At the time of the expedition to Greece the effects of revolutionary ideas among the Russian troops became even more visible, the conduct of the men being disgracefully undisciplined and scandalous. Then there were rumours of “fraternization” at the front between Russians and Bulgarians, and, although no very serious incidents seem to have occurred, the mere possibility of them was in itself alarming. The 7th and 8th Regiments gave most signs of insubordination and demoralization, and one of the most culpable individuals appear to have been Colonel Mindru, the Commander of the 7th Regiment, who hoped to make himself popular by placing himself at the head of the revolutionary movement. General Dietrich, an excellent officer, had been recalled to Russia in the summer of 1917, and after a series of temporary Commanders, General Taranowski had arrived at the beginning of November to take command of the division. But by that time the Bolshevik revolution was triumphant, and the Russian division was going to pieces. At the beginning of January 1918, the Soviets of the 3rd, 7th and 8th Regiments demanded to be withdrawn to the second line, whereas the 4th was ready to remain in the trenches. The more insubordinate elements were sent to North Africa to perform almost forced labour. The others were offered the choice of either continuing to fight or of working in Macedonia as paid labourers. A small minority requested to be sent to fight, and were shipped off to France where they were incorporated in the Russian legion, and so did those of Polish nationality, who joined the Polish Legion. Some of the others agreed to work, but the great majority would neither fight nor work, and these were consequently forced to work, practically as prisoners of war. It is not likely that the French officers and men who had charge of them were particularly tender towards these blackguards who had betrayed the cause of the Entente and were responsible for the indefinite prolongation of the war, to the total advantage of the German.

Gradually the Russian Division was dissolved, by no means a simple matter, owing to the administrative chaos in which its officers had left it. The Russian officers remaining in Macedonia or relegated to Greece did not, save a few exceptions, give a very edifying spectacle of themselves. They continued their unseemly riotous living, extravagantly spending money obtained no one knew how, and bombarded the French Intendance, to whom the liquidation of the force was entrusted, for increases of salary, advances, demobilization bonuses, etc. The total number of Russian troops in Macedonia had been about 15,000, so that their disappearance constituted an appreciable reduction of effectives.

The discipline of the French troops of the A.F.O. under Sarrail’s régime had been getting worse and worse, as was proved by the mutinies which occurred in the 57th Division. The immediate cause of the trouble was the impossibility of granting leave to the majority of the men who were entitled to it. Salonica was full of soldiers on their way home on leave, but who could not depart owing to the scarcity of tonnage. The worst disorders occurred among the men of the 242nd Infantry Regiment, who after the end of their period of rest, refused to return to the trenches. The Command was not in a position to apply extreme measures, and had to adopt sometimes the strong and sometimes the gentle manner. Order was, however, finally re-established, and the last ninety mutineers were surrounded and disarmed without bloodshed (July 1917). Similar incidents occurred in the 2bis Zouaves. General Sarrail attributed the trouble to the officers who had, he declares, first encouraged them and then tried to keep in the background.[36]

All these episodes were signs of a very unsatisfactory spirit, and were calculated to make the French Government ever more doubtful of Sarrail’s military qualities. Another incident was now to prove the last straw. We have already spoken of General Sarrail’s situation with regard to the Allies and to French policy. Partly from a legitimate desire to see the Armée d’Orient treated with more consideration and adequately supplied with reinforcement and material, but still more from his incorrigible tendency to political intrigue, he tried, while M. Briand was still in office, to provoke a political campaign against him in France, as he considered him responsible for the troubles of his Army and attributed to his influence the fact that the French Government often gave way to the Allies in matters concerning the Macedonian Campaign. He had sent to Paris a report on the Armée d’Orient whose conditions he described in the darkest colours, insisting that this state of things should be remedied adequately, so as to avoid an otherwise inevitable disaster. So far there was, of course, no harm. But when the Bonnet Rouge scandal broke out it appeared from the papers of the traitor Almereyda that he had had a copy of the Sarrail report in his hands and that he had communicated it to agents of the German Government, who thus came to know the state of weakness of the Macedonian force; had the enemy been in a position to act upon this knowledge the Macedonian campaign might have ended in a very disastrous manner. But who had communicated the precious document to Almereyda? It was discovered in the course of the inquiry that he had received it from a certain Sergeant Paix-Séailles, a journalist and politician, who in all probability ignored the fact that Almereyda was a traitor, but wished to make use of him for the campaign against M. Briand. Paix-Séailles had obtained the document from Captain Mathieu, an officer attached to the Staff of General Sarrail. Mathieu took upon himself the whole responsibility for the affair, and received a disciplinary punishment from the court martial, but it was impossible to eliminate the general conviction that he would never have made such use of so confidential a document if he had not been authorized to do so by his Chief, whose full confidence he enjoyed and whose hostility to Briand was notorious. About the same time the famous Caillaux dossier came to light, in which was a plan for the appointment of General Sarrail as Commander-in-Chief of the French Army; the appointment was to be made after the coup d’état which Caillaux was contemplating. Even if Sarrail himself had no knowledge of this scheme, the mere fact that his name appeared among the persons in whom Caillaux had confidence made a very bad impression.

On November 13th the Painlevé Cabinet fell and was succeeded by that of M. Clemenceau. To the latter the Allied Ministers, in the Versailles meeting of December 2nd, communicated all the complaints against Sarrail. M. Clemenceau studied the various files concerning him very carefully, and thus became acquainted with the above-mentioned episodes. In spite of the pressure of the General’s political friends, Clemenceau had the courage to cut the Gordian knot without hesitating; on December 7th Sarrail received his order of recall, on the 22nd he left Salonica, and after a series of inquiries he was placed on the retired list.

His departure was welcomed with a sense of relief and satisfaction by all the Allies, and even among the French officers it caused no regret, save in a small group of persons in his immediate entourage who had taken advantage of his friendship to obtain exceptional promotion and other advantages for themselves. With General Sarrail his Chief of the Staff, General Michaud, also departed.

CHAPTER XII
GENERAL GUILLAUMAT

General Sarrail was succeeded by General Guillaumat. The latter was a man of very different stamp. A good soldier and a thorough gentleman, he immediately acquired an authority over the other Allied Commanders such as had never been enjoyed by his predecessor. In France he had given proof of high military qualities, but he remained a short time in Macedonia and had no opportunity of carrying out an offensive. His earnestness of purpose and conduct, however, which were soon made manifest, argued well for the future, and while the merit of the victory is justly attributed to General Franchet d’Espérey, the plan of operations is due, in no small part, to General Guillaumat. Above all he restored the discipline of the A.F.O., which had been badly shaken under the unfortunate Sarrail régime. He brought a new Chief of the Staff with him, General Charpy, who was certainly superior to General Michaud, but he was to prove not too friendly towards the Italians; he retained his post until after the end of the campaign.

The Commander of the A.F.O. was also changed in the autumn of 1918, but for other reasons. General Grossetti was forced to leave Macedonia owing to a serious illness, which had a fatal ending; he left an excellent memory of himself, for his fine military qualities and his character. He was succeeded by General Régnault, late Commander of a group of divisions in Macedonia; he in his turn was succeeded by General Henrys. With the successive Commanders of the A.F.O. our relations were always cordial and friendly, even when they were less so with the C.A.A. It was in fact much easier for two fine soldiers such as Generals Petitti and Mombelli to agree with fighting leaders endowed with qualities similar to their own than with Generals whose attention was largely monopolized by political affairs.