To recapitulate, its history in this place, and at this period, would be impertinent; with the aid of a slight introduction, and a few connecting remarks, enough of the nature of the transaction for the present purposes may be gathered from the correspondence of Thiers and Panizzi, as given below.
The affair seems to have come under serious diplomatic notice about the beginning of 1842, when Queen Isabella was in the twelfth year of her age. For a rough sketch of its origin, let the following suffice. M. Guizot, apprehensive that if a Prince of other than French or Spanish blood were to share the throne of Spain, France might be placed as it were between two fires, and patriotically wishing to make Spain, so far as possible, dependent upon his own country, insisted on limiting Queen Isabella’s choice of a husband to the descendants of the Bourbon Philip V.; at the same time, however, disclaiming any intention of including among the aspirants to the Queen’s hand any son of the King of the French.
The candidates spoken of at the time were—1st. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg, brother of the Queen of Portugal, and by no means a stranger to French blood, whose claim, if it can be so called, though causing the greatest disquiet to M. Guizot, was more a subject of conversation than reality. Indeed, except for a kind of counter-intrigue of a suspicious character, purporting to be in his favour, this competitor, can hardly be said to have been in the race. 2nd. Prince Metternich’s candidate, the Count de Montemolin, son of Don Carlos, who, although within M. Guizot’s conditions, had but little chance of success from the beginning. The third candidature was that of Count de Trapani, brother of the King of Naples, whose chance, as it turned out, was about equal to that of Count de Montemolin. To complete the list followed Don Francisco d’Assise, Duke of Cadiz, and his brother Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, sons of the Infant Don Francisco de Paula.
The design of the French Minister was communicated by M. Pageot, whom he sent for that purpose, to Lord Aberdeen, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The English Minister heard, with considerable astonishment, and with no little indignation, the unwarrantable proposal to restrict the Spanish Queen’s selection of her consort. He replied, however, that in a matter of a nature so entirely domestic it was not the wish of this country to interfere. M. Pageot thereupon endeavoured to obtain from the Foreign Secretary an expression of a like disinclination to intervene in case Queen Isabella were to fix her choice on her cousin, the Duc d’Aumale. The answer to this invidious hypothesis was that it was based upon a very different footing, and involved the question of the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, as settled by Treaty.
As a matter of fact, Mons. Guizot had thus expressed himself to the Cabinet of England:—“We thought fit to apprise you, as the Ministry of one of the Great European Powers, of our intentions in regard to a political matter, which you may possibly consider of European interest, but in which we, on the other hand, take leave to hold the interest of France to be paramount to all others; and, inasmuch as, in such matter, we, the Government of France, have laid down a course of action, from which, so far as lies in our power, we will suffer no departure. We respectfully request you to give your adhesion to our design, or, if that be impossible to you, at least to remain impartial and inactive.”
Such a policy, subtly conceived, and springing from outre-cuidance, might well arouse patriotic indignation, and in no one would it be more likely to awaken this spirit than in Lord Clarendon. His lordship’s censure of Lord Aberdeen’s conduct, however, expressed in the following letter to Panizzi, seems, to say the least of it, a little severe:—
“The Grove, December 23rd, 1845.
“My dear Panizzi,
I should have sincerely regretted if Palmerston had even thought he had reason to complain of any one of his friends during the late odious transaction; but I am particularly glad that the matter should have been discussed between you and him; for, as you well knew my opinions long before any question of a change of Government, respecting his return to the Foreign Office, and the groundless apprehensions which Thiers entertained upon that subject, you had the opportunity, as I am sure you had the good will, of removing any annoyance which a parcel of stupid newspaper articles (written probably for that purpose) respecting himself and me might have occasioned last week. My firm belief is that energy such as Palmerston’s is at this moment greatly needed at the Foreign Office, and that it would tend, far more than the present system, to an entente really cordial between us and France. I have over and over again told Lord Aberdeen that his predilection for Guizot, and consequent partisanship in France was endangering the peaceful relations between the two countries; because, on the one hand, it rendered hostility to England a natural and necessary weapon of attack against Guizot, and, on the other, this imposed on him the obligation to “faire des niches à l’Angleterre,” in order to prove his independence and keep his portefeuille. It was impossible for Lord John to do without Palmerston, and equally so to expect he would submit to take any other office than the Foreign at the presumptuous dictation of that mauvais coucheur, Lord Grey. With respect to Ellice, I believe that the “out of doors” calumnies are groundless. He is as incapable of wilfully concealing anything it was his duty to have communicated as I feel I should be myself. I never saw more efficient zeal than he manifested throughout the whole of the transactions; and, as I was present when he heard from Lord John of the objection raised by Lord Grey, and was witness to the readiness with which he volunteered to go and bring him to reason, it is impossible to suppose he was playing a double part; but he ought to be made acquainted with these reports, and I am sure he will have no difficulty in effectually disproving them. The reason upon which the embryo Government was broken up will, I am afraid, appear invalid and insufficient to the public; but, for my own part, I cannot regret the result. The undertaking was too vast for the slender means upon which Lord John could rely for success; he could only hope for a doubtful and unhearty support; but, having once embarked in the struggle, he would have been held responsible for all the consequences of failure. After a time, however, I am sure that the country will be glad that the measure should remain in the hands of the only man capable of carrying it, and, deal with it as he may, he must advance Liberal principles, and must break up his party.
Ever yours truly,