Of the terribly hard work done by the 21st Brigade it has been impossible to take due note. Since the 28th of April they had covered on foot some 1200 miles, and had done more fighting and marching than any brigade at the front. They could count as many as forty-three engagements to their credit, and as one of the Sussex men said, “We have been in several tight corners, but have always come out on top.” The Irish, Scottish, and Colonial Corps had all received their meed of praise, but certain English regiments, notably the Sussex, the Wiltshire, and the Liverpool Regiments, owing to the fact of their not being prominently engaged in the “historic” battles, got less than their share of appreciation, though no better and braver and more enduring regiments could be found in the British army.
Position of Troops round the Brandwater Basin before the Surrender of Prinsloo.
Operations were now carried forward with additional vigour, for it was known that Boers, some 6000 of them, led by Roux and Prinsloo, who had not bolted with De Wet, must still be in the neighbourhood of the Caledon Valley, the river behind them, the only passes available among the snow-capped mountains, Commando Nek below Fouriesburg, Stabbert’s and Retief’s Neks near Bethlehem, and Golden Gate, leading out of the valley. But these, it must be remembered, were fairly far apart, and loopholes of necessity were many. At all these points the British, lynx-eyed, furious at being given the slip by De Wet, crouched. General Hunter himself observed Retief’s Nek, while General Bruce Hamilton barred Golden Gate, and Generals Paget and Rundle took up positions watching Stabbert’s and Commando Neks respectively.
To appreciate the nicety of the movement a glance at the map is necessary. The geographical nature of the situation in which the Boers found themselves after the battle of Bethlehem was thus concisely sketched by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson:—
“The Boers were holding a great mountain horse-shoe, of which the curved end is at the north, and the open end or back is on the Caledon River, the inside of the shoe being the basin of the Brandwater. On the right-hand limb of the shoe at the second nail from the end is Fouriesburg, and Retief’s Nek is at the top right-hand nail, the road from Ficksburg to Bethlehem going up the Brandwater valley and over Retief’s Nek.
“Outside the horse-shoe to the right, the east, the road from Fouriesburg to Harrismith goes by the Little Caledon River, which is separated by a long east and west range of hills from the hilly plain of Bethlehem. North of this range is Naauwpoort, and from the Caledon Valley to Naauwpoort the road crosses over Naauwpoort’s Nek and goes on to Harrismith on the north side of the range.”
Having blocked the passes to the best of his ability, General Hunter hoped for the best. He knew the Boers might evaporate—as they seemed so magically to do—over the mountains, but he guessed, and guessed rightly, that it would be too much of a wrench to tear themselves from their effects—horses, oxen, carts, and waggons—and these could never be dragged over the barring acclivities.
The first attack on Retief’s Nek was made on the 23rd by General MacDonald, the Highland Brigade, Lovat’s Scouts, Remington’s Guides, and a battery and two 5-inch “cow”-guns. The Boers had previously been thrown off the scent owing to the British troops having taken a wide detour, and they were somewhat surprised in their rocky caves to find themselves in the thick of lyddite, which growled and crashed and fumed at them. Then the Highland Light Infantry, with the Sussex to help them, deployed, the former bearing to left, the latter, with the 81st Battery of Field Artillery, to right, the Infantry making brilliant rushes towards the impregnable lair of the enemy, despite the murderous jets from the rifles of the Dutchmen, which spouted disaster the nearer they approached. Each battalion lost thirty men or so, but brilliant and inexhaustible as they were, found themselves unable, on the initial day, to push the attack. The Black Watch were more fortunate, however, and gallantly carving their passage with the bayonet, managed before nightfall to secure a foothold on the summit of the hills whence they could now await the morrow. At that time General Clements’s Yeomanry were attempting to force the passage of Stabbert’s Nek, gaining ground with difficulty, but clinging to it all night in a perilous position; while on the south-western fringe General Rundle demonstrated in the region of Commando Nek. The morning brought success all round. Stabbert’s Nek was forced by the renewed and sturdy efforts of the Yeomanry and the Royal Irish, and the afternoon of the 24th found the combined columns camped inside the Nek. The Boers, quickly recognising the inconvenience of their position, by noon had stampeded towards the east, hoping to cut through Naauwpoort’s Nek and gain the Harrismith Road, galloping off, however, with the sagacity of purpose for which at all times they had made themselves notable.
The losses so far were sufficiently large, but considering the importance of the position gained they were looked upon as insignificant, and General Hunter formally expressed the opinion that it was owing to the excellent work done by Lovat’s Scouts, who for days in advance had scouted, stalked, and “spied” over the country, that so few losses were recorded.
The casualties at Stabbert’s Nek were:—