Naturally, the court’s misleading[1] interpretation became the jury’s....
After the conviction, Proctor, in an affidavit, swore that one of the bullets “was, as I then testified and still believe, fired from a Colt automatic pistol of 32 calibre.... At no time was I able to find any evidence whatever which tended to convince me that the particular model bullet found in Berardelli’s body, which came from a Colt automatic pistol, which I think was number 3, and had some other exhibit number, came from Sacco’s pistol, and I so informed the District Attorney and his assistant before the trial.... At the trial the District Attorney didn’t ask me whether I had found any evidence that the so-called mortal bullet, which I have referred to as number 3, passed through Sacco’s pistol; nor was I asked that on cross-examination. The District Attorney desired to ask me that question, but I had repeatedly told him that if he did I should be obliged to answer in the negative. Consequently he put to me this question: Q. ‘Have you an opinion as to whether bullet number 3 was fired from the Colt automatic which is in evidence?’ to which I answered, ‘I have.’ He then proceeded: Q. ‘And what is your opinion? A. ‘My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired by that pistol.’” In the affidavit he then proceeded to state that he was still of the same opinion. “But I didn’t intend by that answer to imply that I had found any evidence that the so-called mortal bullet had passed through this particular Colt automatic pistol, and the District Attorney well knew that I did not so intend, and framed his question accordingly. Had I been asked the direct question whether or not I had found any affirmative evidence whatever, that this so-called mortal bullet had passed through this particular Sacco’s pistol, I should have answered then, as I do now without hesitation, in the negative.”[1]
This affidavit of Proctor’s was made the basis of a motion for a new trial before Judge Thayer. Judge Thayer found no warrant[1] in the Proctor incident for directing a new trial.
The arguments of Judge Thayer in denying the motion for a new trial cannot be set forth here because of lack of space. In them, however, he shows himself as unworthy of the responsibilities placed upon him by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. His rigid partiality, his seeking to reduce Proctor’s qualifications and authority as an expert two years after he was offered by the Commonwealth with elaborate reliance as a most important expert, in order to minimize the importance of his affidavit, his later changing of the testimony of Proctor to read “perfectly[1] consistent with” instead of “consistent with” when it suited his purposes to do so, and so on, through numerous instances, certainly violated every standard of right judicial conduct.
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, May 2, 1926, found “no error” in any of the rulings of Judge Thayer. The guilt or innocence of the defendants was not, however, in question before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. That court could not inquire as a matter of independent judgment, whether the facts as set forth in the printed record of the trial justified the verdict. What was reviewed was, in effect, the conduct of the trial judge, Thayer, which was found to have shown “no abuse of judicial discretion.”
But what is judicial discretion?
The present Chief Justice of Massachusetts has given an authoritative definition:
“Discretion in this connection means a sound judicial discretion, enlightened by intelligence and learning, controlled by sound principles of law, of firm courage combined with the calmness of a cool mind, free from partiality, not swayed by sympathy nor warped by prejudice nor moved by any kind of influence save alone the overwhelming passion to do that which is just.”