“Leri, October 24th, 1859.
“My dear Panizzi,
Your letter of the 17th inst. was only delivered to me yesterday, too late for me to answer it then. I hasten to do so this morning, though I fear that my reply can hardly reach London before the question of the Congress shall have been decided.
In the present state of affairs, considering the engagements entered into at Villafranca and to a certain extent confirmed at Zurich by the Emperor, it appears evident to me that an European Congress is indispensable. Were there to be no Congress, and were France to prevent the egress of Central Italy from the provisional condition by opposing the stipulated fusions, those countries would be exposed to serious dangers. The eminent men in the Romagna—and there are many such there—might incite Garibaldi to attempt an enterprise in the Marches and perhaps even in the Abruzzi; at Modena the occupation of the trans-Padan Mantuan territory by Austria—an inevitable consequence of the treaty—might give rise to lamentable collisions; Tuscany perhaps might be more patient of an uncertain condition, but even there the intrigues of the reactionaries supported by the priests would probably be the cause of serious perturbations. Hence the interests of Italy absolutely require a Congress, and, if this is plain, England should participate therein both for her own honour and for our benefit. Austria will not oppose her intervention, but will accept her reservations when it is stipulated that nothing is to be said about the provinces retained under Austrian dominion. It is hard for us to renounce a plea in favour of unhappy Venice; still we must repress our deep sympathies for fear of sacrificing the possible for the desirable.
Austria, relieved of apprehension respecting Venice, ought to concur in the English maxim that the wishes of the Italians should be respected. To put this in more diplomatic form it would be sufficient to say that the Powers undertake not to impose by force of arms any form of Government on the people of Central Italy. This is the principle of non-intervention already proclaimed by the Emperor in his writings and in his speeches. Supported by France and by England, and perhaps by Russia too, it will soon be admitted by Austria and accepted by Prussia.
Passing on to the constitution of the Congress, I do not hesitate to declare for the exclusion of the minor Powers. If only the Duchies and Tuscany were concerned their intervention would be advantageous; but as the most difficult—I will say too the most important question—is that of the Romagna provinces, I fear the Pope would find vehement defenders in Spain and in Portugal.
The Congress once assembled, there can be no doubt as to the course of England. She would first of all propose that the wish of the people legally expressed should receive the sanction of Europe. Supposing this proposition to be rejected, the next would be that the people be consulted by means of universal suffrage, to be verified by the members of the Congress. This proposal would find support in France, and would probably be accepted. If it were not, England would have to enter into a negative phase, and to withstand the proposals of Austria and that of France too. The Duke of Modena being abandoned by every one, even his own relations, there will be nothing to oppose but the restoration of the House of Lorraine in Tuscany, the installation of the Duchess of Parma at Modena, and the re-establishment of the Papal dominion in the Romagna provinces.
Such resolutions as these may be resisted, not only on the ground of the popular rights, but also, and still more efficaciously, in the interest of the monarchical principle, and with reference to ideas of order and stability. Unless we wish to see the now stifled revolution revive, menacing and powerful, it must not be confronted by feeble Governments without root in the soil, destitute of both physical and moral force. If we wish to see thrones respected, we ought not to fill them with despised and despicable princes, whose very names are in irritating antagonism to the sentiment—the national sentiment—now dominating in Italy. If the Grand Duke or his son return to Florence, then, in less than a month, Tuscany will be the head quarters of Mazzini and of the belligerent revolution. Perhaps it will be said that the Duchess or Parma is a strong-minded woman, and is not unappreciated. However this may be, the so hateful remembrances of the father could not be effaced, nor could confidence be inspired in the son. Besides, the system of compensations which some would wish to apply in favour of this branch of the Bourbon family is in direct collision with the sentiments and the ideas which now prevail in Europe. The Modenese would be smitten in their dignity if they found themselves allotted by way of jointure to the widow of that rascal, the petty Duke of Parma. Better for them the restoration of their former Sovereign. In that case they would be victims of a false principle; but they would not be treated as a flock of sheep, disposed of as a counterbalance for conditions deemed onerous by one of the contracting parties.
The Treaty of Vienna is odious enough in many parts; but it is not so odious as that of Campoformio.
With regard to the Romagna provinces, it will be easy for England to get the idea of papal reforms scouted. To entertain such an idea is worse than hateful—it is ridiculous. There is no need to be either a great statesman or a great theologian to feel convinced that the Pope not only does not wish but really cannot consent to serious reforms. So long as he is Pope and King he must in conscience employ the powers of the King to enforce the decrees of the Pontiff. The separation of the two authorities is impossible. The Pope cannot consent to the freedom of instruction, nor to the freedom of public worship, nor to the freedom of the press. He cannot tolerate municipal freedom unless this be understood as an authority of the Town Councils to regulate at will the public roads and the manner of paving them. The Pope as Pope will more easily submit to the loss of a province than to the promulgation of the Napoleonic Civil Code in his States. The Papal restoration ought to be prevented at every cost: it is not only an Italian question, but one of European interest. It concerns us, but it also concerns England, Prussia, even Russia, and all countries where the development of civilization is an object, for this requires as an essential condition the absolute separation of the two Powers. If the Pope should obtain a victory in Italy, the presumption and the pride of the Cullens and the McHales would swell beyond bounds, and Europe would be menaced before very long with the danger of religious struggles similar to those of past ages. Let everything be given up rather than sacrifice the Romagna provinces. Their cause is, I say again, the cause of civilization.