Staff—Colonel B. Hamilton, Major C. M’Grigor. 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers—Captain R. B. Blunt, Second Lieut. M. G. Crofton, Second Lieut. E. I. M. Barret. 1st Border Regiment—Captain E. D. Vaughan, Second Lieut. Muriel. 1st York and Lancaster Regiment—Second Lieut. A. H. Kearsey. 2nd Dublin Fusiliers—Captain C. A. Hensley (since dead), Major F. English. 2nd Gordon Highlanders—Second Lieut. P. D. Stewart. Non-commissioned officers and men, 279. Royal West Surrey Regiment—Second Lieut. Du Buisson. 16th Lancers (Staff)—Captain Dallas.
SPION KOP
On Tuesday the 23rd, the continuous and steady assault of the Boer position seemed to be reaching a promising climax. For four days on the heights above the Venter Spruit the English and Irish Brigades had been doggedly moving up and on, and had carried one position after another in the teeth of many guns, and in the face of discomforts and discouragements multifarious. They had achieved a great deal with comparatively small loss, viewing the masterly manner in which the Boer guns were served. Fortunately the rifle-fire of the foe was not equal in accuracy to their shell-fire, most probably for the reason that the bucolic Dutchman had lost his ancient cunning in wielding the rifle, while in the management of guns of position he was assisted—nay, relieved, by his German mercenaries. The astonishing dexterity of the Teutonic specialists in planting shells accurately at a range of over 3000 yards was a matter for marvel and admiration. Their success was attributed partly to the fact that the range had previously been marked, and also that spots had been selected over which it was known bodies of troops must eventually pass, and where it was certain every shot must be made to tell. For all that, and considering the cross-fire to which the troops were subjected on the opening days of Sir Charles Warren’s attack, the losses were small. A council of war had been held, and three courses had been sifted: first, a frontal attack by night on the second Boer position, possibly attended by terrible loss; second, retirement beyond the river to seek for a new passage; third, attack by night on the mountain of Spion Kop, thence to enfilade and dominate all the Boer positions.
TAKING THE 4·7 NAVAL GUN ACROSS THE TUGELA.
Drawing by J. Finnemore.
The last course was decided on. Spion Kop was to be attacked by night, the Boer trenches to be scooped out with the point of the bayonet, and the position held till again—by night—guns could be dragged up to assist in commanding the position of the foe. Spion Kop, the extreme left of the Boer position, once fortified, would become a key to the door of Ladysmith. So it was thought.
General Woodgate was informed of what was required of him, and Colonel Thorneycroft discussed the programme of the night attack. By his desire, satisfactory reconnaissances had been made, and there was every reason to believe that the attempt would be crowned with success. Accordingly, soon after midnight, General Woodgate, accompanied by Colonel àCourt, started forth with the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half a company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry.
In pitch darkness the troops began their march up the southern slope of the giant mountain called Thaba Emunyama. The steeps were precipitous and rocky, and had to be negotiated with extreme care. Dongas were on this side, boulders on that; these had to be crept through and leapt over with stealthy, cat-like tread lest the enemy on the summit should be forewarned. Now and then the whirr of a bullet showed that the Dutchmen were awake, and were indulging in the pastime of sniping; otherwise the still, purple night spoke of peace. Led by General Woodgate and Colonel Blomfield, the Fusiliers (who, being seasoned fighters, were specially selected for the honour of engaging in “ticklish” work) ascended softly, advancing higher and higher in single file and in cautious silence. When more than half-way up, the approaching multitude was discovered, and the Boer picket, firing, fled. But the warrior crowd pressed on, Colonel Thorneycroft now leading the way, firing never a shot, and waiting till the trusty bayonet should teach its lesson. At three o’clock the summit was reached. The rain drizzled down, the clouds wrapt the hill, but the ardour of the troops was unabated. With a wild, ringing cheer, which echoed far over the hills, the position was carried. The force then proceeded to fortify itself so far as was possible in the hard and rocky ground that covered the heights.
It must here be noted that, owing to the darkness and the impossibility of judging exact distances, the trenches that were dug were badly situated. Instead of the whole or most part of the triangular tableland of the top, the force occupied merely a cramped position on the extreme point. This point was already marked and commanded by six Boer guns, while on the very hill itself was another hostile weapon. Sneaking around the crust of the kop—on the brim, as it were, while we occupied the crown—were sharpshooters and snipers, who from thence could pelt the northern hump of the slope; but in the dense atmosphere of the early morning these facts were unknown, and the effort, under cover of the darkness, to widen our position and capture the entire triangle was not then made.