“The intelligence officers of the column, for some time under Colonel Wools Sampson, did their work in a most efficient manner. By various clever tactics they would locate bodies of the enemy, perhaps twenty and sometimes even fifty miles away from the camp. On their information a sudden swoop would be planned, and carried out, as a rule, successfully. On occasion the whole column would march several miles in the opposite direction to that of the object of attack. Then after the camp was formed, the horses fed, and the men about to turn in for the night, sudden orders would be given for the mounted men to march. The plans were not known generally, even by the officers, till within an hour of marching. Then the camp would be left in charge of the infantry, and the mounted men would proceed as silently as possible on their night march of from twenty to fifty miles. If guns were taken the wheels would be muffled, and every possible precaution would be taken to keep the movement secret. Through the intelligence officers knowing the roads thoroughly very few mishaps have occurred. The march was usually done in column of fours until the point was reached whence the attack was to be made. Even on the darkest nights, when it was difficult for a trooper to see his horse’s head, only very rarely has a man got off the road and lost the column. After a couple of months’ practice the men became adepts at the work.
“When the point was reached from which the attack was to be made the force would be divided into several independent squadrons and sent round the position occupied by the enemy, each squadron leader being carefully instructed about what he had to do, whether his part in the plan was to hold a nek over which the enemy would probably attempt to escape, or whether it was to rush the position at a given time. The usual plan was to make the attack just as daylight began to appear. The leading squadrons detailed for the work, as a rule with Colonel Benson at their head, would gallop for the farmhouse or laager and be right among the Boers before they were properly awake. Latterly the Boers have been taking greater precautions, and some of the commandants have made it a rule to be saddled up by three o’clock every morning. The districts operated in—Carolina, Ermelo, Middelburg, and Lydenburg—have become noted during the war for the stubborn resistance they have made. In these districts there are still considerable numbers of the enemy about, mostly split up into small lots of ten, twenty, or perhaps fifty men. There are many farms which have not been visited by any column. These are situated away from the main roads, and hidden in kloofs and valleys among the hill ranges. These contain stores of food and serve as resting-places for the enemy. The work of destroying these food depôts is steadily prosecuted, but is necessarily a slow process. The Boers, however, obtain abundant supplies from the Kaffir kraals, mealies, meat, and salt being the principal food, and, judging from the condition of the prisoners taken, the Boers thrive on it.”
While the Eastern Transvaal Scouts, under Major Young, were making their reputation for dash in this district, the South African Constabulary and Morley’s Scouts, under Captain Wood, had been doing splendid service patrolling the region of Bronkers Spruit. Boers were known to be in the valley, and the Constabulary posts were threatened by the dangerous contiguity of snipers sheltered in networks of dongas beyond them, but the strength of the Boers was not determined till the 17th, when the small British force came suddenly upon a gang of some 800 marauders which had halted at Middelburg. There was nothing to be done but to attack, and that with rapidity, and before the sudden and really splendid rush of Constabulary and Scouts the great Boer mass gave way—their horses stampeded—and many were wounded, while 11 were taken prisoners. But alas for the tide in the affairs of men! It turned at the most critical moment. The Boers, becoming suddenly aware of the small number of their assailants, made haste to rally their forces and boldly lunged back on the British party. Hand-to-hand fighting, ferocious and sustained, followed, during which Captain Morley of the Scouts was dangerously wounded. Back and back went the Constabulary, on and on came the Boers, till they had recovered the 11 prisoners that had been taken from them and secured 14 of the British to boot. In the fierce fray five of our men were wounded and one killed. On the following day an effort was made by Colonel Bewicke Copley to catch the guerillas and punish them, but without avail. He made a forced march from Springs towards Middelburg, but the commando which had wrought such havoc among Captain Wood’s men was nowhere to be seen. Report said it had disappeared towards the south-east, so after dispersing such stragglers as were found hanging about the line of march preparing to locate themselves in the comfortable sniping-places of spruit and donga, he proceeded to Olifantsfontein, whence he sent for further supplies from Springs. At Olifantsfontein he stayed a week, then went to Springs for the purpose of co-operating with Colonel Benson. This officer, owing to some misunderstanding regarding the urgency of the orders calling him west, and being ignorant of the Boer concentration that had been effected on the 17th, moved from Carolina only on the 21st of August. He marched by Vaalbank to Middelkraal; from thence he veered northwards; drew supplies from Middelburg, and again proceeded on his course towards Brakfontein, near the sources of the Wilge River. Here Colonel Bewicke Copley, after a twenty-mile march, had arrived, and here at dawn on the 31st he came in collision with 450 Boers; fought them; wounded Lieutenant Roos of the Staats Artillery and some others; took 7 prisoners, some horses, cattle, and waggons, and sent the rest scattering to the south.
Colonel Benson, too, was doing his share of the Boer-hunting. Hearing that the enemy had gone south towards the upper part of the Waterval Valley, he decided on another of his night marches for the surprise of the foe. Leaving his waggons in charge of the infantry, he led his mounted troops towards the laager at Kroomdraai (west of Ermelo). The pickets were “rushed,” and before the startled Boers could reach their horses, the gallant Scottish Horse plunged in among them. Fourteen prisoners were taken. The late Landdrost of Heidelberg, and Brink, a member of the Special Government Court for the trial of prisoners, were of the number.
At the conclusion of the adventure—in which he captured 12 waggons, 17 Cape carts, 80 horses, 514 cattle, 11 mules, and some supplies—and in consequence of the Boers having escaped beyond pursuit to the south-east, Colonel Benson proceeded early in September to the Delagoa line (Witbank Station), while Colonel Bewicke Copley returned to Springs.
BULLOCK WAGGON CROSSING A DRIFT ON THE UMBELOSI RIVER, SWAZILAND.
Drawing by Donald E. M’Cracken.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL COLVILLE’S OPERATIONS
In August Colonels Colville and Stewart, who had been operating north of Greylingstad, moved to Standerton. On the 10th the last officer entrained for Dundee to reinforce the troops on the north-east frontier of Natal, while Colonel Colville crossed the Klip and established an entrenched camp at Brakpan. He now, with mounted troops and guns, scoured the Upper Klip Valley, penetrated Natal by Muller’s Pass in the Drakensberg, and deposited at Newcastle his stock and prisoners captured during the march. This march was by no means a triumphal progress, for the district was fringed with Boers who sniped by day and brewed mischief by night. The dongas, spruits, and hills afforded them excellent cover, and the men needed nerves of iron to play a livelong game of hide-and-seek with death, which peeped cunningly from every nook and cranny.
Colonel Colville returned viâ Botha’s Pass to De Lange Drift minus many of his gallant men who were wounded in the course of the ordeal, and proceeded to Standerton on the 6th of September.