The experiences of the officer before quoted were exhilarating. He said:—
“At 3 A.M. on the 8th September an order reached us, which proved to be Sir Redvers’ order for attack that morning. We breakfasted at 5.30 A.M., marched off at 6.30 A.M., forded a stream, and got under cover at the rendezvous, about four to five miles from the Boer position on Paarde Kraal. It looked quite impregnable—indeed, some of the ground between it and us seemed impassable. At 7.30 A.M. the plan of attack was explained to us. We were to be on the right (not left as the newspapers had it) in the first line, the Gordons behind us in the second line, the Royal Irish (half battalion) on our left, and on the left of them again the Devons, supported by more of Buller’s force. The battalion, nearly 1200 strong, covered an enormous front. The men extended to ten paces. We had twelve lines at first, but absorbed four very quickly, to prolong the right. After a severe trudge we reached the ravine. The near side was some 1500 yards from the Boer trenches, the far side about 1200 yards. It had precipitous sides of rock, with two small rocky gullies, down which the men climbed. Its depth was from 300 to 400 feet. At the bottom was a fast running stream, nowhere less than 2 feet in depth, with very slippery, round black rocks at the bottom.
“The men went splendidly, and when Buller saw us appear at the top of the other side and open fire he turned to General Smith-Dorrien and said, ‘By Jove! those Royal Scots are devils to go. I never saw a regiment cross such ground so quickly.’ He also mentioned the regiment specially in orders that night. The scene inside the ravine was grand. The precipitous rocky sides, the tropical vegetation, the running stream, with thickly wooded banks, together with the incessant roar of guns, bursting shells, the ‘knock-knock’ of the pom-poms, and rattle of rifles, combined to make it a weird and splendid experience. We fired by volleys and independently from the edge of the ravine for some time, whilst our artillery supported us nobly. It is impossible to overrate the value of their support. They placed their shells exactly in the right places. Between us and the trenches was a plateau of 1200 yards, without any cover at all, flat, with thin and short grass. At first we advanced by rushes, then in general lines. A grand feeling of elation carried us on regardless of anything. We got to within 200 yards and fixed bayonets. The men, full of excitement, yelled and charged, the guns ceasing exactly at the right moment—one more shell would have hit us—but it was of no use, the Boers had bolted before we reached the trenches, delayed as we were by boulders and steepness. What, however, was worst of all was the fog that now fell on the mountains. It spoilt our bag. We were right round the Boer left, but could see nothing, and except for a few caught at 200 yards by case from our guns, they slipped away.”
Of the British forces thirteen were killed, twenty-five wounded, sixteen of whom belonged to the Volunteer Company of the Gordons. This company, while marching in column about seven miles from the enemy, were caught by a shrapnel shell, which burst among them, but it was noted that they “continued to march steadily forward as if nothing had happened.” It was not the first time these fine fellows had shown surprising grit in awkward situations.
General French, who for the time had been halting at Carolina, now continued his march towards Barberton, fighting as he went. With him were Dickson’s and Gordon’s brigades of cavalry, the Suffolks and Shropshires, and the 4.7 naval guns under Captain Bearcroft. From one fortified position to another they pushed back the enemy, the Suffolks distinguishing themselves by their gallantry in clearing a formidable peak and escaping with few casualties owing to the skilfulness of their leading.
General Hutton’s Mounted Infantry marched east from Belfast viâ Rietvlei to Tafel Kop, and beyond it to Kaapsche Hoop, one of the most beautiful and formidable heights of the Drakensberg, which places command the railway valley to north and west. The view thence towards Barberton is unique. From a precipitous height you gaze over rank on rank of irregular spurs seamed with gullies of sand, russet, and orange, the cradles of alluvial gold. The object of the operation was to clear these districts of Boers and secure General French’s left flank, and also enable the Eleventh Division to advance and take possession of the railway route to Godwan Station. General Hutton’s force consisted of Colonel Alderson’s command, Brabant’s Horse, with one 15-pounder and one Hotchkiss gun, 300 men of 1st Mounted Infantry Corps, and two pom-poms. Colonel Henry’s command consisted of 400 men of the 4th Mounted Infantry Corps, with two pom-poms; Brigade troops consisting of J Battery Royal Horse Artillery, New South Wales Field Hospital, under Major Fiaschi, and New South Wales Bearer Company, under Major Eames; the Mounted Pioneers, under Lieutenant Earle, Royal Engineers, Corps of Scouts, and Telegraph Section. In a thick fog impenetrable as an iced blanket—the same that gathered around the gorges of the Spitz Kop and helped the flying Boers—the troops moved to the place of rendezvous on the Dalmanutha Road, passing the field of the battle of the previous week and the graves of many gallant fellows of the Rifle Brigade who had fallen on that occasion. The troops proceeded according to orders, marching over rough, mountainous, and capricious country, that caused so much inconvenience with the transport that as many as seven waggons upset within the space of a mile. Some waggons, though double-spanned, could not surmount several of the steep ascents; one was at an angle of 45 degrees, and had finally to be sent back some fifteen miles to Machadodorp. In fact, the road was gradually becoming so steep and unnegotiable that nearly all vehicles had to be sent back, nevertheless the top of Kaapsche Kop was reached and found to be vacated by Boers, who had taken to their heels two hours before. This gigantic march enabled the Eleventh Division to march on, and finally, to the Guards Brigade was handed over the possession of the mountain.
General Buller proceeded to occupy the region of the Mauchberg range on the 9th, in spite of some resistance from the enemy, who were at last dislodged by the King’s Royal Rifles. Among the wounded were Second Lieutenant G. Lumley Johnstone, 53rd Battery Royal Field Artillery. Regardless of infamous roads and execrable weather, the troops moved on and on towards the frowning heights of Spitz Kop. But it was a tremendous ten miles along narrow passes among mountains, some of them 6000 feet high, skirting deep gorges, and in the very teeth of the enemy, who ever and anon launched at them fire from pom-poms and musketry, yet failed to arrest the steady onward progress of men and guns. On the 10th they were at Kipgat, midway between Mauchberg and Spitz Kop, the Boers, a demoralised rabble, hurrying before them in such panic that they were unable to prevent the capture of tons of food stores, the gun tackle of a heavy gun, and some ammunition. The rest, rather than it should fall into British hands, they flung over the crags—thirteen waggons being sacrificed to the necessity for speedy flight.
Map to Illustrate the Movements for the Capture of Lydenburg.
Meanwhile the rest of the army was creeping east—creeping indeed, owing to the difficult nature of the country, that grew more and more obstructive and confounding with every mile. The Guards Brigade, with General Pole-Carew, moved from Nooitgedacht to Godwan Station on the 12th, protected on the right flank by General Hutton, who was in signalling communication with General French. This officer having crossed the Komati River on the 10th, was making his way against considerable opposition towards the hills west of Barberton, while General Ian Hamilton, having completed his task for the relief of General Buller, was leaving Helvetia for Waterval Onder.