The relief of Ladysmith and Kimberley accomplished, Lord Roberts was able to adhere to the cherished Napoleonic maxim—an army should have but one line of operation, which should be carefully preserved, and abandoned only as the result of weightier considerations. This army was now being reorganised as one great whole, a task which involved gigantic labour and called for rare discrimination. But the marvellous tact, one might say magnetism, of Lord Roberts smoothed every difficulty, and the enthusiasm with which those who were brought into contact with the Commander-in-Chief alluded to him, was remarkable. An army chaplain, writing home, voiced the popular feelings for the one and only “Bobs”:—“We are serving under the best and noblest man who ever led an army. You can have no conception of the passionate and devoted affection which Lord Roberts inspires in all ranks. It is not artifice, or adroitness, or dramatic power, but a simple overflowing of the milk of human kindness. Every one notices it; all remark it. The roughest and most cynical of the brave men out here cannot escape the fascination of his delightfully quiet and natural manner, his transparent unselfishness; and one sees in him the value in a born leader of men of a clear and musical voice, and eyes bright and piercing, yet full of kindness and benevolent sympathy. He is entirely without affectation, and takes care that the troops are fed, and not stinted of recreation whenever it can be found. Nothing pleases him more than to mix with the men when at play. And he is an example to all in his regular attendance at public worship and in resting on the Lord’s Day. His staff take their ‘tone’ from him, and this is good for all who come into contact with that staff. I never met so active a man. At daybreak he is in the saddle, riding round the camp before he makes an informal inspection, without notice, of some portion of the lines. He shows no sign of failing strength or of impaired energy, and fatigue is a word not to be found in his vocabulary. I am told that the secret is frugal living and early to rest which keeps him in such excellent health. It is a privilege which all value very highly that they have had the good fortune to serve under our Field-Marshal.”
No such raptures were expended on the silent man of Egyptian fame who had made himself into the machinery of the tremendous movement, but how much his wonderful work was appreciated the following extract from the Times serves to show:—“When Lord Roberts and his Chief of the Staff reached Cape Town, we had troops of all arms in South Africa, but we had no field-army, and until we had a field-army the enemy were to a great extent masters of the position. It is not easy to realise the abilities and the unwearying energy needed to convert all the scattered raw material we possessed in South Africa and the reinforcements daily arriving from all parts of the Empire into the coherent and mobile fighting machine now directed by the Commander-in-Chief. To Lord Kitchener under him belongs the credit of that remarkable achievement. He has not only marshalled the fragmentary units of the paper army corps into a workmanlike fighting force, but in a country without roads in a European sense, and with few and light railways, he has seen that they were fed and clothed and supplied with all the innumerable articles indispensable to their efficiency. If Lord Roberts has won the battles, Lord Kitchener has been the ‘organiser of victory.’”
The result of the combined methods of these two great soldiers was little short of marvellous, and when we look back to the days of Wellington, and compare the army of his day with the army at Bloemfontein, we can but wonder and admire and congratulate ourselves.
For instance, the army at Bloemfontein, the victorious army, which had suffered exceedingly from the many annoyances of the Boers, comported themselves in their day of triumph with admirable reserve. Brave as the British warriors of old, they showed themselves men of finer stamp and higher discipline than the men who followed Wellington. We have the words of that great commander, to assure us that his force was almost incorrigible. He declared that his own troops at the beginning of the Peninsular war were “a rabble, who cannot bear success any more than Sir John Moore’s army could bear failure.” He also confessed, “I am endeavouring to tame them, but if I should not succeed, I must make an official complaint of them, and send one or two corps home in disgrace. They plunder in all directions.”
Things in Bloemfontein were very different. The victorious army under Lord Roberts walked in like the heroes they were, stopped their predatory instincts at a word, and paid their way and conducted themselves like gentlemen. Indeed the Free Staters lined their pockets almost too satisfactorily at the expense of their conquerors!
Meanwhile the enemy conspired and plotted. On the 17th of March, at Kroonstad, a great council of war was held by the two Presidents, which was attended by a strange and mongrel community. Among the motley crew were some forty Boer leaders, De Wet, De Larey, Botha, and De Villebois-Mareuil (who was killed at Boshop later on). They were not goodly to look on, as uniform was non-existent, and clean shirts were luxuries that long since had been dispensed with. The action of the Boers, their strength and weakness, came under discussion, and all decided that they must fight to the bitter end. President Kruger offered up prayer, and petitioned the Almighty to give ear to the just claims of his people, while President Steyn, when his turn came, stuck to practical matters, discussed the situation, and declared that if the English thought that because they had captured the Free State capital they had won the battle they were self-deluded. He went on to say: “How should we now continue the war? Should we, as before, defend ourselves in fortified positions, or should we try a new method? I am no soldier,” he continued, “but, according to my conviction, we ought no longer to occupy fortified positions, as the English have learned to manœuvre us out of them without fighting, for which they invariably have plenty of men. Therefore, we ought only, as much as possible, to hamper the enemy’s forward march, and, whilst threatening his rear and flank, attack him everywhere where there is a chance with small commandos without train. We must by this method proceed more offensively than hitherto, and before all turn upon his lines of communication.”
The President’s scheme was much applauded and approved, after which De Larey began to complain of the state of the Boer army, the size and irregularity of the commandos, and the huge waggon laagers behind their positions, stating that owing to these being threatened by a manœuvre of the British, the men were forced hurriedly to leave the ranks to look after the safety of the waggons. He attributed the Boers’ flight at Poplar Grove entirely to anxiety regarding these waggons. He suggested in future fighting with small commandos without train, as he declared it impossible for the Boers to succeed in wielding big armies, because when the enemy attempted to surround or outflank them the Boers lost their heads.
General Joubert proposed “that the so-called ‘veldcornetschappen,’ which are too large bodies to be led by one man, should be reduced to sections of twenty-five, with a corporal at the head. In the Transvaal this had already been initiated with very satisfactory results.” This proposal was also adopted, with the proviso that “‘veldcornets’ who did not at once adopt it should be fined £10.” The position of such a corporal is similar to that of a sergeant in Europe.
Discussion later turned to the coalfields in Dundee, and to prevent them becoming of use to the British it was decided that they must be destroyed. General Botha, however, objected to this destruction, on the principle that the fields were not contraband of war, but private property. Thereupon President Steyn argued: “I am not of a destructive disposition, but this is necessary, and in accord with the law of nations. Does any one think that the English would let a vessel with coal for the Transvaal go by? If I had to blow up half the Orange Free State in order to secure the independence of my people I would do so.” The great council then closed with the following appeal by President Steyn:——“I close the council in the hope that every officer realises the seriousness of the situation. It is a question of life or death to us, whether we shall remain an independent nation or become slaves. I do all that is in my power, and so does also my elder brother (Kruger). I am no soldier, but you officers are, and to you much is entrusted—the future of our country. Your reward will depend on your actions. Your task is a very difficult one. May God aid you! We are all mortal, but is there a more glorious death than to fall for your country and people at the head of your fellow-Burghers. May God help us! The position is indeed full of trouble, but when night is darkest dawn is nearest.”