Still General Rundle’s sense of humanity overcame the instinct of reprisal; for after the battle he offered shelter to the Boer wounded, even promising to tend them without considering them prisoners of war.
In the engagement at Biddulph’s Berg thirty of the British were killed and 150 wounded. Among the wounded officers were:—Grenadier Guards—Col. F. Lloyd, D.S.O., Capt. G. L. Bonham, Capt. C. E. Corkran, Lieut. E. Seymour, Lieut. A. Murray. Scots Guards—Major F. W. Romilly D.S.O. Royal Welsh Fusiliers—Captain R. S. Webber, A.D.C. to General Rundle.
On Thursday, May 31st, the troops proceeded to Ficksburg to the assistance of General Brabant, who had engaged the enemy near the Basuto Border on the Tuesday, and was still fighting.
In spite of General Rundle’s desperate fight, the 13th Battalion (Irish) Imperial Yeomanry, on whose account the battle was undertaken, had a most disastrous encounter with an overwhelming number of Boers near Lindley on the 31st of May. This battalion, as we know, was attacked on the way from Kroonstad to Lindley, and temporarily helped by the operations near Senekal. Subsequently the party came upon a superior force of Boers, and was forced to surrender.
The Cape Times gave its version of the affair:—
“The story was told by Corporal Marks, who, with Trooper Brian, alone escaped capture. The force in question consisted of about 500 men, under the command of Colonel Spragge, and was comprised of the Duke of Cambridge’s Own and the Irish and Belfast Yeomanry. The Duke’s were 125 strong. With this force was a convoy of waggons, while the scouts, of whom our informant, Corporal Marks, was in command, numbered five.
“The little battalion left Kroonstad on May 25, under hurried orders to reinforce General Colvile at Lindley without delay. On their way they captured and disarmed a troop of sixteen Boers whom they found in possession of a quantity of ammunition. Taking their prisoners with them, they hurried on at full speed, arriving at Lindley on Sunday, May 27, about noon. As they entered the town a number of horsemen were seen galloping out at the other end in the direction of Heilbron. Much to their disappointment our men found that General Colvile had left at daylight that day, after some severe fighting, for Heilbron....
“On Wednesday night, after the gallant little band had been fighting against enormous odds for three days, Colonel Spragge decided to send one scout (C. Smith), in company of a Kaffir guide, in search of General Rundle, who was supposed to be in the neighbourhood of Senekal, with an urgent message for help. Corporal Marks and Trooper Brian were instructed to leave at the same time with a similar message for General Colvile. A close Boer line had been drawn round the position of the devoted garrison, and it was necessary to pierce the cordon to reach Heilbron. The scouts left unarmed, and after a terrible night of it, Marks and Brian got through the enemy’s lines. The night was bitterly cold, and the Boers had lighted camp fires, which proved serviceable guides to the two men. They passed so close to the pickets that they could hear them talking and laughing perfectly distinctly. Taking a circuitous route, they kept the Heilbron road some distance on their right, and by rapid marching reached Colvile’s camp at seven o’clock on Thursday morning. The message was delivered to the General, whose reply was that he could do nothing. Unhappily, Smith and the Kaffir were captured by Boers, and Smith was shot on the spot.
“The following is a copy of the despatch given to Corporal Marks for delivery to Colonel Spragge:—
“‘Your message received 7 A.M. I am eighteen miles from Lindley and twenty-two from Heilbron, which latter place I hope to reach to-morrow. The enemy are between me and you, and I cannot send back supplies. If you cannot join me by road to Heilbron you must retire on Kroonstad, living on the country, and if necessary, abandoning your waggons.—(Signed) H. E. Colvile, Lieutenant-General.’
“General Colvile appears to have believed that the little force could make a dash for it and cut their way through to Kroonstad. In any case, he did not see his way to go to the help of the men who had been marching to reinforce himself. Knowing that this message could be of no possible service to Colonel Spragge, and realising the urgency of the case, Corporal Marks decided to take the responsibility of not wasting time by returning to deliver this message, and he and Brian made for Kroonstad as hard as their horses would gallop. About eight miles north-east of the town they learned that Lord Methuen was in the neighbourhood, and they reached his camp about half-past four that afternoon (Thursday). Lord Methuen immediately made preparations to relieve the plucky little force in such hard straits at Lindley, and started the same afternoon. He reached Lindley without opposition the same night. But it was too late.”
Another account said:—“The battalion, consisting of the Duke of Cambridge’s Own and three companies of Irish Yeomanry—under 500 in all—reached Kroonstad on Friday morning, May 22, after a long forced march. A few hours after their arrival they received an urgent message from General Colvile requiring them to join him without delay at Lindley, and they started at 8 P.M. that same evening with one day’s rations, reaching Lindley, fifty miles distant, on the Sunday morning. When the advanced guard reached the town they found it apparently deserted, the only signs of British occupation being empty beef and biscuit tins; and were informed that General Colvile had left at daybreak. Almost immediately they were fired at from behind walls and houses, and finding the place untenable retreated about a mile outside the town, where Colonel Spragge took up a good position on some kopjes, with a stream of water and good shelter for the horses and waggons. This place they defended, fighting by day and fortifying by night, till Thursday, at 2 P.M., on slender rations, though surrounded by greatly superior numbers. On Thursday morning the Boers were largely reinforced, and also brought up cannon—three Krupps and a ‘pom-pom,’—when the shell-fire telling dreadfully at short range, Colonel Spragge felt it would be madness to hold out longer, and surrendered after losing more than seventy-eight in killed and wounded out of his small force—when all was over some of the unwounded were so exhausted that they could hardly march into Lindley, where their gallant enemies as well as the non-combatants gave them the highest credit for the stand they had made in an almost hopeless position. Next day Lord Methuen arrived after a splendid forced march, and the wounded were set free.”
In regard to the loss of the Duke of Cambridge’s Yeomanry, there was a good deal of criticism, and accounts dealing with the raison d’être of the disaster vary. Mr. Winston Churchill, in support of Sir H. Colvile, declared that it was sent out with the absurdly inadequate escort by the fiat of a higher authority, with the full knowledge that Heilbron was surrounded by a force of Boers estimated at from 4000 to 5000 men. It was also despatched without warning, being sent, or at any rate received at Heilbron, so that it was impossible to operate from the latter place to assist its passage, especially as it was actually captured almost immediately after leaving Kroonstad, and fourteen miles from Heilbron.
“In the case of the Yeomanry, the message giving notice of the change of place, where it was to join the 9th Division from Ventersburg to Lindley, was by error addressed to the 9th Brigade, and this was not received by Sir H. Colvile till the 21st of June. The first intimation of their position was given by a messenger to General Colvile’s camp when twenty miles out of Lindley from the Yeomanry, then five miles on the other side on the Kroonstad road. The messenger asked for reinforcement and supplies, but did not represent the situation as very serious, as, in fact, at that time it was not. But at this juncture General Colvile was surrounded by a large force of Boers on his flank and rear, and short of supplies himself, and on a time march under orders to reach Heilbron on the 29th. He therefore advised Colonel Spragge to retire on the Kroonstad road, and authorised him, if necessary, to abandon his baggage, &c.”
Lord Methuen, who at the time was on the march to Kroonstad, was ordered off, as we already know, to the rescue. Within half-an-hour he had started, and by 10 A.M. on the 2nd of June he had accomplished forty-four miles in twenty-five hours. But his expedition was of no avail, for Spragge’s Irishmen had been taken prisoners. Nevertheless having arrived, Lord Methuen proceeded to attack the Boers with vigour, and after five hours’ continuous fighting, put some 3000 of them to flight.
The official list of prisoners of war showed 22 officers and 863 non-commissioned officers and men.