Final Report of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition Commission

by Louisiana Purchase Exposition Commission

The territory originally known as Louisiana was taken possession of by the explorer La Salle in 1682, in the name of Louis XIV, and the first colony was founded by the French at Biloxi in 1699. The vast domain was transferred to Spain, by secret treaty, in 1763, and remained in the possession of that country until 1800, when the King of Spain, during the assistance of Napoleon in the erection of the Kingdom of Etruria for his son-in-law, the Duke of Parma, ceded the Louisiana Territory to France in return for that aid. It was part of Bonaparte's policy and earliest ambition to restore to France all her lost possessions, and by the significant treaty of San Ildefonso, signed by Manual Godoy, the Spanish minister of state (known as the "Prince of Peace"), and Marshal Berthier, minister of France at Madrid, all that vast and vaguely defined territory known as Louisiana, which France had originally transferred to Spain, was reconveyed to France.

Up to the end of the revolution the possession of the Louisiana Territory by one foreign power or another had not touched Americans closely, but now conditions changed. When rumors of the last treaty finally reached the United States, the planters in the Mississippi Valley became alarmed. The laws and customs regulations of the Spaniards at New Orleans were arbitrary, and their business methods antiquated, complicated, and irksome to the colonists, and there had already been friction between them, the Spaniards being aided by Indians hostile to the frontiersmen. The right of deposit was essential to the pioneers who journeyed down the river in their flat-bottom homemade boats; they required a place to store their goods at New Orleans while waiting the arrival of trading vessels. In the early nineties the Spanish authorities closed navigation and refused the right of way to the ocean, but in 1795 a treaty was signed which gave the right of deposit, with certain minor limitations, for three years, and the way to a market was kept open for that period, and thereafter until 1802; that year the Spaniards again withdrew the privilege, and therein lay a potent motive for the acquisition of at least the mouth of the Mississippi River, and, although the immediate demand of these early American settlers was simply an open seaport and waterway to the sea, the Louisiana Purchase was the direct outcome of our strained relations with Spain.

A resolution was offered in Congress authorizing the President to call out 50,000 militia and take possession of New Orleans, but the United States sought security, and a substitute resolution was adopted appropriating $2,000,000 for the purchase of the Floridas and New Orleans, the Floridas being at first the entire cession contemplated, even without the island of New Orleans. The chancellor, Robert R. Livingston, had been appointed as our minister to France at a time when the affairs of that country were in a somewhat precarious condition. Napoleon, then only 34 years old, was dictator, surrounded by enemies. President Jefferson wrote Livingston to make the best terms he could with Napoleon, either for the mouth of the river, site for a city, or place for deposit. He at no time spoke of acquiring the whole tract. Livingston, with great tact and judgment, kept the matter before Napoleon, realizing not only the importance of the small tract originally involved, but the incalculable advantage that would be derived by the United States could the accession of the whole territory be accomplished. He was, therefore, greatly surprised by a question from Talleyrand, in which he was asked "What we would give for the whole tract?" This was followed by a proposition from Napoleon's representative, Marbois, the state treasurer, in which he offered to sell all the Louisiana Territory to the United States for 100,000,000 francs ($20,000,000), with a provision that the United States should pay the claims of American citizens against France for depredations by French privateers, which amounted to 20,000,000 francs ($4,000,000). This offer Livingston declined, and Marbois asked him to name a price. Livingston, after a polite and politic disavowal of any anxiety to seek a larger expansion of territory, cautiously remarked, "We would be ready to purchase, provided the sum was reduced to reasonable limits," but refused to make an offer, postponing the matter until the arrival of Monroe, who, he was informed by the United States Government, had been appointed minister with special powers to negotiate this purchase of New Orleans.

Talleyrand told Livingston that if they gave New Orleans, the rest would be of little value, and Marbois dropped his price to 80,000,000 francs ($16,000,000) and the claims, and later said if we would name 60,000,000 francs and take upon us the American claims to the amount of 20,000,000 more, he would submit the offer to Bonaparte. Our minister declared that sum was greatly beyond our means, and wished Bonaparte reminded that the whole region was liable to become the property of England. The minister of the public treasury admitted the weight of this possibility, but said: "Try if you can not come up to my mark. Consider the extent of the country, the exclusive navigation of the river, and the importance of having no neighbors to disrupt you, no war to dread."

The American minister was not long in deciding to accept Napoleon's proposition to acquire the whole territory, but still waited to conclude negotiations until the arrival in Paris of Monroe.

The great treaty was, in its essential elements, the work of three days. On April 11 Talleyrand asked Livingston "whether he wished to have the whole of Louisiana?" On April 12 Monroe arrived, but was too ill to attend a conference. Livingston again saw Talleyrand, and on April 13 two conferences took place between Marbois and Livingston, lasting several hours and ending at midnight, in which both negotiators agreed upon a treaty of transfer and acquisition, leaving open the amount to be paid. Upon this point they did not widely differ. Livingston's memorable midnight dispatch, dated Paris, April 13, 1803, and finished at 3 o'clock in the morning, gives the authentic official history of the Louisiana purchase treaty. The Livingston letters tell that the decision to sell Louisiana was reached on Sunday, April 10, after Napoleon had had a prolonged conference with Talleyrand, Marbois, and others. The idea of selling originated in the active brain of Napoleon. It was opposed by Talleyrand, Berthier, and others, but Napoleon contemplated war with England, and needed funds. The Louisiana Purchase tract was so far away and would require so much money and so many men to protect it, that, in his estimation, it was probably better to dispose of it at a good price rather than hold, and he feared, in the event of war, which was imminent, he would lose the colony of Louisiana within sixty days after he took possession. The treaty of Amiens was at an end; Austria was threatening; a British fleet was in the West Indies; he was disgusted at the disastrous campaign in Santo Domingo, angry with Spain, and desired to be free for new campaigns in Europe. The First Consul, impressed by our minister's social rank in his own country, no less than by his merciless logic and solid understanding, had given his promise that debts due for the spoliation of our commerce should be paid. This promise, of which he was again reminded, could only be kept by realizing on sale of public lands, as he had no other resource. Small wonder that he wished to be rid of the whole irritating subject of Louisiana.

Monroe, on his arrival in Paris, found that the negotiations for the purchase were already far advanced by Minister Livingston. Owing to the illness of the special envoy, he was not presented to the First Consul until May 1, and hence, as a negotiator, had nothing officially to do with the treaty, which was virtually negotiated April 13, and finally concluded April 30. On that day the treaty was signed in the presence of Napoleon by Marbois and the two American representatives, and when the negotiations were completed Napoleon made the following prophecy: "This accession of territory strengthens forever the power of the United States. I have given England a rival."

The agreement, in the form of a treaty, reached Washington July 14 for ratification. Congress was called in special session October 17; the treaty was confirmed by the Senate after two days of discussion; a resolution was passed, to take effect immediately, but only after much opposition. Many persons were strongly opposed to the purchase, condemned the acquisition of a wilderness, and expressed their belief that the territory was not worth the price to be paid, and that its control would be difficult and unprofitable.

The exact cost ultimately agreed upon was 64,000,000 francs in the form of United States 6 per cent bonds, representing a capital of $11,250,000. In addition to this, the American Government agreed to assume and pay the obligations of France to American citizens for French attacks upon American shipping. These were estimated at 20,000,000 francs, or $3,750,000, making the total payment $15,000,000. The tract comprised 554,000,000 acres. Napoleon sold the territory for 2 cents an acre, or 10 acres for one franc. When the negotiations were pending, Marbois expressed to Napoleon the difficulty of reaching a definite conclusion as to boundary. When Talleyrand was questioned as to boundaries, he returned evasive answers, and said he did not know, and when pressed to be more explicit, said: "You must take it as we received it." "But what did you mean to take?" asked Livingston. "I do not know," replied Talleyrand. "Then you mean that we shall construe it our own way?" said Livingston again, to which Talleyrand made final reply: "I can give you no direction. You have made a noble bargain for yourselves, and I suppose you will make the most of it."

When we consider that Jefferson at one time was willing to give $2,000,000 for New Orleans alone, we can marvel that so vast an empire as the whole province should come to us for the price paid. We can afford to overlook any defects in the treaty details and forever hold in gratitude the illustrious men who, by their diplomatic skill, their earnestness of purpose, and well-directed efforts, achieved one of the greatest triumphs in the world's history. It well justified the assertion of Minister Livingston as he placed his name to the treaty of cession, and rising and shaking hands with Monroe and Marbois, said: "We have lived long; but this is the noblest work of our lives."