There was a farm in the valley below us surrounded by trees and vegetation, said to belong to one Botha, and the road wound along from our left rear past this farm, and disappeared in a cleft in the hills in front of us. We all realised that the position held by the enemy was a terribly strong one, and on the flanks it appeared, as far as we could see with our glasses, to run for miles in a similar way; and there did not seem to be any break or change in the surface of the ground opposite to it, which continued to present the same grassy undulating slopes as far as we could see.
On our left, miles away, we could hear an occasional gun fired, and on our right there had been a shot or two from the Artillery; but for the moment all was still and peaceful, so we sat and nibbled our biscuits and waited.
About one o'clock the five-inch gun, from somewhere in our left rear, began shelling Botha's farm and the ridge near it and beyond: they made excellent practice, and searched the slopes of the hill thoroughly. Near the farm there was a sort of cleft in the hills, into which the road ran: we could trace its existence for some little way back into the hill by the brushwood growing on the edge of the cleft, and just now we were watching this place, some of us, with exceeding great interest. The General had ordered two companies to proceed in a short time towards this cleft, to move up it, and then to swing round to the right and take the hill in flank, thus covering the advance of the remainder of the Brigade, who were prolonging the line on our right, and were to attack on the part of the hill previously mentioned, where the grassy slopes were more gentle and ran easily up to the summit.
Now, for all we knew, this cleft might have been full of Boers on all sides, before and behind, and we were not looking forward to what was evidently going to be a nasty piece of work; but the matter was settled, we had got our orders, and we meant to carry them out to the best of our ability, somehow or other. So we watched with renewed interest the shells of a cow gun dropping about on the ridge and the slope of the hill, experiencing feelings of much satisfaction when one or two, as they occasionally did, fell plump into the cleft in the hill, where we hoped crowds of the enemy were concealed. Although not visible, we knew they were there, as shots occasionally came over and struck the ground near us, when anyone incautiously went too far forward, to look at the position.
Towards two o'clock, the General wished a few men sent over in the direction of the farm, to feel our way; so Lieut. Morphett and a section of E company went out, widely extended, and with orders to go to the Farm and signal back any information, and to occupy the walls and hold out at the Farm until reinforcements arrived.
Directly this small party showed themselves over the ridge behind which we were lying, fire was opened on them by the enemy, who on this occasion showed their stupidity in wasting their ammunition in firing at extreme ranges. We could not, of course, see from what point of the hill the firing was coming, but from the direction in which the bullets were dropping and the way the dust flew up, we could see that those of the enemy who were firing were somewhere on our left front. So we got some men out and opened a steady dropping fire on the slopes of the hill to our left, and especially on a row of poplar trees which looked a good place in which to conceal sharpshooters. Our maxim gun came up too, and rained a hail of bullets all over the hillside at varying ranges. This is about all the good this machine gun is in the advance, because, when the actual forward movement takes place, the gun cannot keep pace and is left behind: of course a gun on a light field carriage could be brought on by hand, but, during the campaign, the gun we were supplied with was a huge, cumbrous affair, as big as a field gun and about as heavy. It took two mules to draw it, and all sorts of manœuvres and operations had to be gone through before a single round could be fired. In this respect the pattern of machine gun needs considerable improvement before it will ever be of any sound practical use in the field, with infantry and in the advance, at any rate.
After a while the enemy's fire lessened, although it still continued to some extent, and we could see Morphett and his few men working their way through the trees, and up to and beyond the farm. Soon they signalled to us that all was clear and no enemy at the farm, but reported some to be on a ridge in front of the farm, and in the row of trees to the left, which we had already searched with our fire. So we peppered this row of trees again with the Maxim, but were unable to develope any rifle fire on the ridge, as the distance was rather too great for us to fire over the heads of our men in front—some of the shots might have dropped short.
During this little episode the Derbyshire had been sent miles away to the right, and the City Imperial Volunteers had moved against the slopes of the hill, some way to our right. It was pleasant to watch their advance party skirmishing up the slopes, which became steeper near the top. They did it very well, and we watched them with much interest, pushing their way, well extended, moving slowly so as to keep their breath, going steadily on advancing and gaining a firmer footing all the time, although they must have been in momentary expectation of being engulfed in a torrent of fire. We could see their advanced scouts out in front creeping up to the crest line, and we waited, breathlessly, fearing to hear at any instant the infernal din and clatter of a heavy musketry fire opened on their column. Still they crept on and the supports got closer up, and we were in dread that the Boers were waiting only until the supports came closer up yet, before they opened a furious and disorganising fire as they did at Magersfontein.
At last the skirmishers gained the crest line, and we could see them run forward and disappear over the ridge, followed by the supports and the remainder of the regiment. Curiously enough, the ridge was not held by the Boers, and the advance of the Brigade could take place at once. Our little scheme of attack in the cleft was not, therefore, required, as the C.I.V.'s had gained the summit; but the General sent forward two companies to occupy the hill overlooking the farm.
Why the Boers had neglected to occupy this long ridge and splendid position, I have never been able to understand: there was every point in their favour, except one, and we should have been compelled to make frontal attacks all along the line, at very great loss, no doubt, before we could have got a footing on the ridge.