At the Chief’s masterly combinations, his ingenious synchronal schemes, his almost prophetic foresight regarding the positions of the enemy, and the effect of his every move upon those positions, it is impossible not to marvel—as at the amazing boldness and rapidity of execution with which was developed a design which brought him with his enormous army in little more than a month from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.
From the following general order issued on his arrival at his destination it is possible to understand the magnitude and the daring of the Chief’s plan, which, merely to read of, renders one almost breathless:—
“Pretoria, June 7.
“In congratulating the British Army in South Africa on the occupation of Johannesburg and Pretoria, the one being the principal town and the other the capital of the Transvaal, and also on the relief of Mafeking after a heroic defence of over 200 days, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-chief desires to place on record his high appreciation of the gallantry and endurance displayed by the troops, both those who have taken part in the advance across the Vaal River and those who have been employed in the less arduous duty of protecting the line of communication through the Orange River Colony.
“After the force reached Bloemfontein on March 13, it was necessary to halt there for a certain period. Through railway communication with Cape Colony had to be restored before supplies and necessaries of all kinds could be got up from the base. The rapid advance from the Modder River, and the want of forage en route, had told on the horses of the cavalry, artillery, mounted infantry, and the transport mules and oxen, and to replace these casualties a considerable number of animals had to be provided. Throughout the six weeks the army remained halted at Bloemfontein the enemy showed considerable activity, especially in the south-eastern portion of the Orange River Colony, but by the beginning of May everything was in readiness for a further advance into the enemy’s country, and on the 2nd of that month active operations were again commenced.
“On May 12, Kroonstad, where Mr. Steyn had established the so-called government of the Orange Free State, was entered. On May 17, Mafeking was relieved. On May 31 Johannesburg was occupied, and on June 5 the British flag waved over Pretoria.
“During these thirty-five days, the main body of the force marched 300 miles, including fifteen days’ halt, and engaged the enemy on six different occasions.
“The column under Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton marched 400 miles in forty-five days, including ten days’ halt. It was engaged with the enemy twenty-eight times.
“The flying column under the command of Colonel B. Mahon, which relieved Mafeking, marched at the rate of nearly fifteen miles a day for fourteen consecutive days, and successfully accomplished its object, despite the determined opposition offered by the enemy.
“The newly raised battalion of the City of London Imperial Volunteers marched 500 miles in fifty-four days, only once having two consecutive days’ halt. It took part in twenty-six engagements with the enemy.
“During the recent operations the sudden variations in temperature between the warm sun in the daytime and the bitter cold at night have been peculiarly trying to the troops, and owing to the necessity for rapid movement the soldiers have frequently had to bivouac after long and trying marches without firewood and with scanty rations.
“The cheerful spirit in which these difficulties have been overcome and hardships disregarded are deserving of the highest praise, and in thanking all ranks for the successful efforts to obtain the objects in view, Lord Roberts is proud to think that the soldiers under his command have worthily upheld the traditions of her Majesty’s army in fighting, in marching, and in the admirable discipline which has been maintained throughout a period of no ordinary trial and difficulty.
(Signed) Roberts, Field-Marshal.”
As may be imagined, the man who could accomplish so much in so short a span of time remained unperturbed by a vision of clouds on the horizon. He knew that though with the fall of Pretoria the campaign nominally ended, there were many minor passages at arms to be expected in various parts of the two Republics. There were the remnants of Botha’s army to north and east; there were De Wet and his marauders playing havoc with lines and telegraph wires, prowling in search of ill-defended convoys, and inspirited to fresh deeds of aggression by the successful capture of Colonel Spragge’s Yeomanry; there were Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp to be occupied by Sir Archibald Hunter, and Griqualand to be finally pacified by Sir Charles Warren.
Map of the Seat of War.
Still, it was unpleasant to receive the report that while the main army had been advancing, an immense force of Boers, through a series of unfortunate mistakes, had succeeded in capturing in the vicinity of Vredefort Road, a convoy and an escort of a company and a half of Highlanders on its way to Heilbron. The outline of the unhappy affair was painful in the extreme. As the mysterious circumstances attending the movements of the convoy have not yet been fully sifted, it would be unfair to accept the numerous criticisms offered on the subject, and details regarding the capture are so lost in the “fog of war,” that it is difficult to give an account of the series of muddles that brought about disaster. It appeared that though the enemy were lurking everywhere the convoy was travelling from Winburg under escort of only a company and a half “odd” men of the Brigade with orders to pick it up at Kroonstad, which place was subsequently changed to Heilbron. At Vredefort the party were to leave the rail and go by road; but shortly it received orders to await an escort that was being sent from Heilbron. General Hector MacDonald wired that it should not proceed further till escorted by a strong force of mounted troops, infantry, and artillery, as he himself, during his five days’ march, had been repeatedly in collision with the foe. The officer in command laagered up. Next day an orderly reconnoitred and failed to detect the presence of the enemy. Suspicion had been aroused, however, by the disappearance of a Colonial conductor, who, it seems, used the occasion to report to De Wet, who promptly seized the time and the opportunity. He sent in with a flag of truce a terse message, “I have 1200 men and five guns. Surrender at once.” An hour earlier Major Haig with 600 men, marching from Vredefort Road, had got to within two miles of the convoy, but hearing that the railhead was threatened had turned back. The convoy was therefore at De Wet’s mercy, and he knew it. He refused to give any terms, so the small party capitulated! General Hector MacDonald, in defence of his Highlanders, who were evidently not at fault, gave a concise account of the circumstances attending the misadventure—an account more trustworthy than those of outsiders—
“While the Brigade was at Wynberg, a company of the Black Watch was sent as escort to a convoy of pom-pom ammunition to Smalldeel railway station, and a day or two later half a company of Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders with captured arms and ammunition, and we were informed that they would join us at Kroonstad. The Brigade, however, instead of going to Kroonstad, marched by way of Ventersburg and Lindley to Heilbron, while the detached companies marched by the railway to Roodeval. As we were opposed—practically surrounded—for the last five days of our march, a wire was sent to Smalldeel not to send in a convoy until it could be escorted by a strong force of mounted troops, infantry, and artillery. The Commandant at Smalldeel, however, sent away the convoy under escort of the company and a half of Highlanders, with the result that it was captured. Perhaps the Commandant was acting under orders from the army headquarters, and that remains to be seen.”
Certain it was that the Highland Brigade, who had already been subsisting on frugal, one may say starvation, fare was left in a sorry plight, and fully appreciated the significance of the saying that too many cooks will spoil the broth. On the shoulders of which of the cooks the blame will eventually rest remains to be seen.
It was the opinion of some that sufficient precautions were not taken to insure the expedition’s transmission of supplies, and the entrenchment and strong fortification of small bodies of troops sent to guard the line of rail; and also that there was an insufficiently co-ordinated system of intelligence, in consequence of which commanding officers moving with detached forces were without definite information regarding the movements and destination of other forces, friendly or inimical, which might have to be encountered.