, more than in the original survey: the perception is of the tree itself, as at first. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively surveying a fine statue, I close my eyes. What follows? The same object continues, without any difference but that it is less distinct than formerly. This indistinct secondary perception of an object, is termed an idea. And therefore the precise and accurate definition of an idea, in contradistinction to an original perception, is, “That perception or consciousness of a real object, which a person has by exercising the power of memory.” Every thing one is conscious of, whether internal or external, passions, emotions, thinking, resolving, willing, heat, cold, &c. as well as external objects, may be recalled as above by the power of memory[97].

15. The original perceptions of external objects, are either simple or complex. A sound may be so simple as not to be resolvable into parts: so may a taste and a smell. A perception of touch, is generally compounded of the more simple perceptions of hardness or softness, joined with smoothness or roughness, heat or cold, &c. But of all the perceptions of external sense, that of a visible object is the most complex; because the eye takes in more particulars than any other organ. A tree is composed of its trunk, branches, leaves: it has colour, figure, size: every one of these separately produceth a perception in the mind of the spectator, which are all combined into the complex perception of the tree.

16. The original perception of an object of sight, is more complete, lively, and distinct, than that of any other external sense: and for that reason, an idea or secondary perception of a visible object, is more distinct and lively than that of any other object. A fine passage in music, may, for a moment, be recalled to the mind with tolerable accuracy: but the idea of any other object, and also of sound after the shortest interval, is extremely obscure.

17. As the range of an individual is commonly within narrow bounds of space, opportunities seldom offer of an enlarged acquaintance with external objects. Original perceptions therefore, and their corresponding ideas, are a provision too scanty for the purposes of life. Language is an admirable contrivance for supplying this deficiency; for by language, the original perceptions of each individual may be communicated to all; and the same may be done by painting and other imitative arts. It is natural to suppose, that the most lively ideas are the most susceptible of being communicated to others. This holds more especially when language is the vehicle of communication; for language hitherto has not arrived at any greater perfection than to express clear and lively ideas. Hence it is, that poets and orators, who are extremely successful in describing objects of sight, find objects of the other senses too faint and obscure for language. An idea thus acquired of an object at second hand, ought to be distinguished from an idea of memory; though their resemblance has occasioned the same term to be apply’d to both. This is to be regretted; for when knowledge is to be communicated by language, ambiguity in the signification of words is a great obstruction to accuracy of conception. Thus nature hath furnished the means of multiplying ideas without end, and of providing every individual with a sufficient stock to answer, not only the necessities, but even the elegancies of life.