President Steyn’s reply (dated 15th May) acknowledges receipt of letter; continues letter:—
“Great blow to me. Month ago discussed matters with your Government, agreed not to ask for armistice until things reached utmost extremity. Shall we obtain armistice? I think nothing has happened entitle us to armistice to obtain opinion of our nations. It is true Boksburg commando lost laager; General Viljoen was obliged to burn his, and blow up his Long Tom; but in spite of this we have not come to last extremity.
“Free State been four months without cannon. I also know of men laying down their arms, officers becoming cowardly. Our ammunition has long been scarce enough, still [some] left to continue. You ask what prospect of successful termination. I ask what chance was there for two small Republics when they declared war against mighty power of England? You will answer, ‘We have trusted in God’s help and foreign intervention. What reason have we for refusing to place further reliance on God?’ I have seen last European papers; I firmly believe complications will take place in Europe within next few months, which will gain our good fortune. Knowing leaders of our deputation, I cannot believe they would sit here without hope of intervention, knowing how we struggle and strive, for I know they love their Fatherland sufficiently to frankly ask the British to end the war if in their opinion intervention is hopeless. The fact that these men remain in Europe convinces me that our case is not hopeless. When armistice comes I shall ask opinion of my nation. If they refuse to give in their determination will be mine also. I do not approve of sending messenger to Europe, it shows our hand. I am deeply hurt you having taken this determination without asking my advice and have acted so hurriedly. If you have not despatched messenger do not do so until I can call my advisers. I have sent for General De Wet; he will be here next week. I will then send you opinion.
“In your letter you say you are afraid your officers will be left alone on commando.
“Here officers may surrender, but Burghers will remain steadfast. I must point out that the Orange Free State has not only spent blood and money, but will have lost its freedom by trying to help the sister Republic, and all reliance of one Afrikander on another will be destroyed for ever. It is ridiculous to think that when flooded with scum of Europe, Afrikander spirit will remain. If we wish to remain a nation now is the time to struggle. Hope you received Natal newspaper, stating Milner going nominally on leave; truth being he not allowed a free hand. In later English paper I have seen Kitchener and he cannot pull together.
“I enclose cutting Natal Witness—‘Public mind in England getting very uneasy about South Africa. There are possibilities which we are not at liberty to mention, and would, if we were, we could not (sic).’
“All these things convince me we shall be destroying all hope for our nation if we now surrender. Brothers, stand fast—take courage to your disheartened Burghers. I have received verbal information that Commandant Hausbrock had engagement with English, drove them back three times. As soon as I can call a council I will send a reply; do not take any further steps till you have heard from me.” Usual ending follows. (Signed) “Steyn.”
Further activities were pursued between the 16th and 24th of the month, when the troops were concentrated at Klerksdorp, activities which had the twofold object of intercepting Boers who might be fleeing before General Fetherstonhaugh’s force (which was sweeping the area between Lichtenburg and Klerksdorp), and of taking up assigned positions for the contemplated drive southward from the line of the Vaal to the Modder. Here again the force marched not empty-handed, 15 prisoners, 120 horses, 25 cases of dynamite, stock, vehicles, and ammunition being the prizes of numerous smartly-executed surprise visits by patrols. Viewing the number of captures in the way of horses, it seemed difficult to comprehend why more mobility could not be secured to the troops, but in reality only 20 per cent. of the prizes were fit for remount purposes, the remainder being brood mares, foals, &c.
While General Elliot was placing his force in the position above described, precautionary measures had to be taken against a recrudescence of mischief in the direction of Kimberley. Report spoke of a contemplated reinforcement of the guerillas in the Cape Colony by recruits from the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. General Smuts was associated with the movement, and the swelling hordes were to join and pass through Hoopstad on their career of devastation. Accordingly Colonel Henry, who was moving between Bloemhof and Christiana, was appointed to keep an eye on the Hoopstad district. On the 16th of July he crossed the Vaal at a point some twenty-three miles south-west of Hoopstad, and promptly secured some prisoners, waggons, and horses that were doubtless about to form part of the reinforced commando. On the 24th, in this district, he was joined by Major Paris, R.M.A., with the Kimberley column, which he had summoned from Warrenton. This officer on the way had come in collision with some 150 of the enemy, and had succeeded, through the gallantry of Dennison’s Scouts, in routing them from a strong position. The day after, effecting a juncture with Colonel Henry’s force, he again came on the enemy under Commandants Badenhorst and Erasmus, and Field-Cornet Van Aswegan. The Boers were in some strength, but Major Paris’s little force (consisting of 230 mounted men, 2 guns, a pom-pom, and 30 infantry, carried in carts) was equal to the occasion. The Boers were surrounded and attacked from three sides, and after a running fight, in which the 74th Squadron Imperial Yeomanry, the Kimberley Light Horse, and Dennison’s Scouts distinguished themselves, the enemy dispersed with amazing celerity, leaving seven burghers on the field and their field-cornet a prisoner. One of the British party was killed and three were wounded.
Brigadier-General Gilbert Hamilton’s column was also on the track of the raiders, he having moved from Klerksdorp to Wolmaranstad (on the 21st) in order to fulfil his share of the hunt. At Wolmaranstad he remained not long inactive, for the news of slinking Boers in the neighbouring kopjes came to his ears, and he quickly determined on a surprise visit to their haunts. The dawn of the 26th found Commandant Potgieter and his hardy crew surrounded in their laager at Blinklip, and General Hamilton, at the cost of only two men wounded, succeeded in putting eleven Boers out of action and securing ten more, together with waggons, horses, and supplies.
Farther to the east on the line of the Vaal, Colonel Western—who also had been at Klerksdorp—spent his time in reconnoitring along both banks of the river to Venterskroom and back to Coalmine Drift, where he was in a position to join the columns of Colonel Henry and General Elliot, which were ranging themselves in readiness for the main sweep south from the Vaal, on the west of the main line.
General Elliot’s force was now swelled by the column—from Klerksdorp—of Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson, and that—from Reitzburg—of Colonel Garratt. From these three columns he organised a fourth, consisting of 1st Dragoon Guards and two guns under Colonel Owen.
Of Colonel Garratt’s movements prior to his operations in connection with General Elliot at the end of July, a word must be said. On the 9th of July he moved to the junction of the Wilge and Vaal Rivers in order to demonstrate to the west of General Bullock, upon the right flank of General Elliot’s troops as they marched through Frankfort and Heilbron to the railway. Here, on the right bank of the Vaal, he came on a Boer laager, captured it, and made several prisoners. Later on, on the 21st, having filled up with supplies, his mounted troops chased two Boer convoys which were trekking on either bank of the Vaal near Lindique Drift, and succeeded in securing twenty-five Dutchmen, together with their waggons, carts, and cattle. Eleven of the enemy were killed and wounded in the fray. Smuts was engaged on the following day, but he and his gang fled to the hills, whence it was impossible to dislodge them. Finally, with the assistance of Colonel Rawlinson from the north and General Cunningham from Vereening, the Boers were routed from their snug positions and forced to take to the plains. Eighteen, however, were captured, and more waggons, horses, and cattle. Colonel Garratt then took up his assigned position on General Elliot’s left.
To better understand the comprehensive nature of the general sweep which followed, reference to a map is now desirable. In General Elliot’s position on the 29th of July we have the Vaal River at our back, the main railway line on our left, the Kimberley-Mafeking line on our right. The various columns were disposed so that the right rested on the Vaal south of Wolmaranstad, and the left (Rawlinson) at Vredefort. On the extreme right came Colonel Henry at Hoopstad; in rear of the left on a wide front came Colonel Garratt, for the purpose of netting fugitives who might break north. In due time, as stops on the east (simultaneously with the advance of Colonel Rawlinson), issued Major Pine Coffin and Colonel Barker (from Kroonstad and Vet River Stations respectively), and as stop on the west (to carry on and lengthen, as it were, Colonel Henry’s right arm) came General Plumer, in the region between Boshof and Modder River Station.