General French was unable to fulfil his part of the programme, firstly, because the Boers saw through his plan, and secondly, because his Division was merely the shadow of the goodly Division that had flown to Kimberley in February, and his operations were entirely handicapped, not only by the nature of the country, but by the nature of his tools. General Ian Hamilton was little better off. Broadwood’s Brigade, which once had numbered 1800, was now reduced to 400, while the Household Cavalry mustered only 63, the 12th Lancers 120, and the 10th Hussars 200. Not only were the regiments reduced in numbers, but their mounts were now of the most heterogeneous description, Basuto, Argentine, and Cape ponies doing duty for chargers, and in many cases utterly unequal to the exertion expected of them. Without this explanation it would be difficult to comprehend why so apparently large a force should have been unable to do more than rout the enemy. But when it is once understood that a considerable part of Lord Roberts’s army was now represented merely on paper, the difficulties of the latter part of the campaign may be better conceived.
The C.I.V.’s had two days of stiff battle. A private, giving an account of his experiences, declared that they were the heaviest days’ fighting he had seen. “The C.I.V.’s were in the firing line both days, and our casualties were about sixty. One of our lieutenants had a very sad death just in front of my company. I have heard two names given to the action, but I don’t know which is correct; they are Diamond Hill and Donkerskoek. Our General said it was a second Spion Kop, the Boer position being so fine, and the firing from the trenches so heavy. Our regiment had got to within about 400 yards of the position, and had fixed bayonets, but had to give up the idea of charging, for if we had half the regiment would have been swept away. One of the Boer doctors was down at our hospital after the first day’s fight, and he told us that the Boers had lost about 600 that day. They must have lost another 600 the next day, as our artillery was much nearer, and simply poured shells into them all day.”
The total losses were about 200, but most deeply deplored by all ranks was the gallant commander, the Earl of Airlie. He was as brave as he was popular, and, like all his famous fighting race, was a soldier born, not made. Besides his record of previous service, he had distinguished himself in the Modder River battle, and was twice mentioned in despatches by Lord Methuen. On one of these occasions he made himself notable for the splendid dash with which he dismounted a section of his men and drove back a party of Boers who were enfilading the British force. In May he was wounded in the fighting round Welkom, was nursed to health at Bloemfontein by Lady Airlie, and went again to the front just before the surrender of Pretoria. Two other distinguished officers fell: Major the Hon. L. Fortescue, and Lieutenant the Hon. C. Cavendish, 17th Lancers.
Besides those already noted the list of casualties during the various engagements contained the names of:—
Killed:—12th Lancers—Lieutenant G. C. de C. Wright. 82nd Battery Royal Field Artillery—Second Lieutenant W. S. Luce. New South Wales Mounted Infantry—Lieutenant Drage. 1st Royal Sussex Regiment—Captain C. J. K. Maguire. City Imperial Volunteers—Lieutenant W. B. L. Alt. Wounded:—12th Lancers—Second Lieutenant H. R. Milvain. F Battery Royal Horse Artillery—Captain R. England. Royal Lancaster Regiment Mounted Infantry—Captain J. M. Graham. Indian Staff Corps—Captain E. Barnes. New South Wales Mounted Infantry—Captain W. Holmes, Lieutenant W. R. Harrison. Kitchener’s Horse—Lieutenant J. S. Cape. 1st Royal Sussex Regiment—Second Lieutenant G. C. Morphett. 1st Derbyshire—Captain T. H. M. Green, Lieutenant A. S. Murray. 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles—Captain A. C. Macdonald. 8th Hussars—Captain E. A. S. O’Brien. 1st Coldstream Guards—Lieutenant Brett. Royal Army Medical Corps—Major H. G. Hathaway. Missing:—12th Lancers—Captain F. Egerton Green.
GUARDING THE COMMUNICATIONS—LORDS METHUEN AND KITCHENER
While the battle for the Delagoa railway line was being planned, Lord Kitchener, with a small force, pushed south and joined Lord Methuen (whose force was at Heilbron) at Vredefort station on the evening of the 10th of June. Together they decided to hunt the marauders.
In passing, it is interesting to note that at this time the following militia corps were doing unostentatious but valuable and perilous service on the lines of communication:—
3rd Royal Scots; 3rd Royal West Surrey; 3rd East Kent; 3rd Royal Lancaster; 4th Royal Lancaster; 6th Royal Warwickshire; 3rd Norfolk; 4th Somerset Light Infantry; 4th West Yorkshire; 4th Bedfordshire; 3rd Yorkshire; 6th Lancashire Fusiliers; 4th Cheshire; 3rd South Wales Borderers; 3rd King’s Own Scottish Borderers; 4th Scottish Rifles; 3rd East Lancashire; 4th East Surrey; 4th South Staffordshire; 3rd South Lancashire; 3rd Welsh; 4th Derbyshire; 6th Middlesex; 9th King’s Royal Rifles (North Cork Militia); 4th North Staffordshire; 3rd Durham Light Infantry; 4th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; 3rd Leinster; 5th Royal Munster Fusiliers; 5th Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
On the 11th Lord Methuen proceeded to scour the railway line, and found the enemy prowling within rifle range on either side of his route. Whereupon, at Rhenoster River, he overtook and engaged De Wet, over whom a temporary victory was gained. The British commander succeeded in capturing camp and etceteras, and scattering the Dutchmen in all directions, though De Wet himself, with his usual nimbleness, disappeared. During the day’s engagement Lieutenant Erle, 12th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, was slightly wounded.