General Pole-Carew, whose object was to establish communications with General Rundle, and for that purpose was advancing his division, with baggage train, as quickly as possible, now appeared in the direction of the main kopje, where the Boers for some days had been hiding. Here Roberts’s Horse came into action; they located the position, which was shelled with great vigour, while at the base was a containing line of the Warwickshire Regiment, which enabled the General to pass with division and baggage, almost under the nose of the enemy, in perfect safety. The Boers made a struggle to arrest the passage of the column, but it was a feeble one. They opened fire from the ridge where they had first ensconced themselves, and past which General Pole-Carew had to march, but the guns of the 85th Battery made their acquaintance with such scant ceremony and so much warmth that there was a stampede. After a few shots had burst into some groups of Boers they all speedily got out of range, taking with them their baggage and guns.
General Rundle, who as we know was waiting to march on Dewetsdorp, now communicated by heliograph that there were some 7000 of the enemy in his vicinity, and also that the country in front was crowded with low hills in which they might be hidden; but General Pole-Carew proceeded boldly to advance, and in his advance made some very necessary reprisals on such farmers, who, preferring covert-guile to open war, had been found aiding the enemy after receiving lenient treatment at our hands. He had previously set fire to a farmhouse whence, with a white flag flying over it, the Boers on Sunday had fired on our men. The farmers were told they could no longer play their double games, acting as they did at one moment the slim warrior, and the next the pastoral innocent.
Meanwhile General Rundle with some 2500 Boers in front of him was waiting till he should get into touch with General Pole-Carew. He was warned by heliograph of the approach of the 4th Cavalry Brigade and of General French, and throughout the 23rd there was little done save running the gantlet of shells which the Boers persistently fired but without doing serious damage. The Yeomanry, who already had shown remarkable “grit,” received considerable attention from the “Creusots” of the enemy, who were apparently holding on to all their eastern positions regardless of the fact that the gigantic prongs of the steel trap which was being prepared for them were shortly about to close. All the forces were now gradually getting in touch with each other, and the Dutchmen’s days were numbered. So it was thought on the night of the 23rd. The 24th broke quietly. No shot was fired. Rundle’s force swung to the left, pivoted on Chermside, who remained in defence of the position, while the mounted brigade protected the outer flank. In this General French, now arrived from the north, also assisted, and proceeded to turn the enemy’s left. The British movements were conducted with due silence and secrecy, they being determined to produce a surprise for the Boers. The surprise “came off,” as the saying is, but it was on the wrong side. When the men creeping up the stony kopje came to peer for the enemy in the trenches they found—merely trenches. “Not a bloomin’ Boer anywhere,” cried a disgusted Tommy, kicking the quiet boulders with a dilapidated boot! The Dutchmen were galloping to Ladybrand. The magnificent web that had been prepared for them was empty.
An officer in the Royal Scots gave some interesting details regarding the part taken by the Third Division in this somewhat complex movement:—
“At this time we heard rumours that one of our mounted companies, the one commanded by Captain Molyneux-Seel, was, together with the Colonial Division, besieged at Wepener. This proved to be correct. At 1.30 A.M. on 12th April we got orders to march at 9 A.M., under General Chermside, who had taken over the command of the Third Division from General Gatacre, towards Dewetsdorp and Wepener, to the relief of the column at Wepener. We reached Reddersburg that afternoon. The rain came on late that evening, and literally flooded us out. Every officer and man was up from midnight, running about trying to keep warm. We had been without tents since 31st March, and are still without them (17th May). On 14th April we moved forward again and reached Rosendal, the scene of the recent disaster to the three companies of the Royal Irish Rifles and Mounted Company of the Northumberland Fusiliers. Graves, shells, cartridges, &c., here showed the tough work they had had. We remained at Rosendal waiting for the Eighth Division to come up until 19th, and had a very wet time of it. We marched again on 19th towards Dewetsdorp, about ten miles, when we went into bivouac. On 20th we moved off at 6 A.M., and after marching some six or seven miles we found the enemy in a position of very great strength covering Dewetsdorp. Our mounted infantry and artillery drove in the advanced posts, and we established ourselves on the Wakkerstroom Hills, in front of the enemy’s position. It was then quite dark. We cooked our dinners as best we could, and lay down and slept the sleep of the just. I forgot to say that we found it very difficult to put out our outpost pickets in the dark, and one unfortunate party, belonging to the Worcestershire Regiment, actually walked into the enemy’s lines and were captured.”
The circumstances of the capture were these. A party of some twenty-five cooks and mates were carrying food to their comrades on the top of a hill. In climbing, dinner in hand, they sought an easy place of ascent, and while doing so, moved too far and found themselves practically in the Boers’ arms. Another portion of this unlucky regiment, a few days later, was drawn up for “foot and arms” inspection, and while thus exposed made a target for the enemy, who promptly seized the opportunity and killed two and wounded four of the men. Continuing his story, the officer before quoted said:—
“At 6.15 A.M. on the 21st we were standing under arms, with extra ammunition issued, awaiting orders, when, “boom,” the first gun had been fired, and the shell burst some 300 yards to our left. To cut a long story short, the battalion remained in reserve that day with the rest of the brigade, and also the next day, but early on the 23rd we were moved up to the first line. The battalion was on the right of a battery of artillery, behind the crest of the hill on a gentle slope. Except for the men in the trenches our position was unknown to the enemy, but the mere fact of manning the trenches was sufficient to draw fire, and in less than half-an-hour we had four of the men who were with the main body of the battalion behind the brow hit. The bullets flew all round us, and went “phut, phut” into the ground at our feet, and it is strange that more did not find resting-places in our bodies. In half-an-hour we had thrown up parapets in front of each company, behind which the men were safe, and we suffered no more casualties. All that day and the next we remained in this position. It was most interesting watching the shells as they burst amongst our trenches, around the gunners, and over ourselves. The Boers had nine guns, and, I believe, 5000 men. Amongst the guns was a quick-firer, a 9-pounder Krupp gun, a high-velocity gun, and two pom-poms. The last-named are unpleasant to the senses, but do little harm. The noise of the discharge resembles in the distance the knocking at a door, and the men constantly replied, ‘Come in,’ cheery and fearless fellows that they are! On the early morning of the 25th (?) we missed our usual awakener of guns and pom-poms, and eventually we found the Boers had evacuated their positions, and, alas! had escaped us and Generals French and Hart. We at once pushed forward on to Dewetsdorp.”
After all the marching and turning and fighting and manœuvring the knowing hordes had been able to steal off from every part of their horse-shoe position round Wepener entirely without chastisement! Here were five infantry and three cavalry brigades with more than seventy guns engaged in surrounding them, and yet they had succeeded in slipping through our fingers! Quite quietly, on the night of the 22nd, they had sent off their waggons; on the 23rd they had taken a parting kick at Wepener; and on the 24th they had retreated—“silently stolen away” to Ladybrand—while part of their force before Dewetsdorp, acting as a covering party, had retired on Thabanchu. That we were foiled and fooled may in a measure have been due to some tactical bungling, but certain it was that the Boers had superior advantages, for they were moving in a country entirely friendly to them, were well informed of all our intentions and movements, and were assisted in all their schemes by so-called farmers who, subtle and shifty, had comfortably surrendered the better to engage in covert operations which, while replenishing their pockets, did not imperil their skins! Moreover they escaped scot free, because Lord Roberts was not inclined to fritter more of his troops on side issues while the great object of the campaign, the seizure of Pretoria and the crippling of the Boers for prolonged military operations, was occupying his entire attention. The capture of De Wet’s forces, or a part of them, was of secondary importance in comparison to the protection of railway communication with the sea base, and De Wet’s minor successes, even when the disasters of Koorn Spruit and Reddersburg were counted among them, were not sufficient to frighten the Chief into a change of his larger strategical design.
Pursuit being useless, General French sent General Brabazon to the relief of Wepener (which was already free), and he himself occupied Dewetsdorp. On the 25th, however, he received orders from Bloemfontein to chase the Boers to Thabanchu, which, at dawn, he proceeded to do, followed later by General Rundle and the Eighth Division. Meanwhile part of the Third Division under Chermside kept the Union Jack floating in Dewetsdorp and watched over the outlying districts. General Pole-Carew, his work in the south done, started for Bloemfontein to prepare for the main advance.