“About nine o’clock on the morning of the 21st, the enemy were reinforced by 500 choice troops, under the command of General Cos, increasing their effective force to upward of 1500 men, whilst our aggregate force for the field numbered 783. At half-past three o’clock in the evening, I ordered the officers of the Texian army to parade their respective commands, having in the meantime ordered the bridge on the only road communicating with the Brazos, distant eight miles from the encampment, to be destroyed—thus cutting off all possibility of escape. Our troops paraded with alacrity and spirit, and were anxious for the contest. Their conscious disparity in numbers seemed only to increase their enthusiasm and confidence, and heightened their anxiety for the conflict. Our situation afforded me an opportunity of making the arrangements preparatory to the attack without exposing our designs to the enemy. The first regiment, commanded by Colonel Burleson, was assigned to the center. The second regiment, under the command of Colonel Sherman, formed the left wing of the army. The artillery, under special command of Colonel George W. Hockley, Inspector-General, was placed on the right of the first regiment; and four companies of infantry, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Henry Millard, sustained the artillery upon the right. Our cavalry, 61 in number, commanded by Colonel Mirabeau B. Lamar (whose gallant and daring conduct on the previous day had attracted the admiration of his comrades), completed our line. Our cavalry was first dispatched to the front of the enemy’s left, for the purpose of attracting their notice, whilst an extensive island of timber afforded us an opportunity of concentrating our forces, and deploying from that point, agreeably to the previous design of the troops. Every evolution was performed with alacrity, the whole advancing rapidly in line, and through an open prairie, without any protection whatever for our men. The artillery advanced and took station within 200 yards of the enemy’s breastwork, and commenced an effective fire with grape and canister.
“Colonel Sherman, with his regiment, having commenced the action upon our left wing, the whole line, at the center and on the right, advancing in double quick time, rung the war-cry, ‘Remember the Alamo!’ received the enemy’s fire, and advanced within point blank shot, before a piece was discharged from our lines. Our lines advanced without a halt, until they were in possession of the woodland and the enemy’s breastwork—the right wing of Burleson’s and the left of Millard’s taking possession of the breastwork; our artillery having gallantly charged up within seventy yards of the enemy’s cannon, when it was taken by our troops. The conflict lasted about eighteen minutes from the time of close action until we were in possession of the enemy’s encampment, taking one piece of cannon (loaded), four stand of colors, all their camp equipage, stores and baggage. Our cavalry had charged and routed that of the enemy upon the right, and given pursuit to the fugitives, which did not cease until they arrived at the bridge which I have mentioned before—Captain Karnes, always among the foremost in danger, commanding the pursuers. The conflict in the breastwork lasted but a few moments; many of the troops encountered hand to hand, and, not having the advantage of bayonets on our side, our riflemen used their pieces as war clubs, breaking many of them off at the breech. The rout commenced at half-past four, and the pursuit by the main army continued until twilight. A guard was then left in charge of the enemy’s encampment, and our army returned with our killed and wounded. In the battle, our loss was two killed and twenty-three wounded, six of them mortally. The enemy’s loss was 630 killed ... wounded 208 ... prisoners 730....”
MEXICAN VERSION OF BATTLE
General Santa Anna, in the memoirs of his old age, wrote a brief and untruthful account of the battle of San Jacinto, an alibi blaming General Filisola for the defeat. He said he had ordered Filisola to join him by forced marches, for the attack on Houston’s army, and was waiting for the reinforcements when he found Houston camped on the San Jacinto. He continued:
“At two o’clock in the afternoon of Aprl 21, 1836, I had fallen asleep in the shade of an oak, hoping the heat would moderate so that I might begin the march (to find Filisola), when the filibusterers surprised my camp with admirable skill. Imagine my surprise, on opening my eyes, and finding myself surrounded by those people, threatening me with their rifles and overpowering my person. The responsibility of Filisola was obvious, because he and only he had caused such a catastrophe by his criminal disobedience.”
This is somewhat at variance with an earlier report, in which Santa Anna recounted his own heroic efforts to rally his troops in the battle until “the new recruits threw everything into confusion, breaking their ranks and preventing veterans from making use of their arms, whilst the enemy was rapidly advancing with loud hurrahs, and in a few minutes obtained a victory which they could not some hours before, even have dreamed of.”
Then, El Presidente went on:
“All hopes being lost, and everyone flying as fast as he could, I found myself in the greatest danger, when a servant of my aide-de-camp ... offered me his horse, with the tenderest and most urging expressions insisted on my riding off the field.... I remembered that General Filisola was only seventeen leagues off, and I took my direction toward him, darting through the enemy ranks. They pursued me, and after a ride of one league and a half, overtook me on the banks of a large creek, the bridge over which had been burned by the enemy to retard our pursuit.
ANTONIO LOPEZ de SANTA ANNA