To give all possible solemnity to his accession Napoleon ordered that the Senate itself should proclaim in Paris the organic 'Senates-consulte', which entirely changed the Constitution of the State. By one of those anomalies which I have frequently had occasion to remark, the Emperor fixed for this ceremony Sunday, the 30th Floral. That day was a festival in all Paris, while the unfortunate prisoners were languishing in the dungeons of the Temple.
On the day after Bonaparte's accession the old formulae were restored. The Emperor determined that the French Princes and Princesses should receive the title of Imperial Highness; that his sisters should take the same title; that the grand dignitaries of the Empire should be called Serene Highnesses; that the Princes and titularies of the grand dignitaries should be addressed by the title of Monseigneur; that M. Maret, the Secretary of State, should have the rank of Minister; that the ministers should retain the title of Excellency, to which should be added that of Monseigneur in the petitions addressed to them; and that the title of Excellency should be given to the President of the Senate.
At the same time Napoleon appointed the first Marshals of the Empire, and determined that they should be called Monsieur le Marechal when addressed verbally, and Monseigneur in writing. The following are the names of these sons of the Republic transformed into props of the Empire: Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Massena, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Davoust, and Besaieres. The title of Marshal of the Empire was also granted to the generals Kellerman, Lefebvre, Perignon, and Serrurier, as having served as commander-in-chief.
The reader cannot have failed to observe that the name of Lucien has not been mentioned among the individuals of Bonaparte's family on whom dignities were conferred. The fact is, the two brothers were no longer on good terms with each other. Not, as it has been alleged, because Lucien wished to play the part of a Republican, but because he would not submit to the imperious will of Napoleon in a circumstance in which the latter counted on his brother's docility to serve the interests of his policy. In the conferences which preceded the great change in the form of government it was not Lucien but Joseph who, probably for the sake of sounding opinion, affected an opposition, which was by some mistaken for Republicanism. With regard to Lucien, as he had really rendered great services to Napoleon on the 19th Brumaire at St. Cloud, and as he himself exaggerated the value of those services, he saw no reward worthy of his ambition but a throne independent of his brother. It is certain that when at Madrid he had aspired to win the good graces of a Spanish Infanta, and on that subject reports were circulated with which I have nothing to do, because I never had any opportunity of ascertaining their truth. All I know is that, Lucien's first wife being dead, Bonaparte, wished him to marry a German Princess, by way of forming the first great alliance in the family. Lucien, however, refused to comply with Napoleon's wishes, and he secretly married the wife of an agent, named, I believe, Joubertou, who for the sake of convenience was sent to the West Indies, where he: died shortly after. When Bonaparte heard of this marriage from the priest by whom it had been clandestinely performed, he fell into a furious passion, and resolved not to confer on Lucien the title of French Prince, on account of what he termed his unequal match. Lucien, therefore, obtained no other dignity than that of Senator.
—[According to Lucien himself, Napoleon wished him to marry the
Queen of Etruria Maria-Louise, daughter of Charles IV. of Spain, who
had married, 1795 Louie de Bourbon, Prince of Parma, son of the Duke
of Parma, to whom Napoleon had given Tuscany in 1801 as the Kingdom
of, Etruria. Her husband had died in May 1808, and she governed in
the name of her son. Lucien, whose first wife, Anne Christine
Boyer, had died in 1801, had married his second wife, Alexandrine
Laurence de Bleschamps, who had married, but who had divorced, a M.
Jonberthon. When Lucien had been ambassador in Spain in 1801,
charged among other things with obtaining Elba, the Queen, he says,
wished Napoleon should marry an Infanta,—Donna Isabella, her
youngest daughter, afterwards Queen of Naples, an overture to which
Napoleon seems not to have made any answer. As for Lucien, he
objected to his brother that the Queen was ugly, and laughed at
Napoleon's representations as to her being "propre": but at last he
acknowledged his marriage with Madame Jouberthon. This made a
complete break between the brothers, and on hearing of the execution
of the Duc d'Enghien, Lucien said to his wife, "Alexandrine, let us
go; he has tasted blood." He went to Italy, and in 1810 tried to go
to the United States. Taken prisoner by the English, he was
detained first at Malta, and then in England, at Ludlow Castle and
at Thorngrove, till 1814, when he went to Rome. The Pope, who ever
showed a kindly feeling towards the Bonapartes, made the
ex-"Brutus" Bonaparte Prince de Canino and Duc de Musignano.
In 1815 he joined Napoleon and on the final fall of the Empire
he was interned at Rome till the death of his brother.]—
Jerome, who pursued an opposite line of conduct, was afterwards made a King. As to Lucien's Republicanism, it did not survive the 18th Brumaire, and he was always a warm partisan of hereditary succession.
But I pass on to relate what I know respecting the almost incredible influence which, on the foundation of the Empire, Bonaparte exercised over the powers which did not yet dare to declare war against him. I studied Bonaparte's policy closely, and I came to this conclusion on the subject, that he was governed by ambition, by the passion of dominion, and that no relations, on a footing of equality, between himself and any other power, could be of long duration. The other States of Europe had only to choose one of two things—submission or war. As to secondary States, they might thenceforth be considered as fiefs of the French Government; and as they could not resist, Bonaparte easily accustomed them to bend to his yoke. Can there be a stronger proof of this arbitrary influence than what occurred at Carlsruhe, after the violation of the territory of Baden, by the arrest of the Duc d'Enghien? Far from venturing to make any observation on that violation, so contrary to the rights of nations, the Grand Duke of Baden was obliged to publish, in his own State, a decree evidently dictated by Bonaparte. The decree stated, that many individuals formerly belonging to the army of Condé having come to the neighbourhood of Carlsruhe, his Electoral Highness had felt it his duty to direct that no individual coming from Condé's army, nor indeed any French emigrant, should, unless he had permission previously to the place, make a longer sojourn than was allowed to foreign travellers. Such was already the influence which Bonaparte exercised over Germany, whose Princes, to use an expression which he employed in a later decree, were crushed by the grand measures of the Empire.
But to be just, without however justifying Bonaparte, I must acknowledge that the intrigues which England fomented in all parts of the Continent were calculated to excite his natural irritability to the utmost degree. The agents of England were spread over the whole of Europe, and they varied the rumours which they were commissioned to circulate, according to the chances of credit which the different places afforded. Their reports were generally false; but credulity gave ear to them, and speculators endeavoured, each according to his interest, to give them support. The headquarters of all this plotting was Munich, where Drake, who was sent from England, had the supreme direction. His correspondence, which was seized by the French Government, was at first placed amongst the documents to be produced on the trial of Georges, Moreau, and the other prisoners; but in the course of the preliminary proceedings the Grand Judge received directions to detach them, and make them the subject of a special report to the First Consul, in order that their publication beforehand might influence public opinion, and render it unfavourable to those who were doomed to be sacrificed. The instructions given by Drake to his agents render it impossible to doubt that England wished to overthrow the Government of Bonaparte. Drake wrote as follows to a man who was appointed to travel through France:—
The principal object of your journey being the overthrow of the
existing Government, one of the means of effecting it is to acquire
a knowledge of the enemy's plans. For this purpose it is of the
highest importance to begin, in the first place, by establishing
communications with persons who may be depended upon in the
different Government offices in order to obtain exact information of
all plans with respect to foreign or internal affairs. The
knowledge of these plans will supply the best means of defeating
them; and failure is the way to bring the Government into complete
discredit—the first and most important step towards the end
proposed. Try to gain over trustworthy agents in the different
Government departments. Endeavour, also, to learn what passes in
the secret committee, which is supposed to be established at St
Cloud, and composed of the friends of the First Consul. Be careful
to furnish information of the various projects which Bonaparte may
entertain relative to Turkey and Ireland. Likewise send
intelligence respecting the movements of troops, respecting vessels
and ship-building, and all military preparations.
Drake, in his instructions, also recommended that the subversion of Bonaparte's Government should, for the time, be the only object in view, and that nothing should be said about the King's intentions until certain information could be obtained respecting his views; but most of his letters and instructions were anterior to 1804. The whole bearing of the seized documents proved what Bonaparte could not be ignorant of, namely, that England was his constant enemy; but after examining them, I was of opinion that they contained nothing which could justify the belief that the Government of Great Britain authorised any attempt at assassination.