"I cannot," said he one day, "sufficiently admire the noble spirit and determined courage of poor Sulkowsky." He often said that Sulkowsky would have been a valuable aid to whoever might undertake the resuscitation of Poland. Fortunately that brave officer was not killed on that occasion, though seriously wounded. He was, however, killed shortly after.
The destruction of the French squadron in the roads of Aboukir occurred during the absence of the General-in-Chief. This event happened on the 1st of August. The details are generally known; but there is one circumstance to which I cannot refrain from alluding, and which excited deep interest at the time. This was the heroic courage of the son of Casablanca, the captain of the 'Orient'. Casablanca was among the wounded, and when the vessel was blown up his son, a lad of ten years of age, preferred perishing with him rather than saving himself, when one of the seamen had secured him the means of escape. I told the 'aide de camp', sent by General Kléber, who had the command of Alexandria, that the General-in-Chief was near Salehye'h. He proceeded thither immediately, and Bonaparte hastened back to Cairo, a distance of about thirty-three leagues.
In spite of any assertions that may have been made to the contrary, the fact is, that as soon as the French troops set foot in Egypt, they were filled with dissatisfaction, and ardently longed to return home.
—['Erreurs' objects to this description of the complaints of the
army, but Savary (tome i. pp. 66, 67, and tome i. p. 89) fully
confirms it, giving the reason that the army was not a homogeneous
body, but a mixed force taken from Rome, Florence, Milan, Venice,
Genoa, and Marseilles; see also Thiers, tome v. p. 283. But the
fact is not singular. For a striking instance, in the days of the
Empire, of the soldiers in 1809, in Spain, actually threatening
Napoleon in his own hearing, see De Gonneville (tome i.
pp. 190-193): "The soldiers of Lapisse's division gave loud
expression to the most sinister designs against the Emperor's
person, stirring up each other to fire a shot at him, and bandying
accusations of cowardice for not doing it." He heard it all as
plainly as we did, and seemed as if he did not care a bit for it,
but "sent the division into good quarters, when the men were as
enthusiastic as they were formerly mutinous." In 1796
d'Entraigues, the Bourbon spy, reports, "As a general rule, the
French soldier grumbles and is discontented. He accuses Bonaparte
of being a thief and a rascal. But to-morrow the very same soldier
will obey him blindly" (Iung's Bonaparte, tome iii. p. 152).]—
The illusion of the expedition had disappeared, and only its reality remained. What bitter murmuring have I not heard from Murat, Lannes, Berthier, Bessières, and others! Their complaints were, indeed, often so unmeasured as almost to amount to sedition. This greatly vexed Bonaparte, and drew from him severe reproaches and violent language.
—[Napoleon related at St. Helena that in a fit of irritation he
rushed among a group of dissatisfied generals, and said to one of
them, who was remarkable for his stature, "you have held seditious
language; but take care I do not perform my duty. Though you are
five feet ten inches high, that shall not save you from being
shot."—Bourrienne.]—
When the news arrived of the loss of the fleet, discontent increased. All who had acquired fortunes under Napoleon now began to fear that they would never enjoy them. All turned their thoughts to Paris, and its amusements, and were utterly disheartened at the idea of being separated from their homes and their friends for a period, the termination of which it was impossible to foresee.
The catastrophe of Aboukir came like a thunderbolt upon the General-in-Chief. In spite of all his energy and fortitude, he was deeply distressed by the disasters which now assailed him. To the painful feelings excited by the complaints and dejection of his companions in arms was now added the irreparable misfortune of the burning of our fleet. He measured the fatal consequences of this event at a single glance. We were now cut off from all communication with France, and all hope of returning thither, except by a degrading capitulation with an implacable and hated enemy. Bonaparte had lost all chance of preserving his conquest, and to him this was indeed a bitter reflection. And at what a time did this disaster befall him? At the very moment when he was about to apply for the aid of the mother-country.
From what General Bonaparte communicated to me previously to the 1st of August, his object was, having once secured the possession of Egypt; to return to Toulon with the fleet; then to send troops and provisions of every kind to Egypt; and next to combine with the fleet all the forces that could be supplied, not only by France, but by her allies, for the purpose of attacking England. It is certain that previously to his departure for Egypt he had laid before the Directory a note relative to his plans. He always regarded a descent upon England as possible, though in its result fatal, so long as we should be inferior in naval strength; but he hoped by various manoeuvres to secure a superiority on one point.
His intention was to return to France. Availing himself of the departure of the English fleet for the Mediterranean, the alarm excited by his Egyptian expedition, the panic that would be inspired by his sudden appearance at Boulogne, and his preparations against England, he hoped to oblige that power to withdraw her naval force from the Mediterranean, and to prevent her sending out troops to Egypt. This project was often in his head. He would have thought it sublime to date an order of the day from the ruins of Memphis, and three months later, one from London. The loss of the fleet converted all these bold conceptions into mere romantic visions.