... I have been so fortunate as to have an opportunity of at once communicating to a very influential personage the chief points of the conversation I had the honour of holding with the Emperor respecting the want of cordiality, not to say coolness, now unhappily prevailing between France and England, my object being humbly to contribute, as far as might be in my power, to the growth of better feelings. I have dwelt on the earnestness with which His Majesty had expressed himself with respect to the English alliance, and on the warmth with which he had spoken of his affection for this nation. I did not fail to repeat what His Majesty had said of his consciousness of never having done a single act which could be construed as injurious or even unfriendly to England; of his feeling that he had most scrupulously fulfilled his duties as an ally; of his having nothing so much at heart as to be on the most intimate terms with this country, feeling confident that that would be for the advantage of both France and England, whilst it gave him, personally, heartfelt satisfaction.
What I said was extremely well received, and the same wish was expressed as that which had been expressed by His Majesty, that the two countries should always act cordially together; that His Majesty would find England most desirous to cultivate an alliance so eminently advantageous to both nations, provided that could be done without sacrifice to England’s honour and interests, and that on this side of the channel they were not aware of ever having given France any just cause of complaint. But that many things created the impression that France, not satisfied with the eminent position in which she was placed, was striving to extend her influence and possession beyond what was just and fair towards her neighbours. In support of this impression a great many facts were alleged. It was stated that Savoy and Nice were annexed not only against the most explicit professions to the contrary, but on pretence that would justify any other annexation of territories that France might covet. I was, moreover, told that France, knowing how injurious it might be to English interests to alter the territorial arrangements on the coast of Barbary with reference to Gibraltar, had nevertheless encouraged an unjust attack on the part of Spain or Morocco; that France was favourable to the fall and partition of the Turkish Empire, well-knowing that England would oppose this consummation with all her might; that agents were traced to Belgium and other parts, endeavouring to create a party in those populations favourable to the annexation of territories now belonging to other States, to France; that agents had even been found at work in Ireland, that the number of pamphlets published in France directed to prepare the world for extensive territorial alterations in favour of an enlargement of the French Empire, and the belief that many of such pamphlets were published with the approbation, if not at the instigation of the French Government, rendered them apparently an indication of the intentions of that Government. It is only necessary, in conclusion, to advert to the great, constant, and progressive armaments of France, both by land and by sea. As to the latter, Englishmen are convinced they cannot be directed to any other end but eventually to offensive warfare, especially against England. France, they say, cannot want for any defensive purpose so large a navy as she has, to which she is steadily adding; and it is obviously for aggressive purposes that she drills her sailors and troops to embark and disembark with rapidity and precision, and that she builds vessels intended for the transport and landing of large bodies of soldiers. It depends on France, I was told, to be on the very best and most intimate terms with this country, that is, by not acting in a manner which excites well-grounded suspicions of her intentions. There is every disposition on the part of England to meet her more than half way, but if the acts of the Imperial Government are not calculated to inspire confidence, it will be impossible for England not to be on her guard, and prepare herself for any contingencies. As to the accusation that England encourages other powers to coalesce to attack France, I am told it is utterly unfounded. It is positively denied, moreover, that there is any intention of forming any coalition, or even of coming to an understanding for the purpose of injuring France. It is, however, admitted that nations who watch the conduct of France are uneasy for their own security, and that they will probably come to some understanding should it ever come to pass that France becomes aggressive.
In conclusion, I was told, the peace of the world as well as the happiness of mankind, is in the hands of France. If she will not attempt to injure others, no one will think of injuring her; and so far as England is concerned, if France will be satisfied with what is fair and honourable, she may rely on the sincere desire of this country of being on the best terms with her, and of her acting accordingly.
You are at liberty to show this letter to the Minister, and even to place it in his hands should he wish to show it to his august master, who ought to know exactly by what feelings and motives political men are moved in this country towards France.
A good understanding with England must be of some value to France. She has raised the storm; she must do her best to allay it if she have at heart the English alliance.
I hope you will be authorised to answer this letter in a manner that will prepare the way to a lasting return of cordiality on both sides.
Yours, &c., &c.,
A. Panizzi.”
M. Mérimée’s reply partakes much of the style of the special pleader. Whilst he strongly disclaims his belief in the Emperor’s bad faith, as suggested by Panizzi, his defence of Louis Napoleon seems hardly inconsistent with the truth of certain of the allegations. He himself appears to have considered his criticism of English policy the strongest point in his letter:—
“Paris, Samedi 6 Octobre, 1860.