As we proceeded we have noted more than one of these transpositions. It may perhaps not be useless to make a recapitulation of them here, without, however, claiming for it perfect completeness.
| Metaphysical Philosophy. | Positive Transpositions. | |
|---|---|---|
| I. Distinction between potentiality and reality. | I. Distinction between the statical and the dynamical points of view, or between order and progress. | |
| II. Principle of finality. | II. Principle of the conditions of existence. | |
| III. Theory of innateness. | III. Definition of human nature as immutable, evolution creating nothing, but bringing out the latent potentialities in that nature. | |
| IV. The idea of the universe. | IV. The idea of the world. | |
| V. All the phenomena of the universe are related to one another. | V. The idea of humanity is the only really universal conception, because the conditions of existence of human societies are in a necessary relation, not only with the laws of our organisation, but also with all the physical and chemical laws of our planet, and the mechanical laws of the solar system. | |
| VI. The Aristotelian theory of science, (knowledge through causes, a priori), and Cartesian theory, (deductive knowledge starting from the simple). | VI. Science consists in substituting rational prevision to the empirical establishment of facts. | |
| VII. The principles of mathematics are synthetical a priori propositions. (Kant). | VII. Geometry and mechanics are natural sciences, and pure analysis can never establish their principles. | |
| VIII. The order of the universe is the basis of moral order: (Stoics, Spinoza, Leibnitz). | VIII. The conduct of man is regulated externally by the whole of the laws of the world in which he lives. | |
| IX. The history of humanity is directed by a providential wisdom. | IX. The evolution of humanity is accomplished according to a law. | |
| X. The notion of a natural law does not necessarily imply a mechanism. | X. The various orders of natural phenomena are irreducible and nevertheless convergent, the real becoming richer at each new degree. | |
| XI. Theory of the immortality of the soul. | XI. Theory of the “subjective existence,” or of survival in the consciousness of others. | |
| XII. Rational theology. | XII. The positive science of Humanity. |
This list might easily be prolonged. Once again it shows us that, in the history of philosophy as in history in general, the result of the most apparently radical revolutions is not so much to abolish as to transform. Thus, Kant’s philosophy might seem to be entirely opposed to that of Leibnitz. Yet we see that the metaphysics of Leibnitz is to be found almost in its entirety in Kant. Of this dogmatic philosophy Kant has preserved the doctrine. He only rejected its dogmatism; which, as a matter of fact, was of capital importance. In the same way, positive philosophy has often been presented as the formal negation of the philosophy which preceded it. When we verify this, we nearly always find them both concerned with the same problems, and often reaching analogous solutions. Here again it is only a question of transposition; an extremely serious one it is true, on account of all that it implies.
Errors of interpretation are very often due to a lack of historical perspective. Once they have been formulated and adopted by current opinion they are difficult to rectify. Time is needed in order that beneath superficial differences, deep seated resemblances may appear. During many years Kant was in all sincerity looked upon as a sceptic in France. Those who criticised him could not conceive how any one could give up metaphysical dogmatism, without at the same time abandoning the doctrines which had been cast in the metaphysical form before Kant. In the same way, in the eyes of most of his adversaries, Comte’s system must have appeared as the very negation of philosophy, because the terms “philosophy” and “relative” seemed incompatible to them. But this system, which is an effort to realise, from the point of view of positive science, the unity of the understanding, and the “perfect logical coherence,” in reality ends by putting the traditional problems of philosophy in a form suitable to the spirit of our age.
IV.
If the relationship between Comte’s philosophy and the doctrines which preceded it is sufficiently evident, it does not follow that this philosophy has brought with it nothing new. On the contrary, the “transposition” of problems and the constant effort to substitute the relative to the absolute point of view, entails serious consequences with very far reaching effects. Some of these were at once apparent, and first served to characterise positive philosophy in the eyes of the public. Others, more remote, but no less important, appeared more slowly.
The negative consequences almost alone attracted attention at first. The chief characteristic of the new philosophy seemed to be the denial of the legitimacy and even of the possibility of metaphysics in all its forms: rational psychology, the philosophical theory of matter and of life, rational theology, etc. It seemed also to deny the possibility of introspective psychology, of ethics in its traditional form, as well as of logic. In a word, one after another, it excluded all the parts of what constituted a “course of philosophy.” No wonder, then, if this doctrine which took the name of “positive” appeared to be chiefly negative.
However, in reality, the negation only affected the so-called “rational” or “philosophical sciences.” Comte reproached them with what Aristotle calls τὸ κένως ζητεῖν. Stringently applying the principle of the relativity of knowledge, he refused to admit anything absolute. He was therefore perfectly true to himself in rejecting doctrines founded upon metaphysical principles. But this entirely negative aspect of his philosophy is very far from being the one according to which we can best understand it. Truly speaking, it is only preparatory, and historians have often committed the mistake of allowing people to believe that it is essential. “We only destroy what we replace,” said Comte.
The question was not to ruin but to transform the psychological, moral and social sciences. As we have seen, positive philosophy does not deny the possibility of a psychology.
On the contrary, it establishes that psychical phenomena, like the others, are subject to laws, and that these laws must be looked for by the positive method. It only rejects the psychology of the ideologists as abstract, and that of Cousin as metaphysical. It claims that, in presence of the phenomena which he is studying, the psychologist should assume the same attitude as the biologist or the physicist, that any search after cause or essence should be carefully avoided, that any metaphysical or ethical after-thought should be set aside. Then a science of physical phenomena will be established; still it will only be able to study the highest mental functions in the “universal subject,” in humanity. If we wish to do so, we may continue to call it by its traditional name, although it is to the old psychology only what the chemistry of our day is to alchemy.