When the Italian troops took over this sector from the Serbs in December, 1916, it was almost completely unprotected. The Serbs had not had time to carry out important defensive works, and had limited themselves to digging those small holes in the earth or rock which I have already described. General Petitti at once set to work to fortify the area, and his work was continued, completed and extended by General Mombelli. During the period of our occupation, over 100 km. of trenches and communication trenches, two metres deep, were dug, 500 caverns cut out of the rock as shelters, and 120 km. of wire entanglements laid down. All this vast labour was accomplished by troops who were supposed to be at rest, for while two of the brigades were in the line the third was employed in preparing these defences.

During the early days of the campaign there was a tendency, as on all other fronts, to concentrate the largest possible number of men in the front line defences, but later the opposite tendency prevailed, viz. that the first lines should be held by an indispensable minimum of troops only, the rest of the forces being kept in reserve in well-protected shelters, ready to hasten forward at the moment of attack, and that powerful second and third lines of main resistance should be constructed. In this way the constant drain of small losses when there was no real fighting going on was avoided, and at the same time the consequences of a possible break-through in the first line were guarded against, as the enemy, in attacking the second lines would have been exposed to the fire of batteries which could easily find their range on ground perfectly well known to them. It was General Mombelli who reconstructed and reinforced the second line and created the third, which was the most powerful of the three, ex novo. The enemy knew very little about these defences behind the first line, and, in fact, on a German Staff map found on a prisoner, whereas the first line is represented with a fair amount of accurate detail, the second is barely sketched and in an inaccurate manner, while the third is merely hinted at with the indication “old Bulgarian trenches.” This is one of the signs that the enemy was less well-informed about the Allied armies than was generally supposed.

The Italian front in Macedonia had, as we have seen, an extension of 15 km., afterwards reduced, with the diminution of strengths, to about 12. Several times, especially during Sarrail’s régime, the C.A.A. tried to induce the Italian Command to extend the line towards the right, but all the three generals who successively commanded the Italian expeditionary force refused to do so, there being no reason for making the 35th Division occupy a sector wholly out of proportion to its strength as compared with those held by other Allied forces; the fact that the sector in question was one of the hardest and had the most difficult communications, so that all movements from one point to another were anything but simple, had also to be considered. The C.A.A., in fact, ended by dropping the matter.[20] It was not until the summer of 1918 that we again somewhat extended our front in view of the coming offensive. As compared with conditions in Italy the Italian front in Macedonia was certainly less deadly, but in some respects it was one of the most objectionable. Unlike the troops in Italy, those in Macedonia were to a very large extent precluded from leave, and at the time of the Armistice there were no less than 30,000 men, out of a total of 50,000, who, although entitled to leave, were unable to avail themselves of the privilege; among them there were 6,000 who had been at the front for twenty-five months on end without leave. When General Mombelli took command, eleven months after the arrival of the force, no one had been on leave at all from Macedonia, and many had been at the front for many months in Italy before crossing the sea. It was at that time believed that leave for the troops in Macedonia was impossible, because they must not be exposed to the risks of the long sea-crossing when it was not absolutely indispensable, while even the journey via Santi Quaranta by lorry (which involved a shorter crossing) seemed too complicated and difficult. But General Mombelli realized the enormous importance of leave, even if comparatively few men had a chance of enjoying it; the mere thought of not being cut off from all hope of leave exercised a very great and beneficial effect on the moral of the troops. He therefore succeeded in overcoming the thousand obstacles in his way and organized the transport of leave parties by lorry via Santi Quaranta. This was one of his services to the 35th Division, and one which made him particularly popular with the men.

Yet in spite of the moral and material suffering, the unhealthy climate, malaria, the constant small losses, and the long enervating inaction, whenever there was something to be done, the men went to the attack with the most admirable dash. Their moral always remained high, and there was never among the Italian soldiers any movement of revolt or even an outward expression of discontent such as occurred among certain French units, not to speak of the Greeks and Russians, among whom mutinies were frequent.

CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS IN THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

From the capture of Monastir to the great offensive of September 1918, there were no notable changes in the situation of the two opposing armies. This does not mean that there were no military operations; there were indeed quite a number of them, some fairly important, but they produced no practical results of great moment, and the line which was stabilized in November, 1916, changed but slightly during the next twenty-two months. The Germans declared themselves satisfied with this state of things, because they considered that the Allied troops in Macedonia were immobile and therefore prevented from being sent to other fronts. Events were to prove the Germans in the wrong, but even in the Entente countries, there were persons who continued to insist, ever more strongly, on the uselessness of the Eastern campaign.

The autumn operations came to an end with the capture of Monastir, after which the enemy was not vigorously pursued, partly owing to the wish of General Sarrail himself, who was always more influenced by political considerations regarding Greece than by military conditions, and partly on account of the exhaustion of the troops. The Armée d’Orient had thus conquered the important positions on the Cerna only by half. The town of Monastir was in the hands of the French, but the heights immediately to the N.W., N. and N.E., which dominated it, were still held by the enemy. In the Cerna loop, we occupied part of Hill 1050, but as we have seen, the enemy held the topmost ridge which dominated our positions, and many of our trenches could be enfiladed. The same conditions obtained in the eastern half of the loop held by the French. The Serbs, too, especially the units of the II Army, were dominated by the enemy, and so also were the British to the west and east of Lake Doiran. The situation was certainly not satisfactory for the Allies, and the events in Roumania, where the Austrians, Germans and Bulgarians had proved completely victorious, might at any moment be followed by the arrival of enemy reinforcements on the Macedonian front and consequently by a general attack. General Sarrail, in his memoirs, attributes the suspension of the operations to the losses suffered by all the Allies, particularly by the French and Serbs, to the inorganic plans of the British and to their small desire to risk fresh operations, to the want of energy of the Italians, due to orders from Rome to General Petitti not to act but to limit himself to being present, and to a divergence of views between the two Russian generals. In reality, the primary cause was, as usual, the want of confidence in General Sarrail on the part of the Allied commanders subordinate to him, and even on the part of some of the French commanders, and to his own want of energy in not seizing the opportune moment, after the fall of Monastir, when the enemy was in full retreat and demoralized. He might then have occupied the heights dominating the town and constituted a far better defensive line, whence it would have been possible, later on, to launch a fresh offensive in more favourable conditions. But he let the occasion slip by, and the enemy, who had been beaten but not crushed, had time to reorganize and reinforce themselves in their positions, rendering them practically impregnable.

We have seen what was the distribution of the Armée d’Orient after the fall of Monastir. Some units of the Army were not yet available—the 16th French Colonial Division, which had been sent out from France, had not yet all landed—the 60th British Division was at Ekaterini to watch the Greeks, and a Serbian division was performing a similar duty at Grevena. At this time (December, 1916) the conditions of the Serbian Army were causing anxiety. General Boyovich had requested that it should all be brought into the second line, as it was thoroughly exhausted. General Sarrail was unable to satisfy his wish, save in the case of three divisions. The most serious aspect of the situation was the internal political crisis through which the Serbian officers were passing. General Sarrail himself telegraphed to Paris on January 3, 1917: “Influential partisans of Black Hand have been sent to Bizerta. Commander Morava Division, several Brigade Commanders, Chief of Staff Shumadia Division, Assistant Chief of Staff III Army have been relieved of their positions.”[21] Soon after he telegraphed that, according to a Serbian order: “In consequence of plot some officers have been cashiered and will be replaced by officers friendly to present régime.” He also mentioned that several regicide officers to whom the present Dynasty owed the throne had been punished. “Movement among officers seems to continue—colonel who ripped open Queen Draga’s corpse has been imprisoned.” In March he telegraphed that there had been a new plot against the Prince Regent, and that he believed that shots had been fired at him. Later this statement was confirmed. It was a conspiracy on the part of officers affiliated to the secret societies, and who wished to murder the Prince Regent and to accept the Austrian peace proposals. The movement was crushed, and several officers condemned to death or imprisonment.

In Albania, the situation was still insecure and chaotic. The Italian XVI Corps was spread over the area from the mouth of the Voyussa to the neighbourhood of Liaskoviki. Along the lower Voyussa there were regular defensive lines, but beyond there were only isolated posts and mobile detachments composed largely of Albanian irregulars. Opposite the Italians was the XIX Austro-Hungarian Corps composed of the 47th Division and the 1/19th Gruppenkommando, which extended to the neighbourhood of Lake Ochrida. There was not yet any liaison between our XVI Corps and the Armée d’Orient.

North of Koritza towards Pogradetz on Lake Ochrida, there were some Austrian forces, about a brigade, and some Bulgarian detachments; it was always feared that these troops might menace the left flank of the French. The latter therefore wished to extend their occupation so as to establish a connexion with our troops in Albania, who, throughout the autumn of 1916, had been advancing from the coast towards the interior. Besides the Austrians and Hungarians, there were several Albanian bands enrolled by the celebrated Salih Butka between Koritza and Tchafa Kiarit, and those of Hussein Nikolitza between Koritza and Ersek. General Sarrail thought it advisable to reinforce the garrison at Koritza, where he sent the 76th Division, recently arrived from France, so as to ward off any danger on the part of the Albanian bands and the Austro-Bulgarian detachments, and also to menace the right flank of the enemy’s forces in Macedonia. He communicated with General Ferrero, Commander of our troops in Albania by wireless and by means of flying officers, and thus a common Franco-Italian operation was arranged to commence on February 17th, with the object of freeing the road between Koritza and Ersek. But General Sarrail also wished to extend his own operation area in Albania, perhaps with a view to having something with which to negotiate in his dealings with M. Venizelos, and therefore, in spite of the agreement with General Ferrero, he commenced operations before the date established, and began his advance from Koritza on the 15th. After a small skirmish with the Albanian bands he occupied Kamenitza, Hill 907, to the right and to the left of the Ersek road, on the 16th Tchafa Kiarit, Helmiz, and Lubonia, sending reconnaissances as far as Ersek, and on the 17th the French infantry, under General de Vassart, met our troops under Colonel Rossi at Ersek. General Sarrail wished Ersek to remain in possession of the French troops, and had tried to obtain this result by means of the little trick of anticipating the date for commencing operations. In his memoirs he states that he had asked General Ferrero’s permission to occupy Ersek and that the latter refused, saying: “Ersek must be left for the Italians.” In reality it had always been agreed that Ersek was to be included in our area, and General Sarrail knew it. Otherwise he would not have made the above-mentioned attempt. He ended by recognizing his error, or rather, he threw the blame on the commander of the detachment operating towards Tchafa Kiarit, who, according to the General, had acted on his own initiative.