SIRE:—The Emperor directs me to write to your Majesty as follows:—
"It is the duty of every French Prince, and every member of the
Imperial family, to reside in France, whence they cannot absent
themselves without the permission of the Emperor. Before the union
of Holland to the Empire the Emperor permitted the King to reside at
Toeplitz, is Bohemia. His health appeared to require the use of the
waters, but now the Emperor requires that Prince Louis shall return,
at the latest by the 1st of December next, under pain of being
considered as disobeying the constitution of the Empire and the head
of his family, and being treated accordingly."
I fulfil, Sire, word for word the mission with which I have been
entrusted, and I send the chief secretary of the embassy to be
assured that this letter is rightly delivered. I beg your Majesty
to accept the homage of my respect, etc.
(Signed)OTTO.
—[The eldest son of Louis, one of the fruits of his unhappy
marriage with Hortense Beauharnais, the daughter of Josephine,
the wife of his brother Napoleon, was little more than six
years of age when his father abdicated the crown of Holland in
his favour. In 1830-31 this imprudent young man joined the
ill-combined mad insurrection in the States of the Pope. He
was present in one or two petty skirmishes, and was, we
believe, wounded; but it was a malaria fever caught in the
unhealthy Campagna of Rome that carried him to the grave in the
twenty-seventh year of his age.—Editor of 1836 edition.—
The first child of Louis and of Hortense had died in 1807.
The second son, Napoleon Louis (1804-1831) in whose favour he
abdicated had been created Grand Duc de Berg et de Cleves by
Napoleon in 1809. He married to 1826 Charlotte, the daughter
of Joseph Bonaparte, and died in 1831, while engaged in a
revolutionary movement in Italy. On his death his younger
brother Charles Louis Napoleon, the future Napoleon III., first
came forward as an aspirant.]—
What a letter was this to be addressed by a subject to a prince and a sovereign. When I afterwards saw M. Otto in Paris, and conversed with him on the subject, he assured me how much he had been distressed at the necessity of writing such a letter to the brother of the Emperor. He had employed the expressions dictated by Napoleon in that irritation which he could never command when his will was opposed.
—[With regard to Louis and his conduct in Holland Napoleon thus
spoke at St. Helena:
"Louis is not devoid of intelligence, and has a good heart, but even
with these qualifications a man may commit many errors, and do a
great deal of mischief. Louis is naturally inclined to be
capricious and fantastical, and the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau
have contributed to increase this disposition. Seeking to obtain a
reputation for sensibility and beneficence, incapable by himself of
enlarged views, and, at most, competent to local details, Louis
acted like a prefect rather than a King.
"No sooner had he arrived in Holland than, fancying that nothing
could be finer than to have it said that he was thenceforth a true
Dutchman, he attached himself entirely to the party favourable to
the English, promoted smuggling, and than connived with our enemies.
It became necessary from that moment watch over him, and even
threaten to wage war against him. Louis then seeking a refuge
against the weakness of his disposition in the most stubborn
obstinacy, and mistaking a public scandal for an act of glory, fled
from his throne, declaiming against me and against my insatiable
ambition, my intolerable tyranny, etc. What then remained for me to
do? Was I to abandon Holland to our enemies? Ought I to have given
it another King? But is that case could I have expected more from
him than from my own brother? Did not all the Kings that I created
act nearly in the same manner? I therefore united Holland to the
Empire, and this act produced a most unfavourable impression in
Europe, and contributed not a little to lay the foundation of our
misfortunes" (Memorial de Sainte Helene)]—
CHAPTER XVIII.
1809.
Demands for contingents from some of the small States of Germany—
M. Metternich—Position of Russia with respect to France—Union of
Austria and Russia—Return of the English to Spain—Soult King of
Portugal, and Murat successor to the Emperor—First levy of the
landwehr in Austria—Agents of the Hamburg 'Correspondent'—
Declaration of Prince Charles—Napoleon's march to Germany—His
proclamation—Bernadotte's departure for the army—Napoleon's
dislike of Bernadotte—Prince Charles' plan of campaign—The English
at Cuxhaven—Fruitlessness of the plots of England—Napoleon
wounded—Napoleon's prediction realised—Major Schill—Hamburg
threatened and saved—Schill in Lübeck—His death, and destruction
of his band—Schill imitated by the Duke of Brunswick-Oels—
Departure of the English from Cuxhaven.
Bonaparte, the foundations of whose Empire were his sword and his. victories, and who was anxiously looking forward to the time when the sovereigns of Continental Europe should be his juniors, applied for contingents of troops from the States to which I was accredited. The Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was to furnish a regiment of 1800 men, and the other little States, such as Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Strelitz, were to furnish regiments of less amount. All Europe was required to rise in arms to second the gigantic projects of the new sovereign. This demand for contingents, and the positive way in which the Emperor insisted upon them, gave rise to an immense correspondence, which, however, was unattended by any result. The notes and orders remained in the portfolios, and the contingents stayed at home.
M. Metternich, whose talent has since been so conspicuously displayed, had been for upwards of a year Ambassador from Austria to Paris. Even then he excelled in the art of guiding men's minds, and of turning to the advantage of his policy his external graces and the favour he acquired in the drawing-room. His father, a clever man, brought up in the old diplomatic school of Thugut and Kaunitz, had early accustomed him to the task of making other Governments believe, by means of agents, what might lead them into error and tend to the advantage of his own Government. His manoeuvres tended to make Austria assume a discontented and haughty tone; and wishing, as she said, to secure her independence, she publicly declared her intention of protecting herself against any enterprise similar to those of which she had so often been the victim. This language, encouraged by the complete evacuation of Germany, and the war in Spain, the unfortunate issue of which was generally foreseen, was used—in time of peace between the two empires, and when France was not threatening war to Austria.
—[Metternich arrived in Paris as Ambassador on 4th August 1806,
after Austria had been vanquished at Austerlitz. It does not seem
probable, either from his views or his correspondence, that he
advised the rash attempt of Austria to attack Napoleon by herself;
compare Metternich tome 1. p. 69, on the mistake of Prussia in 1805
and 1806; see also tome ii. p. 221, "To provoke a war with France
would be madness" (1st July 1808). On the other hand, the tone of
his correspondence in 1808 seams calculated to make Austria believe
that war was inevitable, and that her forces, "so inferior to those
of France before the insurrection in Spain, will at least be equal
to them immediately after that event" (tome ii. p. 808). What is
curious is that Metternich's conduct towards Napoleon while
Ambassador had led even such men as Duke Dalberg to believe that he
was really so well disposed towards Napoleon as to serve his cause
more than that of Austria.