I know not whether Napoleon recollected the motive assigned by Louis for at first refusing the crown of Holland, namely, the climate of the country, or whether he calculated upon greater submission in another of his brothers; but this is certain, that Joseph was not called from the throne of Naples to the throne of Spain until after the refusal of Louis. I have in my possession a copy of a letter written to him by Napoleon on the subject. It is without date of time or place, but its contents prove it to have been written in March or April 1808. It is as follows:—
BROTHER:—The King of Spain, Charles IV., has just abdicated. The
Spanish people loudly appeal to me. Certain of obtaining no solid
peace with England unless I cause a great movement on the Continent,
I have determined to place a French King on the throne of Spain.
The climate of Holland does not agree with you; besides, Holland
cannot rise from her rains. In the whirlwind of events, whether we
have peace or not, there is no possibility of her maintaining
herself. In this state of things I have thought of the throne of
Spain for you. Give me your opinions categorically on this measure.
If I were to name you King of Spain would you accept the offer? May
I count on you? Answer me these two questions. Say, "I have
received your letter of such a day, I answer Yes," and then I shall
count on your doing what I wish; or say "No" if you decline my
proposal. Let no one enter into your confidence, and mention to no
one the object of this letter. The thing must be done before we
confess having thought about it.
(signed) NAPOLEON.
Before finally seizing Holland Napoleon formed the project of separating Brabant and Zealand from it in exchange for other provinces, the possession of which was doubtful, but Louis successfully resisted this first act of usurpation. Bonaparte was, too intent on the great business in Spain to risk any commotion in the north, where the declaration of Russia against Sweden already sufficiently occupied him. He therefore did not insist upon, and even affected indifference to, the proposed augmentation of the territory of the Empire. This at least may be collected from another letter, dated St. Cloud, 17th August, written upon hearing from M. Alexandre de la Rochefoucauld, his Ambassador in Holland, and from his brother himself, the opposition of Louis to his project.
The letter was as follows:—
BROTHER—I have received your letter relating to that of the Sieur
de la Rochefoucauld. He was only authorised to make the proposals
indirectly. Since the exchange does not please you, let us think no
more about it. It was useless to make a parade of principles,
though I never said that you ought not to consult the nation. The
well-informed part of the Dutch people had already acknowledged
their indifference to the loss of Brabant, which is connected with
France rather than with Holland, and interspersed with expensive
fortresses; it might have been advantageously exchanged for the
northern provinces. But, once for all, since you do not like this
arrangement, let no more be said about it. It was useless even to
mention it to me, for the Sieur de la Rochefoucauld was instructed
merely to hint the matter.
Though ill-humour here evidently peeps out beneath affected condescension, yet the tone of this letter is singularly moderate,—I may even say kind, in comparison with other letters which Napoleon addressed to Louis. This letter, it is true, was written previously to the interview at Erfurt, when Napoleon, to avoid alarming Russia, made his ambition appear to slumber. But when he got his brother Joseph recognised, and when he had himself struck an important blow in the Peninsula, he began to change his tone to Louis. On the 20th of December he wrote a very remarkable letter, which exhibits the unreserved expression of that tyranny which he wished to exercise over all his family in order to make them the instruments of his despotism. He reproached Louis for not following his system of policy, telling him that he had forgotten he was a Frenchman, and that he wished to become a Dutchman. Among other things he said:
Your Majesty has done more: you took advantage of the moment when I
was involved in the affairs of the Continent to renew the relations
between Holland and England—to violate the laws of the blockade,
which are the only means of effectually destroying the latter power.
I expressed my dissatisfaction by forbidding you to come to France,
and I have made you feel that even without the assistance of my
armies, by merely closing the Rhine, the Weser, the Scheldt, and the
Meuse against Holland, I should have placed her in a situation more
critical than if I had declared war against her. Your Majesty
implored my generosity, appealed to my feelings as brother, and
promised to alter your conduct. I thought this warning would be
sufficient. I raised my custom-house prohibitions, but your Majesty
has returned to your old system.
Your Majesty received all the American ships that presented
themselves in the ports of Holland after having been expelled from
those of France. I have been obliged a second time to prohibit
trade with Holland. In this state of things we may consider
ourselves really at war. In my speech to the Legislative Body I
manifested my displeasure; for I will not conceal from you that my
intention is to unite Holland with France. This will be the most
severe blow I can aim against England, and will deliver me from the
perpetual insults which the plotters of your Cabinet are constantly
directing against me. The mouths of the Rhine and of the Meuse
ought, indeed, to belong to me. The principle that the 'Thalweg'
(towing-path) of the Rhine is the boundary of France is a
fundamental principle. Your Majesty writes to me on the 17th that
you are sure of being able to prevent all trade between Holland and
England. I am of opinion that your Majesty promises more than
you can fulfil. I shall, however, remove my custom-house
prohibitions whenever the existing treaties may be executed. The
following are my conditions:—First, The interdiction of all trade
and communication with England. Second, The supply of a fleet of
fourteen sail-of the line, seven frigates and seven brigs or
corvettes, armed and manned. Third, An army of 25,000 men. Fourth,
The suppression of the rank of marshals. Fifth, The abolition of
all the privileges of nobility which are contrary to the
constitution which I have given and guaranteed. Your Majesty may
negotiate on these bases with the Duc de Cadore, through the medium
of your Minister; but be assured that on the entrance of the first
packetboat into Holland I will restore my prohibitions, and that the
first Dutch officer who may presume to insult my flag shall be
seized, and hanged at the mainyard. Your Majesty will find in me a
brother if you prove yourself a Frenchman; but if you forget the
sentiments which attach you to our common country you cannot think
it extraordinary that I should lose sight of those which nature
created between us. In short, the union of Holland and France will
be of all things, most useful to France, to Holland, and the whole
Continent, because it will be most injurious to England. This union
must be effected willingly or by force. Holland has given me
sufficient reason to declare war against her. However, I shall not
scruple to consent to an arrangement which will secure to me the
limit of the Rhine, and by which Holland will pledge herself to
fulfil the conditions stipulated above.
—[Much of the manner in which Napoleon treated occupied
countries such as Holland is explained by the spirit of his
answer when Beugnot complained to him of the harm done to the
Grand Duchy of Berg by the monopoly of tobacco. "It is
extraordinary that you should not have discovered the motive
that makes me persist in the establishment of the monopoly of
tobacco in the Grand Duchy. The question is not about your
Grand Duchy but about France. I am very well aware that it is
not to your benefit, and that you very possibly lose by it, but
what does that signify if it be for the good of France? I tell
you, then, that in every country where there is a monopoly of
tobacco, but which is contiguous to one where the sale is free,
a regular smuggling infiltration must be reckoned on, supplying
the consumption for twenty or twenty-five miles into the
country subject to the duty. That is what I intend to preserve
France from. You must protect yourselves as well as you can
from this infiltration. It is enough for me to drive it back
more than twenty or twenty-five miles from my frontier."
(Beugnot, vol. ii. p. 26).]—
Here the correspondence between the two brothers was suspended for a time; but Louis still continued exposed to new vexations on the part of Napoleon. About the end of 1809 the Emperor summoned all the sovereigns who might be called his vassals to Paris. Among the number was Louis, who, however, did not show himself very willing to quit his States. He called a council of his Ministers, who were of opinion that for the interest of Holland he ought to make this new sacrifice. He did so with resignation. Indeed, every day passed on the throne was a sacrifice made by Louis.
He lived very quietly in Paris, and was closely watched by the police, for it was supposed that as he had come against his will he would not protract his stay so long as Napoleon wished. The system of espionage under which he found himself placed, added to the other circumstances of his situation, inspired him with a degree of energy of which he was not believed to be capable; and amidst the general silence of the servants of the Empire, and even of the Kings and Princes assembled in the capital, he ventured to say, "I have been deceived by promises which were never intended to be kept. Holland is tired of being the sport of France." The Emperor, who was unused to such language as this, was highly incensed at it. Louis had now no alternative but to yield to the incessant exactions of Napoleon or to see Holland united to France. He chose the latter, though not before he had exerted all his feeble power in behalf of the subjects whom Napoleon had consigned to him; but he would not be the accomplice of the man who had resolved to make those subjects the victims of his hatred against England. Who, indeed, could be so blind as not to see that the ruin of the Continent would be the triumph of British commerce?
Louis was, however, permitted to return to his States to contemplate the stagnating effect of the Continental blockade on every branch of trade and industry formerly so active in Holland. Distressed at witnessing evils to which he could apply no remedy, he endeavoured by some prudent remonstrances to avert the utter, ruin with which Holland was threatened. On the 23d of March 1810 he wrote the following letter to Napoleon:—