As a coal store for the Royal and mercantile marine, as a dockyard for the refitting of vessels, as a free port for the storage of merchandise, Ceuta would offer the same advantages as Gibraltar in time of peace. As a dépôt for trade with Barbary, it would obviously possess many advantages over the Rock. Nor was this last argument to be despised, when the immense resources of Morocco as a grain-producing country are considered. Her granary is capable of supplying Great Britain with wheat, which could be exported by sea more quickly and cheaply than from elsewhere, and would in a measure relieve the United Kingdom from the risk that, in time of European war, some of the important grain marts of the world may be closed to her.
In case of war, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to victual Gibraltar, as Spain would undoubtedly stop all supplies from entering the fortress from the mainland. No such contingency, on the other hand, could threaten our hold on Ceuta, where plentiful supplies would be available from the mainland both for the use of the garrison and for provisioning the fleet. At Ceuta British ships would find a harbour of refuge in a friendly and neutral country, without being exposed, as they might well be at Gibraltar, to the guns of the enemy on the Spanish coast, and could pass the Straits in safety without approaching within range of a Spanish fortress.
That there would be many and great difficulties in the way of such an exchange was foreseen by Sir John. Not the least of these is the immense expenditure on the fortification of the Rock. This, however, he thought might be met by Spain undertaking to make the necessary alterations and repairs at Ceuta, and, pending the completion of these works, agreeing to allow Great Britain the use of Gibraltar for her ships as heretofore in time of peace or war.
The harbour of Ceuta, in its present state, does not offer the same advantages as that of Gibraltar; but Sir John believed that it was capable of such improvements as would render it thoroughly efficient. Though great expense would be incurred by Great Britain, he thought that the stability which such an exchange would give to the maintenance of the peace of Europe was deserving of consideration.
Finally, it may be remembered that Lord Nelson used to say our naval success in the South of Europe would depend on the friendship of Morocco, or on our obtaining possession of Tangier. He foresaw that any great Power established on a sure footing on the North African coast would practically command the passage of the Straits for seventy miles.
Such were some of the reasons which weighed most strongly with Sir John. His long residence in Morocco, and his genuine interest in its prosperity, led him to advocate the exchange, not merely for the advantage of Great Britain, but also for the benefit of the Moors. He saw in the occupation of Ceuta a means of promoting the welfare of the Sultan’s subjects, and a powerful instrument for pressing upon the Government the reforms for which he so constantly pleaded. In 1865 Sultan Sid Mohammed had introduced certain changes; but these attempts at improvement were too timid to produce any real result.
Three years later (1868), Sir John visited the Sultan’s Court at Fas, and he took every opportunity, afforded by frequent private audiences, of again urging upon his Majesty the necessity of sweeping changes in the judicial, financial, and administrative system of the country.
In a letter written to Sir Henry Layard he speaks of the outspoken advice which he was in the habit of offering to the Sultan, and attributes to his frankness the influence which he enjoyed at the Moorish Court.
This Government is the most miserable in the world, and with the exception of the Sultan himself, who is an honest man without energy, Aji, and one or two others, they are a corrupt and venal set. As long, however, as I am accredited to such a Government, I have thought it my duty to keep on the best terms with all. . . .
Not only my Spanish colleagues, but I may say all in their turn, attribute the good favour in which I am held by the Sultan and his myrmidons to my giving secret counsels in opposition to the demands of Representatives of other Foreign Governments, and thus currying favour. They cannot and will not understand that I have managed to maintain a certain ascendency over the mind of the Sultan, in questions with other Foreign Powers, from the very fact of my never having hesitated in speaking my mind and recommending the most unpalatable concessions. The late Sultan, as also the present, found that when they had not accepted my disinterested advice, troubles ensued and they paid dearly. I therefore still hold my ground at the Court, though Morocco has found itself on more than one occasion, as in the last Spanish war, abandoned by England.